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THEOLOGY OF CREATION
AND NATURAL SCIENCE

WOLFHART

PANNENBERG

Half a century ago Karl Barth wrote in the preface to his treatment of creation
in his Church Dogmatics (III/1, 1945), that there are "absolutely no scientific
questions, objections or supports concerning what Scripture and the Christian
Church understand to be God's work of creation." Such a restriction of the theology of creation to a "retelling" of what the Bible tells us about this subject, has
its price and the price to be paid here was that it could no longer be made clear,
in how far the biblical faith in creation means the same world that the human
race now inhabits and that is described by modern science. The affirmation that
the God of the Bible created the world degenerates into an empty formula, and
the biblical God himself becomes a powerless phantom, if he can no longer be
understood as the one who originates and completes the world as it is given to
our experience. For this reason one should not agree with Barth, but rather with
Karl Heim in his attempt to relate theological affirmations on creation and final
consummation of the world to the respective conceptions of contemporary science (1953). In the context of English theology a theological appropriation of
Darwin's doctrine of evolution was developed as soon as 1889 in the famous volume Lux Mundi, edited by Charles Gorn, where the biblical conception of a history of salvation culminating in the event of incarnation was combined with the
modern evolutionary perspective, and this view has been effective until the present day together with related ideas issuing from the work of Teilhard de
Chardin .
In spite of all the difficulties of a theological interpretation of the natural
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world, Christian theology must not evade the task of interpreting the same world that
is described by scientists to be in fact the creation of God. It is not enough to simply
affirm the world to be God's creation, but such a theological affirmation has to be
made plausible. This is not to suggest that theology should enter the discussions
among scientists on their level of scientific description and theory. Theological interpretation of the world of nature in terms of creation cannot want to present itself as
competing with physics or with any other natural science. Claims like that are excluded by the fact that theological arguments move on another methodological level than
the hypotheses of natural law in the sciences and their examination by experiment do.
From a theological perspective the reality of the world presents itself in the form of a
unique and irreversible historical process which is the result and expression of divine
action. Certainly, in the process of this history there emerge uniformities and structural types of sequences of natural events that correspond to the scientific concept of
natural law. In the book of Genesis it said after the story on the flood: "While the
earth remains, seedtime and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, day and
night, shall not cease" (Gen. 8:22). Such regularities of natural processes, however,
are themselves considered as products of a unique divine decision, not as evidence of
a timeless order of nature. The theological focus on the historically unique and on the
irreversible process of history is also related to the fact that theology does not conceive of space and time in the sense of homogeneous sequences of spatial and temporal units-sequences
that can be geometrically constructed, counted, and measured.
The mathematical form of representing and describing natural processes and the scientific concept of law belong together. The absence of mathematical descriptions in
theology, on the other hand, does not only express the inability of theologians, but
also corresponds to the peculiarity of the theological subject matter and its appropriate treatment.
Now the question arises, whether theology exemplifies a qualitative way of describing reality, such as has been so often reduced in the history of modern science to a
quantitative and consequently mathematical way of description. The ideas of the biblical reports on creation about the sequence in the emergence of natural forms have
been indeed replaced in modern science by conceptions which are based on quantitative descriptions of processes regulated by natural law. Should this tendency be generally valid concerning the relationship between theology and science? The American
physicist Frank Tipler of New Orleans claims in his recent book, The Physics of
Immortality, that theology finally has to be absorbed in physics. In his book, he tries to
show that the history of the universe tends towards an omega point, which is characterized by peculiar properties of the traditional concept of God and does not only function as the result, but also as creative origin of the movement of the universe, and there
is occasion for an identical repetition of all forms of intelligent life in the dimension of
eternity . Professor Tipler accounts for these claims by a proposed theory of scientific
cosmology . The educated layman cannot help being impressed, but he or she is also
impressed by the multitude of different models of scientific cosmology produced over
the last decades. Cosmology , to all appearance, is a highly speculative discipline . But
how is theology to be expected to relate to the possibility of those arguments?

I think that attempted transformations of theology into physics should be observed
with curiosity on the one hand, but also with a certain degree of skepticism on the
other. Curiosity and openness are appropriate, since even tentative constructions of
this kind of work against the widespread prejudice that theological and scientific conceptions are unrelated-a
prejudice the effect of which is usually that theology seems
to be irrelevant concerning our understanding of the reality we inhabit. Skepticism,
however, is appropriate because of the apparent incommensurability between the scientific conception of natural law and the theological approach to reality. Could
indeed the conception of the world in terms of a unique and irreversible history of
ever new and contingent events including the idea of God providing their origin, and
of Christian eschatological hope, be dissolved without important remnant into a
description of the world process on the basis of natural law? Even at this point I see
no basis for theological anxieties. After all, there is the historical parallel of
Aristotelian physics, the objects of which included the existence of God, though not
of a future resurrection of the dead . A proper conception of God as creative origin of
the natural universe, to be sure, had to describe the creation of the world by starting
from God as origin of it rather than dealing with God as an exponent of the cosmic
process. In Christian theology, such a comprehensive knowledge of creation that
would comprise all the different aspects of created reality is not expected before the
final consummation of the world in connection with the eschatological vision of the
glorified ones. Until then it seems likely that human knowledge about the world will
develop under conditions of human finitude and therefore in the form of conjectures
only and by way of their examination and revision. In a reverse argument, Christian
theology seeks to conceive of God as creator of the world on the basis of His revelation in Jesus Christ. But in doing this, theology is not in a position to explain in detail
the processes in the natural world.
The aim of reaching an agreement between the theology of creation on the one
hand and the scientific knowledge about the world of nature on the other , may be
indicated, then, more properly by the term consonance between the two perspectives
than by way of reducing one of them to the other. Consonance presupposes the
absence of contradiction. But it requires more than that. Contradictions can be
absent, simply because ideas stand unrelated , one beside the other. Consonance, however, implies the image of some harmony and consequently of a positive relationship.
How can such a consonance be claimed with respect to affirmations that belong to
quite different methodological levels? In such a case, it is necessary to look for a third
level, which the two others are related to . In the case of the dialog between science
and theology such a third level has indeed always existed. It is the level of philosoph y.
Whenever scientists talk about the relevance of their findings and theoretical formulas in view of our understanding of reality, they move in the medium of philosophical reflection on procedures and results of their science, but no longer on the level of
scientific argument in the strict sense . Reflections on the relationship between natural
law and the contingency of events, between causality and freedom, matter and energy,
the concepts of time and space or evolution take place inevitably in a medium that is
impregnated with philosophical language and its history . Furthermore , in most cases
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the key concepts of science have philosophical origins and underwent modifications
in order to fit the requirements of their use in science. Recent investigations into the
history of scientific concepts like space, time, mass, force, and field demonstrated
connections between the philosophical meaning of these concepts and their scientific
use. Therefore, together with familiarity with the philosophical discussions on these
subjects, a degree of knowledge in the history of science and especially about the history of scientific terminology, is a presupposition of a productive dialog between theology and the sciences.
Christian theology , on the other hand, in the entire course of its history, developed
in close connection with philosophy, though the relationship was not without its
complications and strains. In the case of theology and in distinction from the sciences, the relationship to philosophy is not, in the first place, a matter of philosophical origins of a particular terminology, but rather the task of integrating into theology
and into its explication of the relation of God the creator and redeemer of the world
and of humanity the philosophical language about God, the world, and the place of
human beings in it. Such integration of philosophical theses and conceptions into
Christian theology always meant a more or less incisive transformation of the philosophical meaning, and the occasional tensions arising between theology and philosophy in the course of history often arose from such attempts at appropriation .
Theology, however, is affirming the abiding truth of the biblical God and of His revelation as concerning every human being always depended and will depend on rational
universality of philosophy and therefore had to assimilate to itself not only the philosophical doctrines on God, but also the philosophical affirmations on the world and
human beings. At this point it finally becomes apparent in how far for Christian theology the relationship to the philosophical interpretation of the world becomes the
basis of a dialog with the sciences: the inclusion of scientific considerations and
results in a reflection on how to perceive of reality at large and of the situation of
human beings in the world is not the first and only subject of a theological doctrine of
creation, but belonged always to the philosophical interpretation of the world we
encounter. In dealing with its task of critical appropriation and assimilation of a
philosophical view of the world, theology implicitly dealt always with the knowledge
of nature it contained, and on the other hand the -theological transformation of philosophical concepts of the world has to be measured like philosophical hypotheses
themselves by their ability to do justice to scientific views and results .
Unfortunately, the task of the philosophy of nature and of its integrative reflection
of scientific descriptions of nature is now neglected by most philosophers. The resulting gap is often filled by natural scientists, who from the perspective of their respective discipline offer generalized philosophical reflections and conjectures concerning
the world at large . In this connection, however, the horizon of philosophical problems connected with the respective subject matters and the history of those philosophical problems is not appropriately considered. In these cases it belongs to the
task of theology in the dialog with scientists to remind them of the philosophical
problems involved in the subject matters dealt with in such dialogs and to argue within such a framework for the specific theological conc erns .
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The rest of this paper is to exemplify what has been said so far in general terms on
the dialog between theology and science in relation to a number of particular issues
that appear to me as particularly important for such dialog, because they are important in the foundation of any interpretation of the world . In the first place, some
reflections on the concept of law seem to be appropriate, and this in relation to the
correlate of law in what is contingently given . The correlation of these two aspects in
describing natural processes can be shown in the concept of natural law itself, but this
also offers the opportunity for Christian theology to relate the specifically biblical
understanding of reality to the description of nature by formulas of law. A second
consideration shall focus on the ideas of space and time, which are not only basic in
science, but also important in theological affirmations on God's relationship to the
world . A third question will deal with the relationship of affirmations about God and
about his activity to the movements of bodies, their development and decay-this is
the classical theme of scientific descriptions of nature in the framework given by the
ideas of space and time. A clarification of how the idea of God relates to space and
time, therefore, may have consequences for an understanding of created existence and
movement within space and time in their relationship to God. In this connection
finally certain conclusions will arise in relation to the concept of evolution, but not
only with respect to the evolution of organic life, but also to its setting in the history
of the universe.
In 1970 I published an article on "Contingency and Natural law" that has been the
object of close discussion for a number of years in a circle of physicists and theologians and has undergone considerable modifications as a result of these discussions.
The subject was interesting from the theological perspective, because the biblical
reports on God's action in history emphasize the element of the new and unexpected
in divine actions-an
emphasis that also characterizes the action of God in the creation of the world. The history of God's action constitutes a unique and irreversible
sequence of such contingent acts. The concept of contingency that is used to characterize the divine action in history has its philosophical origin in Aristotle and there it
refers to what occurs by chance and to what is non-essential or possible by contrast
with the necessary. In Aristotle, however, contingency was connected with the concept of matter, while medieval Christian Aristotelianism, especially since Duns Scot,
connected it with God's freedom in his will and action. The concept of natural law, on
the other hand, is logically related to conditions of its application that are contingent
in relation to the formula of law as such, initial conditions and marginal conditions of
the processes described by a formula of law . Those initial and marginal conditions can
themselves result from processes that in their turn may be described by formulas of
law. This does not change the basic fact, however, that each such description presupposes contingent conditions of its application, with the effect, that the laws of nature
may be conceived as descriptions of certain uniformities in natural processes that
occur in what basically is contingently given. This implies the assumption that all
events are in the first place contingent, even when the sequence of events shows similarities or uniform structures. This consequence appeared to the natural scientists
participating in the above mentioned discussions of the sixties as rather problematic,
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although such an assumption is also suggested by the irreversibility of time . In the
meantime, the contingency of events in distinction from contingency in a merely logical sense seems to be generally accepted in view of the fact that many natural processes take place in chaotic forms. Especially, contingency of events can be affirmed with
relation to the indeterminacy of elementary events in quantum physics, provided that
it is taken into account that the same events, because of the uniformities in their
sequence, also become objects of descriptions in terms of natural law. The possibility
of such description, on the other hand, does not eliminate the fundamental contingency of events; rather , the regularities that can be observed in contingent sequences
of events and can be described by hypotheses of law, are themselves contingent facts.
But, while theological affirmations concerning the reality of created existence and the
action of God in his creation are primarily related to this aspect of contingency in natural processes, a scientific description of these processes is primarily concerned with
the demonstration of regularities in those processes, although the dependence on
something contingently given is a precondition in the applicability of the concept of
law itself.
To those involved in the sixties in the discussions at Heidelberg a common basis
for the dialog between theology and nature seemed to emerge from the clarification of
the correlation between natural law and contingency, a common basis beyond vague
analogies and metaphors transferred from one discipline to the other. Nevertheless,
the agreement on the correlation of natural law and contingency did not yet open an
access to a more concrete understanding of nature in theological perspective. In order
to find the key to open up such an interpretation, a theological approach to fundamental concepts of physics, like energy or force and movement as well as to their presupposition in ideas about space and time, had to be developed.
In the early eighteenth century a philosophical dispute on the concept of space
took place, where theological implications played a decisive role. Even today, the correspondence between Leibniz and Samuel Clarke on Newton's description of space as
sensorium Dei in his Optics 1706, has more than merely historical interest. Certainly,
Newton's concept of absolute space has become obsolete to Einstein's theory of relativity, but Newton's thought about space and on God's relation to space was very
complex. It is worthwhile to take a closer look to find out just how much of these
ideas has become obsolete and what hasn't. The conceptions of absolute direction in
space and of absolute dimensions of objects in space are certainly no longer valid. But
Newton's and Clarke's ideas about God's relation to space contain another insight that
is still important. Clarke defended Newton's attribution of the concept of space to the
idea of God against Leibniz' objection that God in such a case would be divisible and
composed of parts . Clarke's main argument was that all division in space already presupposes space, because division can only take place within space . The space that is
presupposed in all spatial division is infinite and undivided, and this space-not geometrical space that is composed of parts-be identical with the divine immensity that
enables God to be present to each of his creatures at their own place . This argument
was still reproduced by Kant in his critique of pure reason in 1781-according
to
Kant the intuition of space as an infinite whole is presupposed in any conception of
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determinate spaces (A 240. Kant did no longer explore the theological implications of
this idea, because he conceived of space as a merely subjective form of human intuition. As soon as somebody wonders about this subjectivism, however-as it occurred
in this century to Samuel Alexander-the
theological implications of the priority of
infinite and undivided space in relation to every determinate concept of spaces
reemerges before one's eyes. The point of this argument is that the infinite space that
is presupposed in each division of spaces is necessarily undivided, by contrast to all
geometrical conceptions of space. Geometrical concepts of space are constructed on
the basis of units of measurement-each
geometrical unit of measurement is itself a
unit of space the concept of which presupposes the undivided whole of infinite space.
That, however, is an infinity that is not to be conceived like it happens in geometry by
indefinite addition of units of measurement, but an infinity that is prior to all division
and therefore also prior to all forms of measurement. The mistake of Spinoza in his
conception of space as an attribute of divine substance consists in the fact that he did
not distinguish infinite geometrical space from the infinite and undivided space of the
divine immensity that is already presupposed in every geometry. If one considers this
distinction, then no pantheistic consequences result from such a close connection
between God and space, consequences that Leibniz seems to have suspected in
Newton. The transition from the undivided space of divine immensity to the space of
our experience that has parts and places can be considered then a consequence of the
occurrence of finite objects and their relations to each other. In such a way one can
also do justice to the relativity of spatial relations with regard to the masses moving in
space. Each type of space that consists of parts presupposes, as Kant emphasized,
some undivided whole of space, because divisions and parts are only possible within
some space that is already there and therefore prior to geometrical conceptions of
space. The ideas about divine immensity and omnipresence with God's creatures can
be referred to this presupposition of undivided space, like Newton and Clarke did,
without violating the divine transcendence over the world, in contrast to the conception of Spinoza that Einstein felt sympathetic with, which however, did not distinguish between the undivided infinite space of divine omnipresence and the space of
geometry .
The relationship between God's eternity and time is largely analogous to that
between his immensity and space . Kant's treatment of time in his transcendental aesthetics corresponded closely to this treatment of the idea of space-in both cases an
infinite and undivided whole is considered the precondition of all division and of all
conceptions of parts. With reference to time this means-"Different
times are but
parts of one and the same time" (A31). The undivided whole of time or rather the
whole of life that appears divided in the sequence of time, has been termed eternity in
the philosophical and theological tradition since Plotinus' treatise on time in his
Enneads. Eternity, Plotinus says, is ultimate completion without parts or division (III,
7, 11) of what occurs in divided form in the sequence of time. Boethius, who transmitted this definition to later generations, called eternity the simultaneous and complete presence of unlimited life (intenninabilis vitae tota simul et pe1fectapossessio, De
Cons. phil. V, 6, 4). Eternity, then, is not atemporal in the sense that eternity and
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time were completely foreign to each other. Rather, according to Plotinus, time is
constituted by eternity, because the transition from one temporal moment to the next
is understandable only if we presuppose some presence of the whole that is separated
in the sequence of temporal moments even within that separation, in other words, a
presence of eternity in the course of time itself. The same idea is expressed in Kant's
sentence, different times are just parts of one and the same time. But Kant did no
longer see time as constituted by the presence of eternity, but in analogy to his conception of space he thought time constituted on the subject of experience, more precisely on the "standing and persisting" human ego (A 123) which, as persisting
through time, according to Kant, forms the basis of the unity of all human experience .
In view of the temporality of the ego itself, however, that we are aware of in our selfconsciousness, Kant's attempt of accounting for the unity of time on the basis of the
unity of the subject may seem to be considerably more problematic than Plotinus'
foundation of time on the concept of eternity.
From a theological perspective of nature, then, God's eternity is present in time,
more specifically as origin and completion of time and of all temporal reality-origin
in the sense of conditioning the continuity of what occurs separately in the sequence
of time, completion, however, because all temporal reality according to Plotinus tends
toward the future in order to realize the whole of its being. It is through the future
that eternity enters into time .
With relation to time as well as to space, the result is that these ideas cannot be
successfully defined on the basis of measurement by clocks or by spatial units of measurement. This may be a very important point in the dialog between theology and science, because the scientific interest in time, as well as in spatial dimensions, is so
closely connected with the possibility of measurement. The ideas of space and time,
however, claim priority with relation to all techniques of measurement. If this priority
is neglected, contradictions are the inevitable consequence. This is so because all
units of measurement are themselves already parts of time and space, that have to be
delimited within time and space from other such parts and therefore already presuppose time and space as such.
Much more difficult than the question of the relationship of space and time to
God's immensity and eternity is a clarification of God's relation to the forces working
in the movements of nature. And yet this is a decisive question for every biblicallybased doctrine on creation, because at this point the possibility of an action of God in
His creation is at stake, an action not only in the beginning, but also in the entire
process of the history of His creation. It was at this point that in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries the alienation between Christian theology and the scientific
description of nature began. The starting point of this alienation was the mechanistic
interpretation of natural processes that Descartes already had inaugurated and that
against Newton's intentions triumphed in the eighteenth century, when all natural
force was reduced to bodies and to their effects upon each other. This conception necessarily excluded God from the understanding of natural processes. If there was a
point , where modern philosophical theology was in unanimous agreement with the
earlier scholastic teaching about God , it was the affirmation that God cannot be a
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body. Consequently any idea of an exercise of power issuing from God and consequently any assumption of divine action in the course of nature was apriori excluded,
if all natural force resides in bodies. Thus God was respectfully urged out of the natural world.
When the far-reaching consequences of the reduction of the forces of natural
movements to conceptions of bodies and masses toward producing an atheistic picture of nature are duly considered, one also can imagine the potential significance of
the introduction of field concepts into the description of natural processes since
Faraday in favor of a theological interpretation of natural processes. This statement
does not mean that the demonstration of the efficacy of electric and magnetic fields
could immediately be used as a model to conceive of God's efficacy in nature . But
although field effects usually have their correlate in masses, Faraday already entertained a vision of finally interpreting all bodily phenomena as manifestations of fields.
A vision like that was close to that of Newton that the forces of natural movement are
finally not material, they do not issue from bodies. Rather, Newton conceived of
God's efficacy in the universe in analogy to how our spirit moves the parts of our
body.
An introduction of the field concept into theology is not, however, primarily suggested by the question of how to understand God's activity in nature, but it is suggested first by internal problems in the doctrine of God. The designation of the divine
being as "spirit" in the Gospel of John Qohn 4:24) has been interpreted since Origin
in the sense that God is Nus, a bodiless spiritual intellect, but this platonizing interpretation does not correspond to the original meaning of this biblical word pneuma
nor to the corresponding Hebrew word ruach. In both cases the root meaning is
moved air, breath, even wind. In Greek thought the word pneuma, which is usually
translated by "spirit," was used in the sense of air in movement like in breath or wind .
This applies to the presocratic philosophers, especially to Anaximenes, but also and
particularly to the Stoics. According to Stoic doctrine, air as the most subtle element
penetrates everything and keeps together the entire cosmos through its particular
"tension" (t6nos). The early Christian theologians before the third century understood
the New Testament identification of God as pneuma in similar ways. Now one of the
most renowned historians of science in our century, Max Jammer, who investigated
the history of a number of key concepts of physics, considers the pneuma concepts of
classical antiquity as predecessors of the field concepts of modern physics. Indeed, the
intuitive idea of a field of power comes to paradigmatic expression in a state of tension in the air. Modern field concepts, however, differ in an important point from the
conceptions of pneuma in classical antiquity-field effects do not require, although in
the nineteenth century this was still assumed, a material medium like air or "ether."
They can pervade space without such a medium. The materialism of the Stoic doctrine of pneuma as air, however, in the sense of a most subtle element that penetrates
everything else, formed the main reason of Origen's rejection of this conception in
interpreting the Johannine characterizing of God as spirit. The absurdities of a conception of God as body-divisible and composed of parts-formed
the negative reason for interpreting pneuma in terms of Nus, and thus for conceiving of God in the
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image of a bodiless intellect. Now it is evident that this conception does not correspond to the root meaning of pneuma. At this point the field concept that replaces the
pneuma doctrines of classical antiquity can become helpful in theology, because it
allows to distinguish the root meaning of pneuma from the conception of a material
basis or medium. If the divine reality is conceived in terms of a field that manifests
itself in the three "persons" of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, then one can do justice to
Origen's objections against any conception of God as body and yet preserve the genuine meaning of pneuma.
Is such a theological use of the field concept a mere metaphor? At the first moment
it may look like that. But one should not overlook that the fundamental requirement
for the application of the concept of field is met in theology . That is the relationship
to time and space, though in the sense of what has been said about the undivided infinite space of divine immensity, presupposed in all geometrical description of space,
and about the undivided unity of time in God's eternity as condition of all temporal
sequence. The interpretation of the pneumatic particularity of God's being as field,
can be accounted for by relating it to the undivided wholeness of time and space prior
to all geometrical description. By the same reason it is distinguished from the field
concepts of physics, but would function as a condition of those in analogy to what
had to be said concerning space and time. The field of divine omnipotence, then, does
not compete with concrete physical fields, but its activity works through all the natural forces without being exhausted by them. Like God's omnipresence is copresent to
all things without falling prey to the relativistic paradoxes of simultaneity, since God's
omnipresence is not dependent on the velocity of light, in a similar way the field
effects the divine omnipresence are not in need of being transmitted by waves . The
concept of waves, though important in the field notions of classical physics and especially as a basis of quantitative description of field effects may not be constitutive of
the field concept as such, while that concept would be empty with being related to
time and space . If the concept of field in the strict sense can be conceived of without
the idea of expanding through waves, then also types of non-local, instantaneous
communication between physical phenomena can be conceived of in terms of field
effects.
In the framework of this paper it is no longer possible to apply what has been said
so far upon a theological interpretation of the world of creatures according to the
sequence of their emergence in the history of the universe. A sketch of such an interpretation has been published in the context of my treatment of the doctrine of creation in the second volume of my Systematic Theology. In the dialog between theology
and science, however, it is still more important to reach agreement about the foundations of interpretations of such a type. Only this much may be said here-the key for
perceiving the interconnection of eternity and time lies with the relevance of the
future in understanding everything existing in time. It is through the future that eternity enters into time . Ever new contingent events proceed from the future, and on the
other hand everything existing in time can expect from the future only the possible
wholeness of its life. All things proceed towards the kingdom of God, but God's sovereignty is already at work by entering from His future into the presence of His crea-
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tures. From th e point of view of the creatures this relationship gets reverted . The
future becomes the direction of extrapolations from the present and from whatever
we know from the past. That is also true in the history of th e universe. Mythical interpretation of the world looks at the order of the universe as founded in its beginning .
Even the biblical report on creation, though no longer a myth in its literal form ,
exemplifies this way of looking at the world. The image of the foundation of all creaturely forms, in a first week of seven days , is in a certain tension, however , to the perspective otherwise characteristic for the biblical understanding of reality, the perspective of ever new actions of God in the history toward the future completion of His creation . The idea of an order of creation, complete in the beginning and not significantly changed in subsequent time made an agreement between theologians and scientists
difficult for a long period, especially during th e struggle about the doctrine of evolution. Much more important, however, in view of a possible consonance between a
theology of creation and natural science , is that the evolution of life occurs within an
irreversible process, where again and again contingencies occur. It is similar with the
history of the universe . With regard to the origin and evolution of life as well as in the
field of cosmology the ideological barriers between the scientific description of the
world and the interpretation of the same world in Christian theology broke down .
One would ask too much, if scientific cosmology were expected to produce right away
a demonstration of the existence of God, as Pope Pius XII believed at the time of the
first enthusiasm about the present standard model of the expanding universe . It is
sufficient that theological interpretation of the history of the universe in terms of creation can be developed in consonance with scientific data and procedures . To this end
it is necessary that the theological doctrine of creation remains able to learn, not in
the sense of adapting itself apologetically to every change of the scientific description
of nature, but in the sense that theology remains vigorous enough to develop from its
own resources ever new interpretations that try to do justice to a changing state of
experiential knowledge of our world, in order to integrate it into the Christian understanding of the world as being created by the God of the Bible.

THE EMERGENCE OF
CREATURES AND THEIR
SUCCESSION IN A
DEVELOPING UNIVERSE
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The term "create" serves in the biblical tradition and in Christian theology to
relate the reality of the world to the God of the Jews. It expresses a rather specific
way of conceiving the divine origin of the world . The term "create" emphasizes the
unconditional and free character of the divine act of producing the world and thus
it indicates the contingency of the world itself and of each part of it as well as of the
divine act and puts it into being.
This way of accounting for the reality of the world seems to have emerged in the
sixth century before Christ, at the time of the Babylonian exile of the intellectual
leadership of the Jewish people. The priestly document on the creation of the world
by the God of Israel, now the first chapter of the Bible, answered the challenge of
the Babylonian religion, especially the description of the way the world was built in
the enuma elish. The priestly text says that it was not Marduk, but the God of Israel
who produced the universe and that He did it in the characteristic way of His action
according to how the prophetic tradition had described God's action in historywith sovereign freedom, unconditioned by any other factor than God Himself.
The account given in this text is significantly different from the older narrative
on the creation of human beings and of the world surrounding them. The narrative
in the second chapter of our Bible focuses almost exclusively on Adam and Eve,
while the priestly report in the first chapter intends to comprise the entire universe
and carefully attributes to each part its proper place. This indicates the doctrinal
character of the priestly texts that distinguishes it from the earlier narrative, where
even the very term "create" was not yet used. The difference is explained by the fact
that the priestly document responds to the challenge of the Babylonian epic by
claiming the world in all its parts for the God of Israel to whose creative activity
each part of it owes its existence .
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The apologetic and doctrinal intention of the priestly report on the creation of the universe was executed by seizing upon elements from the Babylonian and other mythological
descriptions of the origin of the world as well as upon materials from wisdom traditions,
especially from their efforts at collecting the different forms of natural phenomena and
arranging them in catalogues. Regarding both types of materials one is entitled to judge that
the priestly document made comprehensive use of the science of its day in critically selecting and interpreting its results by relating them to the creative activity of God. Whatever
was known at that time about the natural world and the different forms of creatures was
incorporated in the priestly document. In combining the wisdom materials with the mythological quest for the origin of the universe, the priestly document certainly claimed to provide true explanation of the existence of the different forms of reality. And it did so in a
remarkably sober, occasionally almost rationalistic way. The description in Gen. 1:6-9 of
how God made a divide in the primeval water to separate what was beneath the divide from
further supply of water from above with the natural consequence that the waters beneath
the divide would recede and let the dry ground emerge is a beautiful example of ancient
engineering and thoroughly rationalistic. Such rationalism fits very well with the monotheistic emphasis that puts all the stress on the divine command as cause of the emergence of
new forms of reality.
II

The priestly report on the origin of the universe from a creative action of the God of
Israel is a document from an ancient culture, and nobody should expect that the assertions of such a document could agree in all details with our contemporary scientific
knowledge on the origin and development of the universe. In fact, given the historical distance, one should expect that our present conception of the universe of nature and of its
history would have less in common with such an ancient document than is actually the
case. There is rough agreement, first, concerning the fact that our universe had a beginning and that it developed along a succession of stages or steps, however those steps are
conceived materially. But also concerning the material content of those steps and of their
sequence, more similarity is to be observed than one might expect-light at the beginning
of the series, human beings at its end, the priority of light over the formation of stars,
including sun and moon, furthermore the production of plants by the earth, the function
of vegetation as a presupposition of animal life, the close relationship between human
beings and mammals, called "animals of the land" in the priestly creation report (Gen.
1:24-25). Both kinds of creature appear, according to the biblical report, in the sixth day
of creation in distinction from the animals of the water and from the birds .
Such similarities, of course, are limited by dissimilarities-the
creation of the earth
separated in the biblical report from the formation of the stars and prior to them. This
is due to the utilitarian perspective of the priestly report in dealing with the stars and
especially with the sun and moon . There is an unmistakable demythologizing bias
effective at this point , because in Babylon like in other ancient cultures the stars were
closely connected with deities . Therefore, their importance had to be reduced in this
Jewish account on the origin of the universe. The example shows, however , how religious prejudices occasionally distort the presentation of natural facts.
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Other limitations in the biblical report are simply due to limitations of knowledge as it
was available at the time. Thus the concept of life is limited to animals (Gen. 1:30), to the
exclusion of plants, and the classification of animals according to the places of their life
differs from later classifications according to families and species. There are other, more
important differences between the biblical report on the creation of the universe and the
modern understanding of its origin and development. But before turning to them, it
seems appropriate to engage in some more general and more fundamental reflection on
the question of where the authority resides that this text enjoys in Christian teaching.

III
For many centuries, a literal authority was ascribed to the biblical report on the creation of the world as part of the inspired word of the divine Scripture. Even today this
view continues with many Christians who are afraid that the authority of Scripture disintegrates as soon as one admits any incorrectness in detail. The consequence of such a
fundamentalistic view of the authority of Scripture is that one has to cling to the infallible
truth of every single proposition in the text. There is no room, then, for appreciating the
priestly report on creation as a document from an ancient culture, sharing the achievements, but also the limitations, of its cultural setting. Such an attitude, however, amounts
to an obliteration of the authentic character of the biblical text itself. It is precisely in its
form as a document of an ancient culture that the authority of the text must reside. This
also applies to the report on the creation of the universe. If that is so, the authority of the
text cannot coincide with the infallible truth of its particular sentences, as if they were
superior to all later experience. Neither can the authority of such a text consist in the
old-fashioned view of a past stage in the development of human culture. This last statement, however, is somewhat dangerous, for everything in such a text can easily be
denounced as belonging to a past cultural situation and can therefore be dismissed as no
longer relevant. On the line of such a way of arguing any authority of the cultural tradition can be denied, and yet in human cultural history there is, sometimes at least, authority of the content of the cultural tradition in spite of cultural changes. Therefore, it is
always necessary to distinguish between elements that have become obsolete and others
that are still valid . What, then, is at the basis of the continuing authority of a key document of our cultural tradition like the biblical report on the creation of the universe?
Christians will argue that at the basis of such continuing authority there is the continuing faith in the God of Israel and of Jesus Christ. Then the authority of the biblical
report on creation must be looked for not in particular propositions, but in the way it
gives witness to the divine reality of the God of the Bible. This was done, as I said earlier,
by affirming the universe to exist as a result of the creative action of the God of Israel.
The priestly document made this affirmation in the form of a detailed account of how the
universe came into being. To this purpose it made use of all the material knowledge
about the world that was at its disposal. In this act, then, of claiming the universe with all
its content to exist as God 's creation, resides the authority of the biblical report. That
authority is obeyed not when the individual statements of that ancient text are preserved
and repeated, but when the act of laying claim on the universe to exist as consequence of
God's creative action is repeated, and it has to be repeated by using the material knowl-
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edge of one's own time about the world in similarity to the paradigmatic biblical teaching
on creation. In the modern situation, it is necessary to that purpose to use the resources
of modern science rather than to cling to the individual statements of the text against the
empirical evidence of modern science .
But how can theology let itself be guided by the paradigm of the biblical report in getting involved in the scientific materials of a later period? The task is facilitated by the
observation of basic similarities between the biblical approach and our modern view of
the origin and development of the natural universe. The basic similarity consists in looking at the universe in terms of a sequence of emergent new forms, and in the framework
of that overall similarity we may try to deal with the more profound dissimilarities and
differences.
IV

In the judgment of my teacher Edmund Schlink, the deepest difference between the
modern view of nature and the biblical report consists in the modern conception that
new forms of reality emerge from the autonomous activity of nature itself, while according to the biblical view the creatures enjoy their autonomous activity only within the limits of a divine order of their existence that was put up in the beginning.
This judgment contains obvious elements of truth. Thus the different genera and
species of vegetation and animal life were put up, according to the priestly report, in the
beginning by the creator and remain unchanged. He granted to plants and animals the
power of propagation, but such power of propagation only serves to perpetuate the character of the species. It doesn't change the nature of species as it would correspond to the
modern view of natural evolution. At this point the contrast is perfectly clear.
But on the other hand, the creative activity of God can very well be effective, according to the biblical report, through the medium of a created reality. Thus, in Gen. 1:11
God addresses the earth to produce vegetation, and the earth is called upon once more in
Gen. 1:24 to bring forth the animals living on it. Herein, even animal life is understood to
be a product of the earth. The biblical creation story does not exclude, then, mediating
agencies in the act of God's creation. In this respect, there is no opposition between the
biblical report and the basic intuition of the modern idea of natural evolution. So far the
difference is mainly that in modern theory the productivity of the earth is replaced by the
idea of nature and, when it comes to the origin of life, by the idea of a self-organization of
matter and of the creative evolution of life itself.
The difficulty in comparing the biblical report and the modern conception of organic
evolution resides at a different point, in the conception of the priestly document, of
course, that the act of creation was completed at the end of a first period of the world's
existence, while in the modern view the evolution of life and the universe continues
through the entire duration of the world's existence.
At this point, however , the priestly report on the creation of the universe is not typical of
all forms of the biblical witness . In Psalm 104 we have an account of God's creative activity
that describes it in terms of a continuing source of the existence of the creatures (esp. Ps.
104:30). Similarly, in second Isaiah God's action in history is presented as a creative activity
in the sense of bringing forth something new and formerly unknown (Isa. 43 :19), and in
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expressing this idea the prophet uses the same terminology (bara) that functions in the
priestly document as a technical term referring to the creation in the beginning . The idea of
a continuing creative activity of God, then, is not foreign to the biblical witness, though of
course not combined with the idea of evolution as in our modem view. It is the continuing
creation of something new, on which the existence of the creatures depends. That idea cliffers from the traditional dogmatic term creatiocontinuawhich meant only the preservation
of what had been created before. In view of second Isaiah, it is the production of new things
that continues. The intention of the priestly document in Genesis 1 to limit the notion of
creation to God's activity in the beginning, is only one variation of expressing the biblical
faith in God's creative activity as the source of everything.
What was the motivation behind this particular variation in the conception of God's
creative activity? One may distinguish two factors here, one more mythological and a
more theological concern of lasting importance. The theological concern was for the stability and reliability of the order of creation. In view of the priestly document, such stability depends on the unchanged form of things as they were established in the beginning. The modem understanding of nature is also interested in that element of stability.
But we see the stability of nature warranted by the invariable validity of the laws that govern natural processes. Thus one can argue that this concern of the biblical report has
been satisfied in the modern conception of nature, though in a different way.
The mythological motivation in the priestly report on the creation of the world is to
be found in its function to legitimate the Jewish week of seven days and in particular the
institution of the sabbath at its end. On the basis of the priestly document the Jewish
week, with the sabbath at its end, is seen as indefinitely repeating the original week of
God's work of creation with the seventh day of rest at its end. Accordingly, in the decalogue of Exodus 20 the commandment to observe the sabbath day is based on the order
of creation: "for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and all that is in them, and
rested the seventh day; therefore the Lord blessed the sabbath day and hallowed it"
(Exod . 20:11) .
Interestingly enough, in early Jewish exegesis the seven days of creation could be interpreted differently by relating the sequence of seven days to the entire history of the world
rather than confining it to an original period . In the Jewish apocalyptic literature (esp.
Enoch 91 and 93), the seventh day was understood to refer to the future consummation of
the world in the kingdom of God, and in Hebrews 4 the Christian hope for the eschatological future of God was described as a hope to enter into God's own rest after the labor of
creation. In Enoch 71:15, the seventh day of God's rest, identified with the future aeon of
consummation, was even described as the source from which peace is pouring since the
first creation of the world. The peace of the sabbath, then, could be understood as an
anticipation of the final piece in the kingdom of God . The interpretations of the week of
creation are interesting in the context of the present argument, because in their own way
they combine the image of an original period of creation with the idea of a creative activity
of God continuing through the history of the world until its consummation in the eschatological future of God's kingdom . One must not mistake, however , this view for being the
view of the priestly report on the creation of the world and the first chapter of the Bible.
There the act of creation is limited to a first period in the history of the world .
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Important as the difference is between the idea of a creation of the universe in an initial period of the world's history and the conception of a continuing creative activity of
God corresponding to the creative development of the natural world , still this is not the
most profound difference between our modern understanding of natural processes and
biblical view. The deepest difference, rather, is connected with the atomistic perspective
of modern science according to which all natural forms are composed of more elementary particles and processes. This perspective originated from a particular form of ancient
Greek philosophy of nature, from Democritos, and it influenced modern science to such
an extend that the development and sequence of natural forms in the history of nature
are no longer conceivable without it, though the search for the final elements of matter
led to more complicated results than they could have been expected on the basis of
Democritos' atomic theory. Most importantly, there is not just one type of elementary
particles, but several. Furthermore, the difference between particles and events is vanishing, when so-called particles have no more than momentary existence. Nevertheless, the
idea that the qualitative differences of natural forms can be reduced to different combinations of elementary particles has been victorious.
Accordingly, in the perspective of modern science, the sequence of natural forms
starts with elementary phenomena out of which all more complex forms of reality developed. This perspective is significantly different from the biblical report on the creation of
the universe, but it does not necessarily contradict its theological intention. The atomistic
view of the universe and of its development has often been perceived as an alternative to
a theology of creation, and this would be the case if it rendered God superfluous in
understanding the reality of nature. Such could be a consequence of reducing all natural
phenomena to combinations of elementary units, if that meant that the elementary units
are finally the only factors in explaining natural processes and the emergence of natural
forms. In fact, however, the interaction and combination of elementary units that is
involved in the emergence of more complex forms seems to always require conditions of
a holistic nature forming the context of elementary processes. As early as 1966 Ian
Barbour called on de Broglie and on the Pauli Exclusion Principle as expressing the
underivable function of the whole in conditioning the parts. A whole either in the form
of environment or field or as manifest in a system of higher order like the atom in relation to subatomic particles provides the context for the more elementary processes taking
place within it.
In the case of the early universe, the state of that universe as a whole must have functioned as the comprehensive condition of the elementary processes going on within it.
They took place under the conditions of such high temperatures that the state of the universe did not allow for the formation of more complex and enduring forms of reality. It
needed the expansion of the universe and the concomitant process of cooling down to
develop conditions that allow for the formation of atoms and molecules and furthermore,
under the influence of gravity , for their conglomeration to galaxies and stars . Thus, in a
modern view, the development of the universe is also a development of complex and
enduring forms out of elementary processes. But it is also true that the changing stay of
the univ erse imposes conditions on the continuous functioning of those processes.
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The importance of a holistic framework in the emergence of new forms of existence
has also been pointed out with relation to the formation of a biosphere on our earth-the
spontaneous emergence of life depends on a complicated texture of very special conditions as they develop on this particular planet. Life itself seems now to have emerged
through spontaneous self-organization, once those conditions were given and a thermodynamic gradient could be exploited like in the case of the flame that nourishes its life
from the potential energy of the candle. Long before the mechanism of life, its dissipative
nature, was understood, the flame of a candle was considered a symbol of life in its effort
at temporarily preserving its form at the price of consuming the energies of its environment.
As the emergence of living organisms is conditioned by the formation of a biosphere
on our earth, while this in turn is conditioned by the particular state of the expanding
universe, the universe as a whole seems arranged in such a way as to make organic life
possible. This is the basic idea that recently has been discussed under the name of
"anthropic principle ." It means that the emergence of organic life and finally of human
beings is not an insignificant accident of nature as compared to the vastness of the universe. This had been the feeling of sensitive thinkers like Pascal in early modernity, by
contrast to the biblical view of the creation of the world, where the entire sequence of
creatures led up to the creation of human beings. The feeling of being at a loss in the vast
spaces of the universe is no longer assumed to contemporary scientific cosmology. The
natural constants of the universe are arranged in such a way as to make organic life and
intelligent animals like ourselves possible . I do not want to go beyond this "weak" form
of the anthropic principle by claiming that the emergence of intelligent life be necessary
on the basis of how the order of the universe is arranged from its beginnings. I am quite
satisfied with the contingent nature of the emergence of life as well as of other natural
forms in the history of the universe. But the emergence of life and of intelligent life, as in
human beings, is no longer to be considered an insignificant accident in the history of
the universe .
VI
Some such view of the universe as a totality that conditions the particular processes
going on within it and the emergence of ever more complex forms of enduring existence
seems to be required in a theological interpretation of nature in terms of creation. A conception of the universe as an ordered system corresponds to the unity of the one God
who is supposed to be its creator, and the place of particular phenomena within that systematic order as well as in relation to its divine origin determines their individual significance. On the other hand, contingency of events in general and of the emergence of new
forms of reality in particular prevents the individual forms and processes from becoming
completely dependent on the systematic whole of the universe and preserves an element
of immediacy in them with relation to their ultimate origin . Such contingency of natural
phenomena, however, seems bound up with their temporal nature, if time is to be conceived as an irreversible flux of events, where each event is finally unique and the future
always bringing about something new, notwithstanding all the regularities applying in
the sequence of events.
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These requirements of a theological interpretation of nature in terms of creation are
met in the biblical creation report-the universe is ordered in a sequence of six days of
God's work, and the significance of each work of creation is given by its place in that
sequence and in the relations to other creatures such place entails . Each new work, however, is presented as contingent with regard to what went before, and that is expressed by
the origin of each new work of creation in the divine word of command. Finally, the elements of systematic order and of contingency in detail are combined in the scheme of a
temporal series in the emergence of the creatures.
The abiding importance of the biblical creation report may very well be perceived
then in the fact that it stands as a paradigmatic exemplification of a systematic scheme
which meets these three requirements of an overall systematic order, of contingency in
detail and of temporal sequence in the emergence of particular forms. Each new theological doctrine of creation that will integrate theologically the scientific knowledge of its
time has to meet these same requirements in order to give a theological account of the
world of nature as God's creation . Such an interpretation is not superfluous with regard
to our experiential knowledge about nature and it is not an arbitrary imposition upon a
scientific cosmology. At present I want to emphasize that as compared with those three
requirements of a theological interpretation of nature it is of secondary importance,
whether organic life made its appearance on earth as completely new phenomenon or
whether it emerged in a process of spontaneous self-organization from inorganic matter,
and it is also of secondary importance, whether or not each new species is to be considered as a discontinuous new beginning or as a product of the continuous process of
organic evolution of life . Also of secondary importance, finally, is the question of
whether or not the emergence of human beings derived from the development of organic
species rather than coming into existence without mediation by other creatures. I mentioned earlier that even in the biblical report such mediating function of a creature in
producing new forms of existence was not considered to be opposed to the origin of the
new creature from a divine act of creation, as the function ascribed to the earth in producing vegetation and animals demonstrates . Important in a theological interpretation of
nature is that each new form of existence is recognized as contingent fact and hence as
immediate to the ultimate cause of all. This immediacy to the ultimate cause of all, however, is itself conditioned by the place of the new creature in the sequence of others,
because the divine act of creation relates to each individual creature in the context of the
universe God created and not an abstraction from everything else. In this way even the
emergence of human beings is seen in the biblical creation report as conditioned by the
preceding stages of created existence and related to them.
In a modern perspective , then , the expansion of the universe might be perceived as
the instrument of the creator in producing enduring and independent forms of created
existence . The expansion of the universe does not only provide space for a multitude of
creatures, but more importantly the concomitant cooling effect provides the basic condition for all forms of higher organization, higher complexity, beginning with the formation of atoms and molecules. Organic life emerged as a still higher form of such complexity and , at the same time , of independent existence. Though organisms are less durable
than atoms and stars , the self-organization of life expresses an element of spontaneity
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which constitutes a higher form of independent existence . In the biblical report this was
expressed by the idea that living creatures are distinguished from others by sharing an
apportion of the divine Spirit, the cause of life. In modern times a similar idea has been
expressed by T eilhard de Cardin by the affirmation that on the higher levels of complexity there are also increasing degrees of interiority of existence.
Human beings emerged at the end of this sequence, as far as our knowledge goes. In
the biblical creation report this place of humanity implies a special relationship to the
rest of creation on the one hand, to the creator of all on the other. And here we arrive at a
further distinguishing characteristic of a theological interpretation of nature as creation
of God-of the biblical God-and therefore in a Jewish or Christian interpretation of
nature. In distinction from other religious traditions, the biblical view of humanity's
place in creation is certainly anthropocentric, and the Christian doctrine of God's incarnation in one human person and by that person in humanity puts a particular and ultimate emphasis on that anthropocentric position . But it is not a narrow type of anthropocentrism that would shut itself off from anything else. It is an inclusive anthropocentrism that relates the human predicament of the destiny of the entire universe in the light
of its divine origin. It is a form of anthropocentrism, therefore, that involves a responsibility of humanity for other creatures as far as the range of human activity extends. When
in the biblical report the human beings are commissioned to exercise dominion over the
earth and everything on it, that does not mean that all other creatures are delivered to
arbitrary disposal according to human license, but the divine commission aims at a form
of dominion that represents within the created universe the authority of the creator
Himself and therefore involves responsibility for attending to God's creation and to His
resolution of granting some degree of independent existence to the products of His creative activity. The place of the human being at the point of culmination of God's creation
inevitably involves that kind of responsibility in correlation with the special relationship
of that creature to God the creator of all.

CHRISTIANITY AND
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In the course of this century the cultural context of Christian churches
changed significantly. The culture became more visibly non-religious than it had
been before . Certainly, the separation between church and state originated two
centuries earlier. But that did not necessarily entail an alienation of the culture
from its religious roots . With the exception of Judaism, most of the different
churches that came to enjoy unrestricted activities after the abolishment of an
established religion, were Christian denominations so that the predominately
Christian, even Protestant character of the American culture was not deeply
changed as an immediate consequence of the separation between church and
state. In other Western societies more explicit links with some or another
Christian church continued
to be effective until the present century.
Nevertheless, it will become evident that the roots of the process of secularization that resulted in the present alienation of the public culture from religion
and especially from Christianity, can be traced back to the seventeenth century.
In the contemporary situation, the climate of secularism puts considerable
strain on the confidence of believers in the truth of the Christian teaching. It is
the situation Peter L. Berger described years ago in his book A Rumor of Angels
(1969), in terms of the situation of a cognitive minority whose standards of
knowledge deviate from those that are publicly taken for granted . Plausibility,
Berger wrote, "in the sense of what people actually find credible , of views of
reality depends upon the social support these receive." Where this social plausibility weakens, it requires additional personal strength to maintain beliefs that
are no longer in line with those dominant in the social context. This is a social
and psychological situation that has nothing to do with the question of truth. "It
is, of course, " says Berger, "possible to go against the social consensus that sur-
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rounds us, but there are powerful pressures [which manifest themselves as psychological pressures within our own consciousness] to conform to the views and beliefs of
our fellow men"(43). This is precisely the strain which the secularist culture puts on
the consciousness and behavior of Christians in Western societies that were formerly
more or less strongly influenced by Christian values and beliefs.
One consequence of the secularist mood is that the extent of sheer knowledge
about Christian teachings, biblical names and events, and the history of Christianity is
dwindling. The situation is no longer that some people reject the truth claims of
Christian teachings. Increasing numbers of them don't even know about what should
be accepted or rejected. This is remarkable because Christianity has been so important in our cultural tradition. One cannot understand Western culture and its history
without the Christian religion. The more widespread the lack of information about
the contents of the Bible and Christian teachings, however, the easier the creeping up
of prejudices against Christianity, especially the prejudice that Christianity has been
an oppressive form of religion. Therefore, even when people are getting interested in
religion again, which is a natural reaction against the lack of deeper meaning in the
secularist culture, they would not normally turn to Christianity, but rather to alternative forms of religion.
The difficulties of the Christian message in this cultural situation have been sharpened recently by tendencies to relativize the concern for truth. While the enlightenment challenged the traditional Christian affirmations by demanding rational argument for the truth claims of Christian teaching instead of a simple appeal to authority,
now truth claims as such are considered obsolete. This turns Christian doctrines into
mere opinions that may be affirmed or not according to individual options and preference. The dissolution of the notion of truth, however, ruins the idea of Christian missions. Missionary preaching is no longer seen as bringing the truth to other peopleand therefore legitimate-but
as imposing upon them one's personal opinions, which
must appear improper. And even when we leave the issue of missions aside, why
should people opt for the Christian faith, if not because the apostolic teaching is true?
Or, more precisely, if it is not even meaningful to claim its content to be true? The
issue of truth is absolutely vital for the Christian faith. The destruction of the idea of
truth, on the other hand, can be seen as a strategy of legitimating the secularist culture
since its lack of true meaning is precisely the point of its most delicate vulnerability.
II
Secularism and even modern culture in general have sometimes been characterized
as a phenomenon of apostasy from the Christian faith. The most important Christian
thinker who took that view was Karl Barth. In Karl Barth's opinion, modern culture
has been a revolt against the Christian faith in putting the human being in the place
of God . There is much that can be said in favor of such an interpretation of modern
culture. The concept of human nature has indeed become basic in modern culture in
a ·way that can be compared to the religious foundation of the cultural system in earlier periods of history . The concern for human rights is but one aspect, though politically the most important aspect of the occupation of modern culture with human
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nature and whatever belongs to it. Increasingly that meant to make the human individual the highest value and criterion. But does that modern tendency possess no
truth whatsoever in a Christian view? Should it simply be rejected as modern apostasy? ls not the emphasis on the individual person of distinctively Christian origin?
Does not Christianity have a great deal in common with that modern spirit? Did it not
even contribute to liberate the Christian consciousness itself from the distortion of
intolerance? The relationship between the Christian faith and modernity seems more
ambivalent than to allow for a simple rejection of modernity by Christians . Though
modern culture, in turning secularist, contributed to the alienation of a great many
people from the Christian faith, it is still necessary for Christians to learn and remember the lesson that the rise of modernity teaches and to appropriate its positive values
to the Christian consciousness itself.
III

The distinction between the secular and the religious or spiritual realm had a long
history in the development of Christianity. In earlier centuries that distinction did not
imply the complete separation and emancipation of the secular segments of social
life-the political and economic system, but also law and parts of the educational system and arts--from the spiritual life of the church . To the contrary, the distinction
between the secular and the religious sphere had itself a Christian basis . The
Christian awareness that the present order of society is not yet the kingdom of God,
but an imperfect and provisional form of social life, lies at the root of the distinction
between the secular and the spiritual. It is a distinction that sets Christianity apart
from other religiously imbued cultures like Islam. It separated the Byzantinian Empire
already from the pre-Christian Roman empire, because in the post-Constantinian
period there was a balance between the authority of the bishops and that of the
emperor, while in Ancient Rome the emperor himself had been the highest priest,
pontifex maximus .
The distinction between the religious and the secular, however, took on another
significance after the Reformation of the sixteenth century or, more precisely, after
the century of religious wars that followed in the wake of the breakup of the medieval
church which had been the unwanted result of the Reformation. When in a number
of European countries no religious party could get the upper hand in the attempt of
imposing its own faith upon the entire society, the unity of the social system had to
be based on a foundation other than religion , since religion had proved to disrupt the
social peace. In the second half of the seventeenth century, therefore, most people
became convinced that religious controversies had to be bracketed if social peace was
to be restored. This was the historical movement when modern secular culture was
born .
In earlier centuries, such a step would have been unimaginable. Even in the century of the Reformation, religious unity was generally considered indispensable for the
unity of a society . This was the reason why neither Luther nor Calvin could conceive
the possibility of religious toleration, though they emphasized the decisive importance of the individual conscience in matters of religious faith. The step toward reli-
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gious freedom and toleration was first taken in the Netherlands, near the end of the
sixteenth century, in order to restore peace between the Catholic and Protestant parts
of the population of that country. The principle of religious freedom and toleration
was proclaimed by William of Orange with the confidence of acting in line with the
Protestant understanding of the Christian faith, in line with the liberty of a Christian,
which Luther had thought and with the appeal to conscience in matters of faith. But
actually it was a significant step towards a complete reconstruction of the social system and of the culture itself.
The older assumption that the unity of society requires unity of religious faith at its
basis was not without good reasons. If the citizens are to obey the law and the authority of a civil government, they must believe that it is right to do so and that they do
not simply succumb to the caprice of those in power. To this end the wielding of
power must be regarded legitimate in the name of some authority beyond human
arbitrariness and manipulation. In other words, religion must oblige and restrain
those in power as well as those upon whom such power is exercised. In such cases the
subjects can feel united with those entrusted with legislative and administrative
power in common responsibility to some authority that stands above all of them . If
there is no religious unity, however, the legitimacy of government is jeopardized and
so is social peace among its subjects.
Such reasoning seems long obsolete . But it has never been effectively refuted. It
was dismissed for pragmatic reasons, because of the urgent need to restore social
peace in spite of religious differences and controversies. Alternative legitimations of
government were developed, of course, replacing the religious one. Most important of
these alternative legitimations became the idea of representative government. But still
the plausibility of such legitimation is more pragmatic than theoretically secure.
IV
So far I suggested that the origin of modern secular culture is to be looked for at the
end of the period of religious wars in post-Reformation Europe, generally in the second
half of the seventeenth century, though earlier in the case of the Netherlands. In order
to restore social peace in multi-confessional societies, the political system, the authority of the law, but also the public culture at large had to be based on a foundation other
than religion whose contents had become controversial. The new foundation was
human nature. Systems of natural law, a natural morality, even a natural religion were
designed in order to satisfy that need . Not least of them was the natural theory of government, presented in terms of social contract theories that demonstrated the need for
civil government in order to secure individual survival at the price of the natural freedom of individuals , as with Hobbes, or even in order to secure that individual freedom
itself within the limits of reason and law, as with John Locke. Wilhelm Dilthey argued
successfully that these theories that reconstructed the law, morality, and the foundations of the political order on the basis of the idea of a common human nature ,
replaced the old religious foundation of society and thus enabled the European nations
to put an end to th e period of religious wars. The result was the autonomy of secular
societ y and culture with regard to the churches and the religious tradition .
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Other theories on the rise of modern secular culture account for its origin as produced by a process of secularization. The most famous of these theories is perhaps
Max Weber's work on the origin of modern capitalism. According to Weber, modern
capitalism did not develop from purely economic motivations and factors, but its
early history depended on the Calvinist doctrine on predestination and its impact on
human conduct. Calvin taught that though God's eternal decree on election or repudiation of an individual person remains mysterious, its provision for a particular person can be guessed on the basis of his or her conduct. If they do the works of regeneration, it is likely that such a person belongs to the chosen ones . For the Calvinist
believer, then, there exists a strong motivation to produce works of regeneration.
According to Protestant ethics, however, these works consist of what one's worldly
vocation requires in terms of conscientious observation of professional duties in secular life. Thus Weber assumed that the rational asceticism of the early capitalists had
its source in the otherworldly hope of Calvinist spirituality. That spirituality got secularized, however, when its dedication was put in the service of the multiplication of
capital, and in that way it produced a system that finally functions independently of
the original motivation.
Other applications of the idea of secularization claimed that the modern belief in
progress consists of a secularization of the Christian eschatological hope. The hope
for progress aims no longer beyond this life, but seeks improvement within this
world. Karl Lowith argued that the development of the modern philosophy of history
should be regarded as a secularization of the Christian theology of history, the history
of salvation. Philosophy of progress replaces the providence of God that had been
believed to guide the historical process toward an eschatological consummation, by
the predictive power of science and technology bringing about a future of worldly
happiness. Science itself was described as having secularized the theological concept
of the law by turning it into the idea of eternal laws of nature, and the ideal of an infinite universe in early modern science was considered as the result of a secularization
of the earlier belief in the infinity of God.
In all these examples a religious content is transformed into something immanent
and this-worldly. Taken together these examples seemed to suggest that modern culture as a whole was the result of a process of secularization, where instead of God,
humanity was put in the center and entrusted with the task of directing the course of
history, the task which hitherto had been considered the prerogative of God's providence.
The thesis that modernity arose from a process of secularization got criticized by
others like Hans Blumenberg, because it puts modern culture under an obligation to
its Christian past so as if the substantial contents of modern culture would originally
and truly belong not to modernity, but to its Christian predecessor. Against that
Blumenberg asserted that modernity emancipated itself from the oppressive claims of
the Christian religion, human autonomy forming the core of the modern mind. In
effect, this position was not so far removed from that of the theorists of secularization,
because their point was also that the religious heritage had been transformed into
something else, since humanity rather than God was put in the center.
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There is, however, one fateful flaw in the views of both sides, of those who claim
that processes of secularization are responsible for the transition from medieval to
modern culture but also of those critics who account for that transition in terms of an
emancipation from a culture dominated by religion-both these views conceive of the
rise of modern culture in terms of a primarily ideological process . In reality, however,
the hard facts of war and civil war, the experience of a disruption of social order and
peace in consequence of religious controversies produced the occasion that necessitated the transition to a reconstruction of society and public culture that was no longer
based on unanimity in religion, since all endeavors to settle the quarrels between religious parties had proven to be in vain. As soon as one recognizes this situation in
early modern history, it becomes understandable that at the origin of modern culture
people did not mean to turn away from the Christian faith altogether. Emancipation
from religion was not the motivation but rather the longterm result of the processes
and pressures on enforcing a reconstruction of society on a foundation other than
religious faith . Since in the transition to a public culture based on conceptions of
human nature rather than religion, a break with Christianity was not intended, it is
also understandable that Christian ideas continued to be effective, but were often
transformed in the sense of secularized views .
In a Christian assessment of the relationship of modern culture to Christianity, it is
particularly important to appreciate correctly the origins of that culture. First, the
description of the process just offered dissolves the impression, as if modernity from
the outset was opposed to the Christian faith. Second, the description shows that the
visions of Western Christianity in the post-Reformation period and the lack of tolerance in religious controversies were directly responsible for the rise of a secularist culture. That entails the lesson for the Christian churches that unless they overcome
those inherited controversies and restore some form of unity among themselves
together with a reappropriation of the idea of tolerance to the Christian conception of
not only freedom, but of truth itself, they cannot reasonably expect that the exclusion
of religious positions from the public square of modern culture be reconsidered . On
the other hand, the memory of the role of religion in the origins of modern culture,
favors certain conceptions and prejudices about the divisiveness and intolerance of
Christian beliefs, entailing also their irrational character and prejudices, that are very
difficult to overcome .
V

A third fruit of an appropriate understanding of the way modern culture arose from
its Christian past, is an ability to recognize certain ambiguities in basic conceptions of
modern culture, ambiguities that are due to a mixture of Christian and non-Christian
elements. The most important example of this is the modern idea of freedom. On the
one hand , there is a Christian root of the belief that all human persons are born to be
free and that therefore their freedom ought to be respected. The Christian meaning of
that belief is that all human persons are created in the image of God and meant to
enjo y communion with God-in fact it is only communion with God that actually
sets us free, according to John 8:36 and Paul , 2 Cor. 3:17. Each human person is ere-
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ated in order to enjoy the freedom that issues from communion with God, but it is
only in Christ that such freedom is fully realized through redemption from sin and
death. The modern idea of freedom, as it was proposed most effectively by John
Locke, differs from the Christian view by focusing only on the natural condition of
the human person . It differs also, however, from its other source, the ancient stoic
ideas of natural law, since the Stoics considered the original freedom and equality of
human beings in the state of nature to be lost because of the necessities of a life in
society. It was the Reformation doctrine on the freedom of the Christian that made it
possible in Locke's thought to claim the original freedom as an actuality for the present state of human life. And in distinction from later libertarian views of individual
freedom, Locke thought that pure freedom is necessarily united with reason and
therefore relates affirmatively to law. One can take this position as an echo of the
Christian conception that freedom depends on being united with the good and, therefore, with God. The prevailing view of individual freedom in modem societies, however, is the right to do as one pleases. It is not connected with any notion of the good
as constitutive of such freedom itself. Any idea of freedom, of course, involves the risk
of its abuse, due to the conditions of the incompleteness of human existence in history. The risk of abuse, to be sure, has to be accepted wherever the right to decide independently is granted. But it makes a difference, whether the distinction between use
and abuse is observed or neglected in talking about the very constitution of human
freedom. If it is observed, freedom cannot be equated with unbridled license . But at
this point, the modern use of the idea of freedom is deeply ambiguous, and this ambiguity is characteristic of the ambivalence of secular culture with regard to values in
general and to the contents and standards of our cultural tradition in particular.
Consequently, a consumer attitude is prevailing far beyond the field of goods that can
be obtained or sold on the marketplace. The ambiguous relationship to values and to
the cultural tradition is also responsible for the weakness of secularist societies.

VI
Under the impact of Max Weber the dominate expectation concerning the future of
Western culture was, until recently, that secularization would continue to pervade all
aspects of society and of individual behavior while religion would be increasingly marginalized. Since two or three decades, however, it has become evident that secularization or,
as others put it, progressive modernization of society produces a feeling of meaninglessness in the public arena of society and culture, and such feeling can lead to frustration and
irrational, even violent outbreaks against the social system. This is the weakness of secularist culture and the main reason why it is difficult to predict its future . It depends on
how long the majority of people will be ready to pay the price of meaninglessness for the
space a secularist society offers to the exercise of individual license. As long as this is combined with a situation of comparative affluence, it might be tolerable for a long time. On
the other hand, irrational reactions are unpredictable, especially when the feeling of the
legitimacy of social institutions erodes . In this precarious situation, the secular societies of
the West would do well to pay more attention to the cultural tradition as a source of social
stability and especially strengthen the religious roots of their cultural identity.

34

Pannenberg

This is said with regard to the best self-interest of secular society concerning its
own stability and longterm survival. Religion as such has little stake in whether such
advice is heeded or not. Contrary to anxieties that were widespread a few decades ago
among people attached to religious faith, it can be said presently that the future of
religion is less precarious than that of the secularist society. Religion is not going to
fall victim to progressive secularization. Religion is not going to disappear, because
progressive modernization and secularization of society produce a need for sources
that can provide meaning for human life, a meaning that we do not give to our life
ourselves, but that we have to receive as given by some authority beyond human
manipulation. The resurgent interest in religion and in quasi-religious movements
that started a few decades ago took secularist intellectuals by surprise, but could have
been predicted (and was predicted by some) as an inevitable reaction to secularism.
The renewed interest in religion, however, did not always turn to the Christian
churches . In fact, it does so somewhat rarely. Among the reasons of this peculiar fact
there seem to be first the widespread prejudices against Christianity as "conventional
religion" in the public consciousness of the secularist culture. Therefore, alternative
religious options can seem more attractive. A second group of reasons for the fact that
the renaissance of religious sensitivity and yearning so often brings water on other
mills than the churches may have to do with the ways the churches or many of them
respond to the secularist culture. This is the final issue this lecture is turning to: How
should the churches relate to the secularist culture?
VII

The worst way of responding to the challenge of secularism on the part of the
Christian churches is to adapt to secular standards in language, thought and the style
of life. Unfortunately, many Christians and particularly many clergy consider adaptation to the secular culture a necessary strategy for winning over the people who live
in a secularist society and culture. But if members of a secularist society turn to religion at all, they look for something else than they have in that culture . It is the spiritual emptiness of secularism that makes people turn to religion. Therefore, if religion
is offered to them in a secularist style, where the religious content is carefully concealed-if it is present at all-it can be counterproductive. This explains, I guess, why
in recent decades there has been a decline of membership in mainline churches, while
conservative churches grow . What people look for in religion is a plausible alternative
or at least a complement to life in a secularist society , and when religion comes to
them in a secularist disguise, it is bound to be less attractive .
This argument does not suggest that the churches should stubbornly continue
everything that is old-fashioned. The old-fashioned ways of doing things in church
may include elements that are really boring or even neurotic . Religion should be presented to members of the secularist society as a vital alternative or complement that is
plausible as such . But an alternative to secularism it must be. The presentation of religion , its message and ritual, in secularist disguise inevitably raises the suspicion that
the religious substance has sold out and that perhaps the clergy themselves do no
longer believe what they are supposed to preach, when they try to get around the

Christianity and Secularism

35

hard issues. It is the proclamation of the risen Christ, the joyous manifestation in him
of a new life which overcomes death, that the Church owes to the members of a secularist culture .
That the Church in its teaching and lifestyle should withstand the drain of adaptation to the secularist culture, is not an argument in favor of fundamentalism. It is true
that fundamentalism in its many forms, with its apparent strength and certitude, is
psychologically often successful with persons who suffer from the emptiness and
uncertainties of secularism . Where fundamentalism seizes upon a complete population, it can become a terrible power producing a climate of intolerance and violence.
But it lacks a deeper plausibility. Therefore, the apparent certitude of fundamentalists
is often shallow.
Instead of the fanatic alternative of fundamentalism, the opposition of Christian
proclamation and faith to the spirit of secularism should always seek the alliance with
reason. That is in keeping with the classical Christian tradition that since the time of
the early church used the alliance with reason and with true philosophy to argue for
the universal validity of the Christian teaching. In the confrontation with fundamentalism, the secularists are right in exposing irrational fanaticism and intolerance. The
Christian opposition to secularism must not lay itself open to charges like that.
Rather, Christian teaching may confidently lay claim to the truth that the secularist
spirit thinks no longer worth searching for. While at the time of the enlightenment
Christian doctrines were challenged in the name of reason and rational truth, contemporary secularism has itself become irrational. It seems the more promising, in such a
situation, to renew the old alliance between the Christian faith and reason. Laying
claim to reason, however, requires the acceptance of criticism on the side of
Christianity itself and an ethos of self-criticism regarding traditional Christian doctrines and forms of spirituality. Even the Bible is not to be exempt from critical
inquiry. The acceptance of biblical criticism is an inevitable implication of a renewed
alliance between faith and reason. Our Christian confidence in the truth of God and
of His revelation should be vigorous enough to suppose that it will not be overcome
by any findings of critical inquiry, if only prejudiced forms of criticism are themselves
shown for what they are . It would display unbelief, if we felt it necessary to protect
the divine truth of the Bible from critical inquiry. Such inquiry can finally only
enhance the splendor of the truth of God contained in the biblical writings.
Confidence in that truth, however, is what the Christian proclamation and teaching
has to live on and to witness to in confronting the challenge of secularism.
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Whatever problems a typical reader of Genesis 1 may have with its creation
story, they rarely include a puzzlement about God's resting on the seventh day .
Yet even on a little reflection that rest reveals the kind of anthropomorphism
which all too often aggravates biblical parlance about God. Of course, the image
of God taking a rest should seem inoffensive in comparison with the image of
God who, according to the second creation story in Genesis 2-3, walks through
the Garden of Paradise in the afternoon breeze and replaces with leather garments of His own making the loincloths with which Adam and Eve covered their
sense of shame. If there is any human shortcoming involved in God's taking a
rest on the seventh day, it is far less shocking than His pretending ignorance of
why Adam and Eve felt ashamed on account of their nakedness.
Still, if one is to give, however indirectly, a literal meaning to the assertion
about God's taking a rest, it is impossible to avoid the inference that God somehow got tired as He went through His six-day work. The slightest concession to
anthropomorphism could then prompt one to picture God in the plainly anthropomorphic posture of toiling and getting tired, distinct as His predicament could
be from ordinary human exhaustion .
A most effective antidote to the prompting to think that God is but a superior
form of a human being is, of course, on hand in the Decalogue . There the very
first commandment, which imposes the duty to worship no gods, only the true
God, is bolstered by the prohibition of making graven images of Him: "You shall
not carve idols for yourselves in the shape of anything in the sky above or on the
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earth below or in the waters beneath the earth" (Exod . 20:4 ) . This prohibition, partly
because its transgression entailed death as punishment, forcibly reminded even the
most earthy Jew of the non-material nature of the true God. But if God was so different from anything material, what could be the reason for the emphatic assertion that
He ceased from His work of six days by taking a rest on the seventh?
The reason has much to do with the justification of the Decalogue's third commandment to turn every seventh day of the week into a holy day: "Remember to keep
holy the sabbath day." A justification, and hardly a trivial one, is clearly necessary
since the manner of fulfilling the commandment is outlined in severe details: "Six
days you may labor and do all your work, but on the seventh day is the sabbath of the
Lord, your God. No work may be done then either by you, or your son or daughter,
or your male or female slave, or your beast, or by the alien who lives with you"
(Exod. 20:8-10). Indeed, the justification given could not have been more exalted in
character-the
very example set by almighty God is invoked-"In
six days the Lord
made the heavens and the earth, the sea and all that is in them; but on the seventh
day he rested. That is why the Lord has blessed the sabbath day and made it holy"
(Exod. 20:11) .
Clearly, one is faced here with a divine role model set for man. The point is made
even more emphatically when God enjoins Moses to tell the Israelites that the sabbath-rest is both the expression of God's holiness and a means of making the people
holy . Moreover, if the same rest is "an everlasting token" between Him and the people, it is only because "in six days the Lord made the heavens and the earth, but on
the seventh day he rested at his ease" (Exod. 31: 17). Last but not least, the seriousness of the command is conveyed by the threat that anyone desecrating the sabbath
would be put to death and "if anyone does work on that day, he must be rooted out
from his people" (Exod. 31:14).
A rather different justification of the observance of the sabbath is given in the second version of the Decalogue where only the prohibition to make one's slaves work
on the sabbath is mentioned (Deut. 5:15). This difference is, of course, only one of
the many that impose the conclusion that the Pentateuch was composed of different
parts and over a long period of time. The justification of the sabbath rest with a reference to the example set by God may indeed have been formulated only in post-Exilic
times. It could, of course, have circulated orally long before and the prohibition itself
could very well be of Mosaic origin . But since that justification is strikingly similar to
the concluding phrase of the first creation story, its dating can hardly be separated
from the dating of that story .
The dating of the first creation story, as given in Genesis 1 (actually Gen. 1:1-Gen.
2:3), is in part conditioned by the fact that it starkly differs from the story of creation narrated in Genesis 2 and 3. The latter story, because of its primitively narrative character,
can readily be assigned to Mosaic times . But the very systematic character of the first creation story betrays the kind of reflection which coincides with later periods in literary
development. However, regardless of how the various parts of the Pentateuch are dated,
the results would not entail a reconsideration of the main conclusion in this essay.
The usual reason for assigning Genesis 1 to post-Exilic times is its alleged depen-
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dence on Enuma elish, the Babylonian creation story. Recitals of that story had to be a
familiar experience to the Jews in the Exile. But surely, the post-Exilic author of
Genesis 1 showed a great originality in eliminating almost everything from that long
and convoluted story in order to produce from it, if such was the case at all, his own
story in Genesis 1. He kept nothing whatsoever of the long and bloody struggle in
which Marduk had to engage before coming to the creation of the world. In that struggle, vaguely symbolic as it could be of the conflict of physical forces or entities, such as
sea water, fresh water and mist, Marduk first has to vanquish an armada of gods who
rally behind Tiamat the great mother. Moreover, even after his victory Marduk has to
use as raw material the chopped up parts of Tiamat's carcass for the formation of the
various parts of the world. 1 Clearly, there is something unconvincing in Marduk's producing the sky by his mere breath, a far cry from creation out of nothing. 2
In Genesis 1 there is no trace of any butchery, any rivalry or any battle. No
Leviathan there, no hint of a ChaoskampP-in
short, no evidence of any exertion on
God's part. God, in Genesis 1, produces everything with an ease which is not disturbed by any competition or difficulty. That consummate ease makes it improper to
think that God needed six days for doing His work, let alone for His resting on the
seventh. Yet, God emphatically rests on completing His creative work on the seventh
day. Here too the difference between Genesis 1 and Enuma elish is nothing short of
monumental. The Babylonian story is neither structured on a seven-day week, nor
does it come to an end with a rest. Rather, on concluding his world-making, Marduk
begins a wild celebration with his troupe of victorious gods . Last but not least, in the
Babylonian story humans are produced only for the purpose of providing the gods
with slaves so that they may continue their carousings at leisure.
This contrast between the endings of these two creation stories should alone discredit efforts to make Genesis 1 appear as a borrowing from Babylonian lore . The idea
of such a borrowing is not even bolstered by the fact that in Babylon the king, his
magician, and his physician had to abstain from certain acts on the seventh day of
each week of two particular lunar months, the Marchesvan and the intercalary month
Elul. They must not eat food prepared with fire, must not ride in chariots, must not
wear bright garments, and should not exercise authority ... But for the ordinary
Babylonians life could go on as on any other day of sweat and toil.
Herein lies a major difference with the Jewish sabbath as legislated in the terms set
forth above. Also, the Jewish sabbath, unlike the Babylonian, was not fixed to the
lunar month. There is no trace in Hamurabi's legislation about the obligation to forgo
manual work on the seventh day of the week. 5 The Babylonian shabattu and shapattu
are in all evidence unrelated to the Hebrew sabbath. The latter's uniqueness or originality has so far withstood all efforts to present it as a borrowing from other cultures.
And the same holds true of Genesis 1 as a whole, although for reasons not necessarily
identical with the widely received ones.
One such reason relates to the first phrase of Genesis 1, which contains a detail
unnecessarily and unjustifiedly turned into one of its distinctive elements . Th e detail
is the verb bara, a verb made mysterious by countless exegetes. " They are , of course,
right in saying that in all but five of the fifty or so of its occurrences in the Old
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Testament, bara stands for an action performed by God. But not a few exegetes of that
chapter were hardly justified in passing over in silence the fact that there are exceptions to such a use of bara. Moreover, the exceptions are not insignificant. Three of
them, two in Joshua Uosh. 17:15 and 18), and one in Ezekiel (Ezek. 23:4 7), are noteworthy partly because they are textually well attested readings. More importantly, the
ones in Joshua and the one in Ezekiel are separated by six or seven centuries. In other
words, they attest the permanence of the use of bara with a purely human connotation-there
is nothing divine in the act of cutting down trees on some hilltops, as
commanded by Joshua . The same is true of the command of Ezekiel that the bodies of
two women of ill repute, representing a faithless Judah and Israel, be cut to pieces.
Tellingly, translators of Genesis 1 are very reluctant to render the first verse of
Genesis 1 as, say, "In the beginning God has sundered the heavens [from] the earth." 7
Yet this is what would be required by a strict adherence to the basic meaning of bara.
Instead, it has become a hallowed custom to render that verse as "In the beginning
God made the heaven and the earth" which does less injustice to the etymology of
bara than the phrase, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."
After two thousand years of Christian theological reflection, the word creation can
emphatically mean only creation out of nothing or creatio ex nihilo. This phrase was
indeed formulated in early Christian times 8 because it was quickly realized that what
Christians meant by creation differed enormously from the "creation" performed by
Plato's demiourgos, let alone from what was on hand in crassly emanationist, pantheistic cosmogonies. In all these the word creare (or its synonyms) could be used, but
only insofar as it meant mere growth (crescere) from something already there, however embryonically or seminally.
Creation out of nothing is, of course, a supremely effortless act, inasmuch as it
totally eliminates all dependence on matter. As such it cannot mean the cutting
through of any matter. Of such an absolutely effortless act of creation there is no trace
in Genesis 1, free though that chapter is of any crude overtone in reference to a God
who works, and performs indeed the greatest conceivable work, the creation of all.
But the verb bara in the first verse of Genesis 1 still suggests, etymologically at least,
that God cut through something, or sundered one part of a thing from another, as He
created the all, a totality conveyed by a listing of its two main parts, or the heaven and
the earth.
That etymological connotation is much less evoked in the concluding phrase of the
creation story. No reference to heaven and earth is made as God is said to have
blessed the seventh day and made it holy because on that day God rested "from all his
work which God in creating had made (barn)." The idea of sundering is only remotely
present when the creation of man as male and female is reported in terms of bara in
verse 27. The immediate context is the making of man in the image of God, where
bara is used twice.
It would, however , be rash to think that the eminence of man, being made in the
image of God , called for the use of bara in order to convey an eminently divine action.
For bara is used in connection with the creation of "the great sea animals and all that
creeps, (having) a living soul , which swarmed in the waters according to its kind, and
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every bird ( with) wing according to its kind ." By contrast the verb asa is used to
denote the making of the obviously much more noble items-the sun, the moon, and
the stars. By then asa had been used in reference to the making of the firmament
(verse 7), the most noble part of the Hebrew world edifice . Again, asa is used in verse
31, in reference to the totality of what God has made, in jarring dissonance with the
use of bara in the first verse, where the making of the totality of things is stated. Asa is
again used when the making of all land animals is mentioned (verse 25). The indiscriminate occurrence of these two verbs in Genesis 1 might by itself discourage efforts
to ascribe too readily to bara a status with a divine connotation.
No wonder that in translating Genesis 1 into any modern language, scholars have
rendered both bara and asa by the same verb, either to make or to create. The two
Hebrew verbs are indeed synonymous to a high degree, whatever their etymological
differences. Why then did bara earn the special distinction of being used, in the rest
of the Old Testament, mostly in connection with an action performed by God?
Genesis 1 alone makes it difficult to seek that tie in the relative nobility of the object
of God's action. The stars, the moon, and the sun, to say nothing of the firmament,
could, even if deprived of any divine status, still seem far nobler than whales and reptiles, yet these lowly creatures and not those heavenly bodies were said to have been
made in terms of bara.
The answer for the almost invariable connection of bara with a divine action may
lie in its etymology. Did not the act of slashing carry the connotation of performing
something with ease? Analogy with the English idiom, to do something with a flourish, comes to mind. Therefore the first verse in Genesis 1 may mean that "In the
beginning God made with the utmost ease the heaven and the earth, that is, the totality of things." However, this point should not be pressed too much. It may be more
appropriate to say that bara and asa were simply used for the sake of stylistic variety .
As was noted above, the expression "heaven and earth" means the totality of
things -or the universe. It should seem natural that if God is assigned any work, it
should not be about some detail but about the whole. The work should have for its
object the most encompassing work conceivable, the making of the all or the universe. Indeed, in three steps it is the idea of this totality which is conveyed in
Genesis 1. After the general statement concerning the all (verse 1), the work of the
second and third days conveys the same totality in terms of the principal parts of the
whole or universe as known to the Hebrews . The whole or universe is a tent-like
world-edifice, with the floor (the earth) and the roof (the firmament) as its principal
parts. Plants come with the earth, because wherever there is moist soil, some vegetation invariably sprouts up.
The same device is used to convey the notion of the all, or universe , in the work of
the fourth and fifth days, which witness the production of the main particulars of the
principal parts. The stars, sun, and moon are the main particulars of the roof of the
cosmic tent, whereas the birds and the fish are the main particulars of the floor region
(earth). In fact the author of Genesis 1 gives a hint of his full awareness of using the
device in question as he summarizes God's action as follows: "Thus the heaven and
the earth and all their array were completed. " Th e word arra y is a rendering of th e
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Hebrew cebaam (hosts) because of its closeness to cbi (ornament, glory) and therefore
also translated as decor. Jerome rendered it as ornatus, which in turn provided the
basis for summarizing the six-day work as opus divisionis and opus ornatus. Had it
been translated, as it certainly could have been, as "particulars," its role in supporting
the repeated assertion of totality as the objective of God's work would have sharply
stood out.
The stylistic device to convey the idea of the whole by the listing of its main parts
is very common in biblical Hebrew. In the Psalms alone 9 one finds a plethora of uses
of that device. That all people, or everybody, are meant is conveyed by such expressions "low and high," "rich and poor," "little and great," "the just and the wicked"
(Pss. 50, 114, 10). All beasts are meant by "wild and tame" (Ps. 148). All the time, or
always, or all seasons, is the meaning of "day and night," "summer and winter,"
"evening, morning, and noon" (Pss. 1, 74, 55). All movements, all postures are meant
by "coming and going," "to walk and to lie down" (Pss. 121 and 139). Psalm 148 is so
much structured on this device of stating the whole by listing its main parts as to lend
itself to be condensed in a few words: In the heavens/ everybody, everything/ on the
earth/ everything/ everybody/ praise the lord! The similarity with the structure and
method of Genesis 1 should seem obvious.
The device, whereby the idea of totality is conveyed in terms of listing the parts, is
a staple feature in classical as well as modern languages. Suffice to mention the Greek
en ge hai thalassa, which is terra marique in Latin, and "on land and sea" in English,
meaning "everywhere" in each case. In English, this device is on hand in the idiomatic phrases, "lock, stock, and barrel" (the three main parts of a rifle), and "hook, line,
and sinker" (three main parts of a fishing gear). Both mean a far greater totality than
the entire rifle or the entire fishing equipment.
Curiously, authors, old and new, of books on rhetoric do not pay sufficient attention to this very effective device which may best be called "totum per partes."
Whenever they speak of merismos, those authors, beginning with Aristotle, have in
mind rather the device of pars pro toto, which is to convey the idea of totality in terms
of one principal part. Exegetes still have to produce a detailed study of the role which
the totum per partes plays in the Bible as a means of conveying the idea of totality.
The reliance in Genesis 1 on the device totum per partes should seem especially significant in view of the surprising rarity of the use of the adjective hhol (all), a word
which, in a context dealing with the all, could be expected to be a dominant feature.10
Yet hhol occurs only in reference to the birds and reptiles, and to the plants that nourish man . The only broader use of hhol occurs only at the end, in reference to the completion by God of all his work and to his resting from all his work.
In Genesis 1 the stating of totality as the object of God's work hinges above all on
the use of that stylistic device . It is free from that conceptual obfuscation which is the
hallmark of explaining Genesis 1 in terms of myths and legends, both left studiedly
undefined. It was not without good reason that Alfred Loisy, a modernist, who would
have gladly found in Genesis 1 a legend, called it the most scholastic treatise in the
entire Bible. 11 But that almost scholastically logical character of Genesis 1, anchored in
the idea of the vastness or total character and of the unrestricted goodness of God's
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work, remains genuinely biblical, riveted as it is in the biblical notion of the universe .
This is why the firmament comes first , as a place closer to the throne of God than the
ground, which logically should have come first.
The land animals, which should have come with the fish and the birds as chief particulars of the ground area, come on the sixth day as a background to emphasize the
superiority of man and woman over them. Adam conveys his superiority over the animals by naming them. The woman's superiority over the animals is conveyed by the
fact that Adam finds no suitable mate for himself among them.
By the sixth day it has been repeatedly stated that whatever God has made is good .
The goodness, the perfection of God 's productivity, is expressed also in the fact that,
as any accomplished architect, God too provides for a manager, for a steward . The
perfection of God's work is further conveyed by the fact that , like all sensible architects, He too begins by providing light, before He does anything. By specifying the
purpose of the sun to give light, Genesis 1 reveals much of the ambivalence of biblical
parlance about light as a special substance, independent of the sun. 11
Therefore one is entitled, in the context of Genesis 1 alone, to argue that the coming of the light before anything else physical depends above all on the intention of the
author of Genesis 1 to present God as a most reasonable worker. As such, God does
what every skilled architect or contractor does-He begins by providing light for His
work. (He also begins by having on hand the piled up building material-a perspective within which the presence of a primitive chaos [tohuvabohu] logically follows .) It
makes no sense, that is, biblical sense, to get around the problem of the coming of visible light before the sun by searching in the words "Let there be light!" for a hint of
invisible light as assured either in Maxwell 's electromagnetic radiation or in the 2. 7°K
cosmic background radiation. It should now also be very clear why it is abusive to
take, however furtively, Genesis 1 for a science textbook in cosmogenesis and biogenesis. It is rather sad that at times well-meaning and devout , first-rate scientists give
support to that vagary., i
Such an abuse of Genesis 1 did not begin with latter-day creationists . Inasmuch as
creationism is an effort to find a concordance between Genesis 1 and the science of
the day, practically all the church fathers, all the scholastics, all the reformers and
counter-reformers, and all 18th- and 19th-century exegetes of Genesis 1 were guilty
on that score. '4 It was not until 1900 or so that the haplessness of this situation began
to dawn on leading exegetes.
On the Catholic side, the dawn of awakening was epitomized by F. Hummelauer,
professor of Old Testament exegesis at Gregorian University and co-editor of the
series Cursus scripturae sacrae, to which he contributed the volume on Genesis . There
at the end of his survey of the history of interpretations of Genesis 1 he exclaimed :
"All is darkness and chaos , whence let light come forth at long last!"' 5 Hummelauer
felt that there is a solution on hand if Genesis 1 is treated as a series of visions given
to Moses . The question whether, among other things, the firmament , to say nothing
of the flat earth, was real or merely visionary for Moses , remained unanswered by
Hummelauer. Only by doing grave injustice to the very realistic diction of Genesis 1
could one assume that the firmament and the upper waters were not real for the

author of Genesis 1, be it Moses or whoever else.
Dissatisfaction with concordist interpretations of Genesis 1 prompted H. Gunkel,
on the Protestant side, to give a radically new direction to efforts to cope with that
troublesome chapter. He did so, however, by insisting that Genesis 1 be treated as a
legend, a myth, to be understood by aesthetic sensitivity. 10 Like many of his Protestant
followers (with G. von Rad being most influential among them) and, from the 1940s
on, many Catholics as well, Gunkel failed to be specific on the crucial question: What
is to be meant by legend and how can it be used in coping with the very realist parlance of the author of Genesis 1 about the external universe? Much less could he
explain himself on the subject of aesthetic sensitivity, a very elusive and markedly
subjective commodity. The question about the specific nature of a legend or myth was
not, for instance, answered in Danielou's handwaving that the author of Genesis 1
"used its material freely." 17 In fact, the systematic approach of that author, as outlined
above, indicates that he did not feel at all free as to what to say and how to proceed.
The world as he knew it, and his intent to put across the idea of cosmic totality, set
for him a narrowly defined path for presenting his principal message.
That message is the kind of key to Genesis 1 whereby it is unlocked from the fateful grip of comparisons with science, old and new. That principal message is not that
God created everything, not that He has full dominance over everything, not even that
man was created in His image. Much less is the principal message that man has to be
an ecologically minded steward of God's creation, if this message is there at all, and
not merely read into it by some new-fangled ecological consciousness.
In Genesis 1, as in any other well-written story, the principal message is disclosed
at the very end. At the end of Genesis 1 God is said to have rested on the seventh day,
after taking a general look at the completion of a work touching on all things. But this
brings back the very first puzzle raised at the very start of this essay: Did God need a
rest? Did He spend energy as He worked?
Since both these questions ought to be answered, and for very clear biblical reasons, in the negative, an explanation must be sought in a different direction. This
direction readily offers itself as soon as one takes seriously the possibility, a most likely one, that Genesis 1 is a post-Exilic document. The direction is not that very dubious one which is tied to the alleged similarity of Genesis 1 with Enuma elish, a story
which the Jews could hear ad nauseam during their capitivity in Babylon. What really
nauseated them was their being under cultural pressure to take the seventh day in the
manner in which all others did-by toiling, selling, buying, and carousing.
The immediately post -Exilic times witnessed the birth of modern Judaism, with a
central emphasis on the sacredness of the sabbath rest . General neglect of the sabbath
observance had already been singled out by Jeremiah as a sufficiently grave offense to
bring down "unq uenchable fire" on the gates of Jerusalem, whereas its observance
could assure that "it remain inhabited forever" Uer. 17:19-27) . In reciting the story of
Israel's infidelity, Ezekiel mentions the habitual breaking of the sabbath and lets God
recall : "I also gave them my sabbaths to be a sign between me and them, to show that
it was I, the Lord , who made them holy" (Ezek. 20 :12).
In spite of such prophetic utterances, and in spite of the agonizing lessons of the

Captivity, the observance of the sabbath left much to be desired among the Remnant,
whatever the meticulous observance on the part of some. Among the latter were those
who, in the Maccabean wars, refused to defend themselves when attacked on the sabbath, a policy which had to be corrected (1 Mace. 2:31-41) . No corrective action
stemmed the trend which is codified in the section "Shabbath" of the Mishna. There
among the "forty save one" works prohibited are not only sowing, ploughing, threshing, building, pulling down, and similar patently heavy manual works, but also "making two loops, weaving two threads, separating two threads ... writing two letters, erasing in order to write two letters . .. and taking out aught from one domain into another." Concerning the latter class of work, among the forbidden minute amounts to be
moved was the mere drop of oil sufficient to rub the little toe of a one-day old child. 1~
More serious trangressions were the target of Nehemiah 's animated pleas on behalf
of the holiness of the sabbath which he saw threatened by the mercantile pressures of
profit-making. In denouncing them in eight verses (Neh . 13:15-22), practically the
grand finale of the historical books in the Hebrew Bible, Nehemiah pronounces eleven
times the word sabbath. This makes those eight verses well-nigh unique in the entire
Bible with respect to the sabbath and helps one to understand why its observance
became so central in the formation of post-Exilic Judaism.
Since in that formation Nehemiah played a central part, it may not seem unjustified to connect the redaction of Genesis 1 with his highly-charged concern for the
sacredness of the sabbath. This may also explain the amplification of older texts of
Exodus with verses, already quoted, that tie the command about the sabbath observance to God's rest following his act of creation . Such may have been also the context
of the addition of various specifics concerning works prohibited on the sabbath .
Given at a time when the people lived a nomadic life in the desert , the original Mosaic
legislation could hardly contain all the restrictive details on hand in Exodus 20 which
is most likely a priestly recension. Most importantly, the obligatory character of those
details could be greatly strengthened by a parable in which Almighty God acts as a
role model for resting on the seventh day .
Reading Genesis 1 as a parable does not turn it into a legend or a myth . The closer
the ties between parables and reality, the more powerful the message . This is why , for
instance, the parable of the sower is so effective in its moral message. Genesis 1 would
lose much of the effectiveness of its essentially moral message, given in terms of God as
a role model for observing the sabbath, if one were to take lightly the realism of its
worldview. That view is about the all, as seen by pre-modern man. But, and here comes
the biblical saving grace for Genesis 1, that all is merely a reminder that there may be
an immensely larger all, not yet known by man, and ultimately known only to God.
In this age, when breakthroughs in scientific cosmology are announced every other
month, it is well to recall that scientific cosmologists can never be sure that they deal
with the strict totality of things, as they deal with a vast aggregation of galaxies. While an
infinite universe was always a sheer extrapolation, never to be viewed from the outside
by scientific observers, the finite Einsteinian universe too precludes its scientific verification by external observation . The all, the Universe writ large, remains even in this scien tific age the object of an inference, and not a strictly verifiable scientific object. 1''
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The same difference exists in the Bible between the all known by man at a particular time and the all known by God . Awareness of this has telling instances in the
Bible . Hanna 's exclamation (1 Sam . 2:3) about an all-knowing God witnesses that
awareness within the common ranks of the people . On a socially much higher level,
there is a similar, though equally spontaneous, instance on hand in Mordecai 's prayer
where the inference to an all which may surpass the "heaven and earth " lurks
between the lines: "You made heaven and earth and every wonderful thing under the
heavens. You are Lord of all, and there is no one who can resist you, Lord. You know
all things" (Esther 4C:4-5). Against this background, Esther 's own exclamation, "you
know all things! " may readily appear in its true perspective . Also in post-Exilic times,
Susanna takes refuge in the fact that the eternal God knows not only all that is hidden
but "all things before they come into being " (Dan . 14:42). These exemplary members
of the Jewish people had, in speaking of the all known to God, immensely more in
mind than the all that needed to be known about their own particular case . They had
in mind that all which it was the privilege of the Almighty to know, an all that could
only be approximated, and very remotely at that, by the ever-growing grasp of man's
knowledge about things and events.
Had that difference been kept in mind by those learned in biblical lore, much benefit would have been derived both in Jewish and in Christian circles. Among Jews, a
barrier would have been set against hairsplitting, so prevalent in Talmudic and
Midrashic comments on Genesis 1, concerning physical details of the world-making
as described in Genesis 1.20 The presence of such a barrier would have channelled
mental energies for using the sabbath-rest as a spiritual immersion in the meaning of
creation. The depths of that immersion were far from being fathomed when
Maimonides registered a by then staple view that God commanded resting on the sabbath so that the truth of creation might be pondered and gratefulness for God's kindness be rekindled. 11
The stifling regulations of Mishnah cast their shadows even when a truly deep perspective was voiced. A case in point is the Horeb by Samson Raphael Hirsch, chief
rabbi in Oldenburg in the 1830s. He viewed the sabbath as a weekly reminder for man
about the ever possible misuse of his creative abilities: "What was there to safeguard
the world against man? What safeguard that man in his position of honour would not
forget God; that he would not look upon the world, which had been entrusted to him
to govern according to God 's will , as his own property; that in his controlling power
over the things around him he would not regard himself as master; and that he would
not live in God 's world solely according to his human will? " The safeguard was the
sabbath-rest. This meant that "even the smallest work done on the Sabbath is a denial
of th e fact that God is the Creator and Master of the world. " However, the work was
not ph ys ical exe rtion as such , but any work , however minutely physical which
involved a "con structive exercise " of one 's intellect: "If you have engendered, without
th e slight est exertion , even th e small est change in an object for human purposes , then
you have profaned the Sabbath , flouted God , and undermined your calling as Jew."
And as if to opp ose all temptations of mod ernity , Rabbi Hirsch explicitly specifies
man's "tech nical skill " that assis ts man's spirit so that he may master the world as the
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operation to be utterly set aside on the sabbath. By the sabbath-rest man restores the
world to God and acknowledges that his own authority over it stands in subjection to
Him. 12

The shift from the last day of the week to the first in the Christian context entailed
also a liberation from stifling prohibitions. In line with this, Jerome introduced the
distinction between servile and non-servile work as the true meaning of the Mosaic
legislation concerning the sabbath-rest. Also, the doctrine of Christ's resurrection
included a cosmic perspective on the sabbath-rest, as the pledge of the final restoration of all, a process to which the Christian could rightly contribute, especially with
culturally creative work. More recent theological reflections on the resurrection of
Christ contain indeed renewed awareness of its ties to the first creation, brought to a
close by God's resting on the seventh day. n
There are indeed good reasons for believing that a deeper understanding of the
sabbath-rest would help to put the six-day creation story in its true perspective-it is
a parable with the primary purpose of setting up God as a model in the role of resting
after a six-day work. But precisely because the resting is done by God, it symbolizes
full spiritual activity. As such it can and should be imitated by man through concentrating on spiritual matters while refraining from all sorts of slaving, toiling and busybodying.
Had Genesis 1 been seen in this perspective ( which is very different from the perspective of the various steps of His world-making), the lures of concordism might
have been resisted from the start, that is, from the late second century that saw the
work of the first Christian apologists. The lure was the temptation to have the worldview of Genesis 1 appear to be in conformity with the light which scientific workfirst Aristotelian-Ptolemaic, then Copernican, afterwards Newtonian and Laplacian,
and in our times Einsteinian and post-Einsteinian-provides
about the physical
world. For all their awareness of the dangers of that lure, a Basil and an Augustine
nevertheless tended to yield to it. The result was a by now two-thousand-year-long
bungling with Genesis 1, which brings only discredit to the message about salvation
and provides endless grist to the mill of scoffers, of ten taking cover with copious references to science.
Most importantly, concordist interpretations of Genesis 1 greatly distract from its
principal message, which is to see in the Maker of All a role-model for making the
sabbath holy . It may be best left for Orthodox Jewish scholars to articulate this connection without imposing prohibitions such as , for instance , the stopping of elevators
on the sabbath. As to Christians , their refocusing on that role-model would dampen
their enthusiasm for being busy with all sorts of manual projects on weekends. Few
factors would indeed counter so effectively the runaway secularization not merely of
life but of the lives of Christians as well, than their devout consideration that the
Maker of All had set for them the pattern to follow.
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Notes
l.
Almost invariably ignored by champions of the similarity . A most notable case is provided
by the volume Genesis (Anchor Bible) , translated with an introduction and notes by E.A.
Speiser (Garden City, N .Y.: Doubleday, 1962), p. 10.
2. See on this A. Heidel, The Babylonian Genesis: The Story of Creation, 2d ed . (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 21.
3. If Genesis 1 was composed after the Exile, the absence of cosmic struggle in it is all the
more noteworthy. Not only did the author of Genesis 1 give wide berth to what had already been
available in Isaiah chapter 27, but also to two post-Exilic Psalms, 74(75) and 89(90), in both of
which God's crushing of the heads of Leviathan (Rahab) is given with succinct vividness as an
expression of God's superiority over whatever dark forces there may be operating in nature.
4. See R. North, "The Derivation of Sabbath," Biblica 36 (1955): 182-201.
5. Those who overemphasize the dependence of the Mosaic legislation on Hamurabi's laws,
in order to undermine the possibility of revelation, are, as a rule, strangely silent on the total
absence in that famed Babylonian text to any reference to a rest on the last day of the week. It
hardly testifies to much thinking that this applies to the most widely read English version of
Hamurabi's laws, The World's Earliest Laws by C. Edwards {London : Watts & Co, 1934), which
is number 4 3 in The Thinker's Library.
6. Such as W. Eichrodt and P. Heinisch. Their efforts partly hinge on the rather unconvincing implicit assertion that the meaning of a Hebrew verb can noticeably change when used in
some (Kal and Nifil) and not in other tenses.
7. Even such a resolute champion as P. Beauchamp of the idea that biblical creation is a separation is reluctant to obey the full logic of his position in this respect. See his Creation et separa
tion: Etude exegetique du chapitre premier de la Genese (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1969) .
8. This was done with a particular force by Tertullian.
9 . For other examples, see my Genesis 1 through the Ages (London: Thomas More Press; New
York: Wethersfield Institute, 1992), pp. 281-86 .
10. As noted by H. Ringgren in his article khol in Theologisches Worterbuch zum Alten
Testament (Stuttgart : W. Kohlhammer, 1982- ), vol. 4, col. 148.
11. A. loisy, Les mythes babyloniens et les premiers chapitres de Genese (1901; repr. Frankfurt:
H. Saamer, 1916), p . 25 .
12. That independence was emphasized, more on the basis of Egyptian than of biblical documents,
by W .F. Albright, in section I, on chaos and the origin of light in Genesis, of his essay, "Contributions
to Biblical Chronology and Archeology" Journal of BiblicalLiterature43 (1924): 363-69.
13. The widest circulation was given to that misunderstanding by the famous astronomer, Sir
James Jeans, in his The Mysterious Universe, first published in 1929 . There the reference to the
transformation of matter into radiation is followed by a prominent scientist's most unscientific
exegesis: "These concepts reduce the whole universe to a world of light , potential or existent,
so that th e whole story of its creation can be told with perfect accuracy and completeness in the
six words: 'God said, let there be light ' " (p. 3) . In recent years, A. Penzias, a devout Orthodox
J ew and a Nobel laur eate, made a similar connection in the pag es of the New York Times
(March 12, 1978 , p . l) .
14. As argued throughout my Genesis 1 through the Ages.
15. F. Hummelauer, Commentarius in Genesim (Paris: P. lethielleu x, 1895) , p . 68 .
16. H. Gunkel, The Legends of Genesis, tr. W.H. Carruth (Chicago: Open Court, 1907) .
17. J. Danielou, In the Beginning . .. Genesis I- III , with a foreword by G . Sloyan (Baltimore:
Helicon , 1965), p. 29.
18. The Misl111a,translated from the Hebrew with introduction and brief exp lanator y notes by
H. Danby (Lond on: Oxford University Press , 1933), p . 106 . Similar details fill for the most part
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the entire section "Shabbath " pp . 100-120 .
19. See my Is there a Universe? (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press ; New York: Wethersfield
Institute, 1993), the enlarged text of the Forwood Lectures for 1992 delivered at that
University .
20. For details, see my Genesis 1 through the Ages, pp. 43-45 .
21. The Guide for the Perplexed, tr. M. Friedlander (1881 ; 2d rev. ed. ; New York: Dover , 1956) ,
p. 219 (part 11, ch. 31).
22. S.R. Hirsch , Horeb: A Philosophy of Jewish Laws and Observances, tr. 1. Grunfeld (London :
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SUICIDE
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There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide . Judging
whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question
of philosophy. -Albert
Camus

In the state of Michigan, a battle is raging over the activity of Dr. Jack
Kevorkian. A former pathologist, he began medically assisting suicides in 1990
to enable suffering, terminally ill patients to end their lives. In March 1993, the
Michigan state legislature banned assisted suicides, a law specifically aimed at
Kevorkian. What is happening in Michigan, largely inspired by the furor surrounding "Dr. Death," is a microcosm of things to come in the United States.
The scenario in Michigan concerning physician-assisted suicide (PAS) or medicide is not new, but has been fanning the flames of the debate elsewhere over
this practice, a debate that will undoubtedly in time take on national and international proportions. The Hemlock Society, which promotes the legalization of
PAS for the terminally ill, has upwards of 50,000 members, and recently two
states voted down "right to die" initiatives by only narrow margins .1
More and more people are coming to believe that it is their right to end their
lives when they wish by this intentional means. If assistance from a doctor is
required, the doctor should not be punished. PAS, so the argument goes, should
not be legally banned. Those who oppose the legalization of PAS and thereby
support the banning of it, on the other hand, claim that the state would make a
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mistake if it does not take a stand against it, and inaction would establish a dangerous
precedent by essentially sanctioning the deliberate taking of life.
PAS obviously transcends the scope of Kevorkian and his lawyer, Geoffrey Fieger.
A more thorough treatment would engage the more thoughtful Dr. Timothy Quill,
author of Death and Dignity : Making Choices and Taking Charge. However, since
Kevorkian and Fieger represent such central figures in this emerging debate, it is
instructive to take them as somewhat paradigmatic of this movement . Kevorkian sees
himself as the leading proponent of an important historical revolution, in which the
taboo surrounding death will finally be removed .
He has apparently received numerous requests for assistance. He screens out many
of them, ostensibly considering only those which meet the following criteria: the
patient must be suffering from a fatal or irremediable condition from which he or she
will never recover, the patient's family must entirely agree, the patient's medical condition must be verifiable by Kevorkian, a psychological consultation when appropriate and the patient must never waver.
In an effort to explore a few of the relevant issues involved in this admittedly
morally ambiguous question, let us critically examine a representative argument in
favor of PAS, which typically goes something like this: People have the right to end
their own lives, and to enlist medical professionals to help, when pain becomes too
great to bear and life's quality is thereby reduced to an unconscionable level. Those,
myself included, who would deny this right are, according to Fieger, religiously motivated fanatics who simply wish to impose their provincial views on others. Three
important issues raised by this stance of PAS supporters are the following: What
should be thought of those religiously motivated opponents of PAS? Is it truly people's right to end their lives when they wish with a doctor's assistance? And is the
rationale ofreducing pain sufficient basis on which to risk legalization of PAS?
RELIGIOUS BIAS
What should be thought of religiously motivated opponents of PAS? A large number of the most vocal opponents of PAS are, at some level, religiously motivated .
Among supporters of PAS there has been a concerted effort to capitalize on the religious nature of this resistance . Among the likes of Fieger is a conscious and deliberate
attempt to portray the opponents of PAS as zealous religionists far to the political
right of mainstream America . These fanatical reactionaries, the argument goes,
though unwilling themselves to change , are exceedingly willing to impose their narrow views on others . At the most elementary and obvious level, this effort is an example of the logical fallacy argumentum ad hominem , which assumes that discrediting a
person thereb y discredits his or her arguments.
A more legitimate critique of religious motives questions their value in a pluralistic
society. In an age when the wall of separation between church and state is assiduously
maintain ed, and when th e need for tolerance and openness to a broad spectrum of
ideas is emphasi zed , religion has taken on a pejorative tone in public discourse. The
trend is toward increasingly permissive legislation, including the legalization of PAS,
and perso nal choice seems to be the dictated conclusion of any social issue involving
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religious conviction. All it takes for an issue to be decided on the basis of personal
choice is the characterization of the debate as religious in character, at which point it is
automatically assumed that nothing more needs to be said. If classical theism or traditional religion is involved, then the question is answered: personal choice has priority. 2
Certainly this debate entails more than religious considerations alone. Relevant to
this debate, for instance, are agreed upon nonreligious standards to test consequences. But this debate remains in need of being informed by religion. An issue like
PAS or euthanasia requires societies to decide on a collective moral vision. Christians
in this society have always been passionate players in that process, and those of every
creed must continue to be involved and included. Unfortunately, this culture is
quickly forfeiting its intellectual capacity to acknowledge the relevance of transcendent and religiously based normative moral codes to public discourse. Richard John
Neuhaus, one of today's foremost authorities on religion in contemporary society,
stresses that laws, to retain legitimacy, must be seen to be coherently connected with
basic presuppositions about right and wrong, good and evil.3 He warns that morality
becomes mere sentimentality when its religious foundations and theological underpinnings are lost, but recently we have too often uncritically assumed that religiously
based moral concerns can no longer be binding on our public ethic .4 While that has
taken place, the resultant moral void has simply been dogmatically filled in with other
moral postulates as greedy for transcendence as anything religion can muster. The
public square detests a moral vacuum.
Society's uncritical relegation of religion to a place of irrelevance is having numerous harmful consequences, and those who argue that religious conviction ought to be
a disqualification from the public debate are laboring under fundamental misunderstandings. This bias against religion will not only sustain the dichotomy between the
institutions of church and state, but will drive a wedge between the laws of the land
and religiously rooted moral values. Whenever this happens, potentially positive legislation and constructive influence can be lost simply because they are construed as
too suggestive of religion. Imagine the result if Dietrich Bonhoeff er's opposition to
Hitler, Martin Luther King's battle for equal rights or William Wilberforce's fight
against slavery had been silenced and consigned to irrelevance just because they were
in part spurred by religious conviction.
If the attempt to portray PAS as a legal debate with no room for religion is one
attempt to silence religious resistance to PAS, another attempt is to portray the debate
as a scientific and medical matter. Dr. Kevorkian has said that he will "do what a doctor should do: alleviate the suffering of the human being in front of me if it's justified
medically." Notice that the alleged basis for his actions is medical, not moral. His
lawyer has similarly asserted that it is inappropriate to "inject a matter of faith with a
purely medical and scientific issue." The clear implication is that this debate is a medical and scientific debate alone with no room for religion, faith claims or traditional
morality.
This is confused thinking . By its nature, science alone is not equipped to handle
moral, philosophical or metaphysical inquiry. The debate over PAS involves these
very questions. The insistence that science alone answer the moral questions about
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PAS assumes a mistaken view of what science does. Science deals with the empirically
verifiable and quantifiably measurable, not normative and prescriptive questions of
ethics. Whether anything exists outside science's necessarily truncated vision is not a
question it can answer, nor one it should be expected to answer. The evidence that
science offers concerning our ultimate questions, such as detectable patterns of regularity or the auspicious conditions for human life, is necessarily ambiguous and
inconclusive.
Arguing that theological considerations be bracketed out of this debate is simply
naive at best, patently dishonest at worst. Doctors should not be the only ones doing
medical ethics . Their insights and facts are crucial, but without religious convictions,
logical distinctions and ethical discussions, the prior philosophical and theological
assumptions of doctors may be advanced dogmatically in the name of science and
uncritically accepted. That includes Dr. Kevorkian, who hastens to give primacy to
his own "scientific" moral ideals and expects the laws to live up to those standards,
while those with a "religious" moral vision are supposed to keep quiet and, preferably, out of the public debate.
Likewise, Howard Simon, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union,
concurs with Kevorkian when he claims that opposition to legalizing PAS on theological grounds is illegitimate. Certainly, however, Simon must be aware of his own
guiding truth claims and ideological biases, such as when he claims, echoing
Kevorkian's sentiments, that "the right to control our own lives ...belongs to each of
us" and "it is my life and the decision should be mine." These are ambitious theological assertions in their own right, as are any fundamental presuppositions which
incline us toward one side of this debate or the other. Simply because his propositions
reflect a "secularistic theology," as it were, does not exempt them from scrutiny. And
just because the assumptions of some are fueled by religious conviction and tempered
by traditional morality does not mean they ought to be decried.
As a society we are fast losing our language for moral discourse. And by ruling out
of court as irrelevant any religious morality, a great historical source of our public
ethos in this country, we are now more and more refusing to contend with the complexities of ethical conundrums . The probable basis on which an issue like PAS will
eventually be decided will be very narrow, and it will likely be this: PAS safeguards
our rights, while a law against it would reduce our freedoms. Is that the extent of collective moral imagination and discussion of which this culture is capable?
RIGHT TO DIE
In the fall of 1993, my father suffered and died from an acute case of lymphoblastic leukemia . In his final weeks , his condition deteriorated daily. The final two weeks
rendered him unconscious much of the time, delirious and disoriented from the
cumulative effect of chemotherapy, internal hemorrhaging, the cancer itself and the
several medications being administered . When his time of death arrived, the family
had already done much of their mourning. Seeing him dying like that seemed worse
than the actual death itself.
My father 's suffering could have been worse. It certainly could have been better,
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but it could have been substantially worse in terms of intensity and duration. As my
father suffered and my family suffered along with him, I thought about physicianassisted suicide at times. I was not giving it serious consideration in this case, but was
attempting to understand its appeal in the lives of those who have had to endure prolonged periods of suffering. It is not difficult to see why a relatively painless and
immediate death can seem so much better than continuing in horrendous pain
(though modern palliatives make such cases rare).
But I hesitate affirming a legislative sanction of physician-assisted suicide. Among
my reservations is a serious concern over the way rights language has been employed
in this debate, sometimes clouding the issues considerably and avoiding important
questions altogether. In this section I would like to discuss this rights language in
moral discourse generally and in the PAS debate particularly, pointing out a few of
the limitations, assumptions, and implications of its common usage.
Supporters of PAS submit that it protects the "right to die" of human beings. The
point they are stressing is people's right to die when they choose to die. Expressed less
euphemistically, those like Kevorkian and Fieger are asserting people's right to kill
themselves and to enlist others' help when required. It is not simply the negative right
of refusing life-preserving treatment, but the positive, legislatively sanctioned right of
officially assisted suicide. That people have the right to commit suicide, even with the
help of a licensed health care professional, is becoming an accepted moral postulate,
increasingly treated as a self-evident proposition, within the conventional wisdom
and reigning "plausibility structures" of this culture. It is usually stated dogmatically,
thereby begging a most important question of this debate: Is suicide our right, and
does it include the right to enlist the assistance of others?
The assumption that moral debates can be reduced to the level of rights is widespread, a trend concerning which I hold some reservations. I should therefore quickly
preface this discussion by stressing that I am not yet convinced of the validity and
soundness of the arguments in favor of conducting moral dialogue exclusively (or
even primarily) in rights language. Such discourse typically assumes that the world is
constituted under adversarial power structures and attempts to construct an individualistic approach to ethics, while yielding conclusions far-reaching and communal in
scope. Rights do not exist in a vacuum, not even private rights, for to assert a right is
also to impose an obligation on our society to provide means for the exercise of that
right. Rather than reinforcing individualism when a private right is societally
affirmed, that society incurs upon itself at the moment of legislation the obligation to
provide the suitable means for its citizens to enjoy that right.
That the question of rights has generally come to be seen as the legitimate focus of
the PAS debate is undeniable, however. Interestingly, both sides of the debate often
employ rights language. The Hemlock Society, which promotes the legalization of
PAS for the terminally ill, speaks of a "right to die," while their strongest opponents
are typically self-avowed "right to life" proponents. The present ban against PAS in
my home state of Michigan was temporarily repealed when Judge Cynthia Stephens
decided that "the right of self-determination includes the right to choose to cease living." By some estimates, about eighty percent of the population of the state of
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Michigan believe that human beings possess a "right to die" and that legislation sanctioning PAS ought to be adopted. This figure is usually reflected among my philosophy students at the university where I teach, with about four out of five initially
affirming PAS because "that's our right."
An important reason why one's right to die is often uncritically accepted today is
this society's cultural climate. It is a culture averse to imposition. Since anything that
smacks of imposition is anathema, the banning of PAS has an inherent strike against
it from the outset. By its nature, it is a nonpermissive law and is thus characterized by
its opponents as an imposition of religious values and an infringement of rights.
Within our contemporary moral context, where primacy is often given to individual
and private rights, it is small wonder that PAS is finding an increasingly receptive
audience. Considered carefully, this cultural climate offers little reason to assume that
suicide is indeed our right. It certainly helps explain why rhetoric appealing to rights
language in the PAS debate is effective persuasion for so many, but the prior question
of whether suicide is indeed a right has still not been answered.
The swelling popular conviction that suicide is a right has usually resulted less
from good reasons and logical arguments than from a brute assumption being
absorbed into the working mentality of our culture. When pressed, one reason that
may be offered for such a right is that suicide as an option is an implication of human
freedom. We possess a free will with which we can justifiably make our own decisions
about our lives, it is argued . This rationale, though, is clearly inadequate, confusing
free will with other types of freedom, and assuming that what we can freely choose of
our own volition should necessarily be politically, ethically, and legally permissible.
Quite obviously that is not the case. Something which we possess the capability of
doing is not thereby a right. Libertarian freedom, if it exists in the face of the challenge of determinism, implies neither political freedom nor moral license necessarily.
It may be suggested that a right to die can be gleaned from the Karen Ann Quinlan
case and subsequent rulings which have established the right under certain circumstances to be disconnected from artificial life support systems. This procedure has
come to be known as passive euthanasia, allowing death to take place naturally.
Justice Scalia, in the Nancy Beth Cruzan decision, equated the termination of life support with ordinary suicide, collapsing any distinction between passive euthanasia and
PAS. However, it does good to recall that Scalia was the only justice to do so. The
assertion that denial of life-saving medical treatment by a competent patient constitutes suicide has been largely rejected logically and legally, and for good reason.
Suicide involves active steps taken to induce death, while passive euthanasia affirms
the causality of the underlying disease as the agency of a person 's death. The
Michigan ban on PAS that has been alternately legislated and struck down specifically
distinguishes PAS from "withholding or withdrawing medical treatment. "
Some opponents of PAS strongly support passive euthanasia for similar reasons
they oppose PAS. As my father's condition worsened, the family had to make a decision regarding his "code status." As an opponent of PAS, I was also a strong voice in
support of declaring my father's status "no code ." That meant, in case of cardiac
arrest, for instance, he would not be resuscitated. Doctors and nurses would have
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made pain management and comfort care their priority, not the prolonging of his life
at any cost. With everything else my father had experienced in recent years medically,
and now with him suffering from a fatal disease, I and my family decided that it was
time to draw the line in terms of how much we could reasonably expect medicine to
do. PAS supporters neglect doing this, it seems, believing that a doctor's obligation is
not only to prolong life and minimize pain, but to help in the taking of life when all
else fails. The lesson to learn from vexing moral dilemmas introduced by too great a
faith in medicine is to draw the line earlier, placing less trust in medicine, not to
expect medicine to solve the problem that it has helped create (usually at the insistence of patients' families).
Some suggest that a right to die is presupposed in ongoing medical techniques.
Such a challenge attempts to blunt distinctions between PAS and what is already
accepted medical practice. In attempting to alleviate pain, doctors often administer
substantial doses of analgesics and, in doing so, sometimes hasten death . One of the
points of resistance to laws against PAS in the medical profession is concern that such
laws may impede current medical procedures. However, a traditionally honored distinction can be upheld by means of the doctrine of double effect, traceable to Aquinas.
This distinction points out the difference between primary and secondary effects,
arguing that culpability not be extended to secondary effects unintended by our
actions. Substantial doses of palliative therapies requested by patients may occasionally hasten death, but death in such cases is an inadvertent effect of the primary goal of
pain relief. PAS intentionally induces death rather than secondarily and inadvertently
effecting it, distinguishing PAS from ambitious palliative therapy. 5
Suppose this suggestion: suicide is at least our legal right since so many states have
struck down legislation making it illegal. In response, I would ask this question: Does
the absence of legislation against suicide make it our right? Perhaps another important reason for not making suicide illegal other than the desire to provide its sanction
is that criminal punishment is virtually ineffectual as a deterrent to suicide . In this
case, another reason is obvious: there is no way to punish a successful victim of suicide! The fact that a law against suicide cannot be enforced does little to confirm suicide as our right, particularly given this culture's formal efforts to avoid suicide. If suicide has been given our blessing, why have state legislatures found it in the public
interest to dissuade such behavior by funding ambitious suicide prevention programs
1 and forbidding assisting in a suicide?
To call our presumed right to die into question almost seems a waste of time, but it
1
: happens to be that little piece of question-begging with which many opponents of
PAS have to differ. This alleged right usually functions as the crucial unquestioned
~ premise in the argument for PAS, without which the argument fails. To say "I have a
right to end my life when I wish " is easy, while testing the legitimacy of such a claim
i becomes more involved. We are driven to foundational questions about communal
responsibilities, limitations on personal rights , the significance of death and the
1,
, appropriateness of suicide .
' What exactly is meant by saying that we have this moral right to choose when to
; die? A right is something one is entitled to , that to which one has a ju st and proper
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claim, and implies a principle of congruity and appropriateness. It is something apposite to us. The rights a society argues for thereby reveal its anthropology; the basic
human, moral, legal rights a society believes it possesses reflect what it thinks of
humanity. The rights people actually possess are dictated by the true nature of humanity, which may or may not be accurately reflected in what a society believes . The discussion of anthropology concerning human nature is prior to the decision about
human rights, and has to take place at the level of worldview.
Representatives from a broad array of worldviews are encouraged to enter the public debate over PAS and voice their convictions and concerns. They are at liberty to
convince the populace of the wisdom or compassion of PAS, or lack thereof, by the
power of their ideas and cogency of their arguments. This courtesy should be extended to the spectrum of worldviews , from theists and atheists to existentialists, Kantians
and humanists . The debate over PAS features an appeal to our ultimate commitments,
our most basic ethical convictions and most deeply cherished values. Satisfactorily
answering whether or not we as a culture wish to affirm that suicide is a basic and
fundamental right requires the participation of everyone, the formation of a consensus and the clearest and best of arguments all around.
The dogma that people have the right to end their lives when they so choose presupposes a humanistic understanding, according to which human beings are the masters of
their own destiny, entirely autonomous and independent. This approach should not be
exempt in the public arena from the same critical scrutiny rightly aimed at all other possible worldviews . In contrast to humanists, theists often question those Homo sapiencentered assumptions, positing instead that humankind is God's creation, and as created
beings, essentially dependent on God, they are subject to God's sovereignty. According to
most theistic conceptions of humanity, no such right to commit suicide exists. Such a
right would usurp God's authority, exceed the prerogatives of human freedom and violate the prohibition against murder that the Judeo-Christian ethic, for instance, teachesan ethic that has long served to inform public discourse in this culture.
This culture can discard such theistic perspectives as archaic and outdated if it will;
the question is whether it should. To assume that all traditional moral convictions are
necessarily inferior to the "liberated" ethics of today is potentially the apex of arrogance, an instance of what has been called "chronological snobbery."
Unlike life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness in the Declaration of Independence,
suicide is usually not touted as an unalienable right with which we have been endowed
by our Creator. Kevorkian certainly would not attribute such a right to God; his worldview is succinctly put in his answer to the question of what happens to us after we die:
"You rot." Assuming human rights are either intrinsic or conferred, then, that would
leave the so-called right to die as a necessary part of humanity or personhood. Those
who are inclined to deny such a right, on the other hand, see PAS as contrary to human
nature. Theists generally assume that the wisdom of God's moral laws is evident in the
way they accord with both nature in general and human nature in particular.
Those truly individualistic impulses and instincts not to be denied within us usually do not have to do with our rights so much as with our natural desire as human
beings to survive. J. Gay-Williams, reflecting on euthanasia, has argued that
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Every human being has a natural inclination to continue living . Our reflexes
and responses fit us to fight attackers, flee wild animals, and dodge out of the
way of trucks. In our daily lives we exercise the caution and care necessary to
protect ourselves. Our bodies are similarly structured for survival right down to
the molecular level. When we are cut, our capillaries seal shut, our blood clots,
and fibrogen is produced to start the process of healing the wound. When we
are invaded by bacteria, antibodies are produced to fight against the alien organisms, and their remains are swept out of the body by special cells designed for
clean up work.
It is enough, I believe, to recognize that the organization of the human body
and our patterns of behavioral responses make the continuation of life a natural
goal. By reason alone, then, we can recognize that euthanasia sets us against our
own nature .... Euthanasia involves acting as if this dual nature-inclination
towards survival and awareness of this as an end-did not exist. Thus, euthanasia denies our basic human character and requires that we regard ourselves or
others as something less than fully human. Euthanasia does violence to this natural goal of survival. 6
This innate desire we have to preserve and sustain life has long been encapsulated
in the Hippocratic Oath doctors take. Euthanasia and PAS violate the natural inclination people have to preserve life and safeguard society. Deep within us are a desire
and sense of responsibility to heed our will to live and thereby cultivate the fabric of
society rather than to militate against and undercut that through an individualistic
warrant for suicide. How do proponents of PAS justify their exclusively individualistic
orientation when faced with the inherent sense of social responsibility that we all feel
and that most all cultures have cherished?
It suffices to say that the right to die, a crucial premise in the case for PAS, does
not deserve its status as an unapproachable, unassailable verity . In fact it is but one
dubious tenet among others in a worldview that claims an exalted view of
humankind, but which actually leaves an ever decreasing set of safeguards in place for
the innocent and most helpless of the species. Opponents of PAS seriously question
whether the arena of death is one in which finite human beings exercise legitimate
and exclusive autonomy. The words of Gloucester from King Lear still ring clear : "We
must endure our going hence even as our coming hither."
SLIPPERYSLOPE
If this society decides to legalize PAS, it will institutionalize a certain rejection of
the prohibition against murder by sanctioning assistance in self-murder. Such a decision will largely be based on an act-utilitarian ethic contending that the elements that
make an act right or wrong are not the intrinsic features of the act, but the consequences of the act. Assisted self-murder will be legalized in certain cases because in
those cases the ends will have been deemed to justify the means . Rather than a rul ebased orientation, utilitarianism will have become the dominant ethical approa ch of
the legislators, at least in the case of PAS. The opinion of man y people is that it is
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high time for this transition to take place, and for utilitarianism to be accorded its
special place of honor in the formation of our public ethic .
Act-utilitarianism remains a problematic method of formulating a public ethic,
however, because an exclusive regard for each action's consequences, over against
general prima facie rights and wrongs, makes today's legislative decisions a major, not
to mention laborious, guessing game. Decisions which are made to minimize suffering, given the limited knowledge and perspective we have, may turn out tomorrow to
have been entirely mistaken, a notorious epistemological difficulty of utilitarianism.
What goes especially unquestioned is whether the utilitarian denial of ethical norms
is a prudent way in which to achieve the best of consequences .
Often overlooked is the fact that adherents of traditional rule-based ethics are usually at least as concerned with the consequences of actions as utilitarians are, sometimes more so. Although traditionalists believe in the existence of objective moral
standards, they also happen to be convinced that it is the faithful following of those
ethical norms, in general, by which the overall best consequences are finally secured
for all concerned. 7 According to this understanding, the deleterious consequences of
an immoral action are not merely an incidental effect but a manifestation of the
action's ethically deficient nature, a function or an internal component of evil, if you
will. An intimate relationship thus operates between an action's intrinsic moral features and its ultimate consequences, so that certain behavior is not wrong simply
because it results in hurt, but rather it often results in harm because it is actually bad.
A society which institutionalizes the rejection of an inherently right moral precept or
principle, or embraces a wrong one, places itself at a grave risk to reap the destructive
whirlwind of consequences which will invariably flow out of that decision. 8
This analysis can be applied to PAS in a most socially relevant fashion. On ruleutilitarian grounds alone, if it could be effectively argued that the legalization of PAS
could and most probably would have devastating results, that alone should be a sufficient reason to ban it. Alleged rights, such as suicide, have been denied to exist in the
past when they were perceived to be inherently wrong and such restrictive legislation
was deemed to serve the public interest. Certain rights are also denied to exist when
their probable result would be the fundamental
undermining
of a culture .
Government has the responsibility to impose legitimate limitations on personal freedoms when necessary to safeguard the welfare of a society .
Many attempts have been made to delineate the potential harmful effects of
euthanasia and PAS. These are arguments which appeal to what is called a "slippery
slope. " The idea behind such arguments is that once we have started down an incline,
by legalizing PAS for instance , there is no putting a stop to the momentum of the
result ant do wnward motion . Some would call such reasoning fallacious, as some
app eals to slippe ry slop e arguments against PAS undoubtedly are, some being mere
"scare tactics." However , not all of them are , and the fact is that legitimate concerns
exist over the kind of precedent the legalization of PAS would set.
It is far from my intentio n to pro vide an exhaustive catalogue of all the possible
negative conseque nces of legalizing PAS. A few that others have elaborated on include
the possible decline in overall medical care, th e corruption of medical practice , dam-
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age to patients' confidence in physicians, the prospect of PAS becoming the only feasible medi~al "treatment" for the poor, the making of killing increasingly acceptable
and routme and the extension of PAS to include the chronically depressed or those
who simply feel useless or like a burden (note the dehumanizing connotations in
such labels as "useless" or "burden") .
Such speculations and conjectures about worst-case scenarios after the legalization
of PAS are often dismissed categorically by avid PAS supporters . However, it is they
themselves who have chosen consequentialism as the most reliable route for finding
the right public policy. If they are true to their principles , they should be as concerned with the potentially damaging results of legalizing PAS as anyone. Their natural rejoinder is that they endorse legalization only under clear restrictions and guidelines which would regulate the practice and minimize harmful effects or abuses.
The logic of PAS itself defies such regulation, however. For if suicide is a right
intrinsic to human nature, with what substantive justification can we discourage suicide for any reason whatsoever? When human autonomy justifies PAS, as a growing
portion of this society believes, then any competent person is accorded the "privilege." The lesson will be conveyed through the legalization of PAS that suicide is the
proper, or at least a legitimate, response to a life subjectively and individually deemed
below an acceptable quality level. Suicide could well become the epidemic result of
this implicit societal teaching, and it would not be long before the integrity of the
whole culture could be seriously violated. Teenagers, among whom suicide is already
rampant, would essentially be issued a societal sanction to opt for suicide rather than
enduring their temporal troubles. The suicide rate today among the elderly has
already surpassed that of teenagers, a tragedy that would be only exacerbated by PAS.
Another portion of this culture's population considers mercy, not autonomy, to be
the salient rationale for PAS, the more utilitarian oriented basis. But once we have formally substituted the importance of the quality of life as we judge it for the importance and dignity of life itself, how can we impose a limit on the logical implications
and practical ramifications of such a decision? On what nonarbitrary grounds can we
continue to uphold even those screening criteria of Kevorkian's? How can we withhold death from those most in need of it just because they are no longer competent to
assert their wishes? Once we lift up the immediate reduction of pain or, even better,
its total elimination as the supreme virtue and sublimest goal of our public ethos,
does PAS become not only the privilege but the mandate? Do we not confer upon
ourselves an ever-increasing responsibility to resolve pain by bringing about death?
Pain is not only part of dying, it is part of living.
If PAS by nature is beyond regulation, now is the time for us to realize that. After
medicide is characterized as a right, no reversal of course is realistic, no matter how
painful the path we traverse. Any attempt to do so would simply produce an outcry of
protest, just the way prohibition did or a repeal of abortion rights would today : Once
legislatively affirmed and societally appropriated, rights become entrenched m our
mindset and practically impossible to remove.
.
.
Precedent the crucible of experience, shows the ease with which PAS leads to voluntary activ~ euthanasia and, eventually, to involuntary active euthanasia , including
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the physically disabled, the mentally incompetent and those too expensive to treat. In
Holland, where PAS has been officially tolerated, three percent of all deaths are now
directly caused by doctors. That percentage would translate into over 60,000 deaths
caused annually by doctors in this country. 9 What is more, Dutch physicians are now
performing more than two times more involuntary euthanasia than voluntary, an
unpalatable statistic for the empirically minded utilitarian to swallow. 10 A 1991 study
found that in one year more than 1,000 Dutch patients incapable of giving consent
died at the hands of their doctors, demonstrating that PAS resides at the threshold of
euthanasia, another terrifying slippery slope. 11
Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop writes
I am convinced that in the 1930s the German medical sentiment favoring
euthanasia (even before Hitler came to power) made it easier for the Nazi government to move society along that slippery slope that led to the Holocaust. The
German euthanasia movement started with defective babies, then reached out to
eliminate the insane, then to those suffering from senile dementia, then to patients
with advanced tuberculoses, to amputees deemed of no further service to the
Reich, to Gypsies, to Poles, and finally to Jews. The Holocaust was upon us. 12
PAS essentially involves a contract between a patient and his doctor for a service to
be rendered that will culminate in one party in the contract dying. Even though this
may be a contract between only two people, it has become a public, communal agreement, not merely a private decision expressive of individual autonomy. It is a form of
social action, asserts Daniel Callahan, the director and co-founder of the Hastings
Center and author, most recently, of The Troubled Dream of Life. It thus functions at the
heart of this culture's social ethic, the glue which holds this diverse country and democratic experiment together. If PAS is legalized, it will dramatically alter the content of our
public ethos, becoming part of the social framework of the citizens left behind.
In my father's final weeks, the family pitched in to be with him around the clock,
attending to his needs, changing his sheets, feeding him ice. Undoubtedly he was
experiencing pain at times, sometimes severely, though usually only temporarily. My
father was also forced to endure some humiliation, being utterly dependent on either
family or nurses to help with uncontrolled bodily discharges, for instance. During
that time, echoing through my mind was the rhetoric I had heard in favor of PAS,
usually wrapped in rights language: "We have a right to die with dignity." Such language seems to imply that pain or dependence on others robs us of dignity. In contrast , though , looking at my father, I did not feel that way. Yes, my dad experienced
pain, so we tried desperately to find the right pain medication to help . And he was
dependent on us, even to the point of being a burden on us . But the family would not
have had it any other way. We genuinely felt and believed that mutual burden-sharing
was part of what being a family was all about, and part of what being communal
beings was about. Our respect for our father only increased through the difficult
episode; at least in our minds he never lacked any dignity. On the contrary, his willingness to lean on our strength and compassion demonstrated a profound depth of
character and inner grace.
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Did my father lack dignity in his own mind? It is difficult to say, since he was
rather noncommunicative in his final weeks. This much is clear, though: suicide for
him simply was not a living option. It was not a category he thought in terms of, nor
was it part of his intellectual furniture. At least one reason for that was this society's
social ethic, which has not yet formally projected suicide as a legitimate response to a
life deemed below an acceptable quality level. I could not help but watch my dad and
wonder how it might have been different had suicide already become part of the intellectual framework and moral mentality of this society. When the pain was intense and
his care increased, would he have considered himself obligated to request an earlier
assisted death after seeing the strain that his dying put on the family? Would he have
felt so burdensome that he felt obliged to hasten his own death?
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Being witness to such a heartwrenching, anguishing experience as my father's
death, I am reminded that to speak of issues of death, dying, and human suffering is a
task that requires tremendous sensitivity and compassion. This is no mere academic
exercise alone, but something vitally at the heart of the human condition, rife with
human emotion and practical import. Though I sometimes fail, I attempt to tread this
ground gingerly, hoping that my comments may resonate with both the intellectually
honest and the emotionally sensitive, even if my readers do not entirely concur with
my tentative conclusions or sympathize with my concerns.
This essay has attempted to carve out an important niche in the public debate for
religiously motivated opponents of the practice of PAS, to call into question the widely assumed "right to die" of human beings and to make mention of some potential
negative results of legalizing PAS. It has been my guiding premise that PAS and
euthanasia are morally bankrupt and legally imprudent, and now I will offer a few
additional reflections and provisional conclusions.
Rights language introduces many questions. Does such individualistic language
underestimate the scope of its communal implications? Has such language extinguished categories like responsibility and virtue? Is it adequate to handle morally
ambiguous cases like PAS? Does it often beg important prior questions like the prerogatives of human freedom and the essence of human nature? Does such language,
as compelling as it may seem, merely skate on the surface of deeply philosophical,
metaphysical, and moral issues?
The legalization of PAS would ensure that a significant shift takes place in the public attitude toward suicide. Logically, legally, and ethically, that would be the
inevitable result. The ACLU, the organization fighting for PAS only with procedural
safeguards in place, will be the same organization arguing tomorrow for the unconsti. tutionality of any safeguards they help institute today. If anyone doubts that, think for
a moment how often the ACLU has helped the cause of any thoughtful regulation on
abortion laws. Slippery slope arguments only constitute fallacies when the relationship between alleged causes and dramatic results is not clearly enough established.
' Concern over the consequences of legalizing PAS is well warranted, given the nature
and content of such legislation. Regulatory guidelines would soon be seen as arbi-
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trary, inviting covert evasion or blatant rejection , as the logic of PAS inexorably
comes to fruition. As Christians we are being remiss when we do not express our
strongest reservations about such an unwise and far-reaching law as PAS, which
would be based on a relatively few truly "hard cases " that remind us that our best
energies as a community are spent supporting the hospice movement, loving and supporting suffering patients and working toward even better pain control.
The laws of our democracy invariably reflect the moral convictions of the majority,
whether the majority is right or wrong . If the echoes of public support for PAS reverberate into a mighty shout, the legislators are sure to hear and heed . PAS could very
well become a salient feature of the social, economic, and political landscape of this
society entering the twenty-first century: an expansive, decreasingly discriminatory,
profit-driven enterprise offering suicide as one more "service" to be sought at a bargain. What might enhance the likelihood of this happening is Kevorkian's promise
not to eat as long as he is imprisoned for breaking the new law. In effect, he argues,
the state will then be assisting his suicide, and in that scenario he may well become
something of a martyr and catalyst for the cause .
Meanwhile, the Christian Church should use its freedom to voice its concerns in a
winsome and compelling manner, credibly and intelligently finding ways to influence
the outcome of the public debate. Without claiming perfect discernment of God's will,
we should willingly participate in discussing this dilemma , listening sensitively to
those who disagree with us, becoming informed about the relevant issues to be
addressed and questions to be asked and playing our own special part in the whole
process. Lovers of God and humankind, committed to objective truth and normative
morality, should not remain silent and uninvolved when they see their culture buy
into the fleeting and misguided values of humanistic philosophy.
As the Church stresses its views on PAS, Christians should also remain insightfully
aware of the need for harmony and integrity within and among all of their own various beliefs. Can Christians continue reconciling consistent opposition to PAS and
euthanasia with inconsistent opposition to abortion or war? Can Christians justify
opposing PAS if they support capital punishment? The earliest Christian communities
were consistently "pro-life ." They were pacifists who were firmly opposed to capital
punishment , abortion , and suicide of any kind. Philosopher James Rachels's contention sounds reasonable that Christianity 's eventual concession on issues like war
and capital punishment, tempering its earlier radical stand, was but a politically expedien t compromise , not something theologically and exegetically derived . Today
Christians must be willing to think through their opposition to PAS, and to follow
again their logic and con victions to their natural conclusions . I am convinced that the
mos t logically and theologicall y consistent view for Christians opposed to the legalization of PAS is to be additionally opposed to war, capital punishment and abortion,
though I know thoug htfu l Christians who disagree with me.
Assuming PAS is officially sanctioned here one day , then the Church will be faced
with having to work on this issue more from the bottom up than from the top down,
not unlike what has happened wit h abortion. What makes this appropriate is that
be ing a Christian means not only th at we beli eve rightl y as individuals , but that we
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have been baptized into a community with a certain set of beliefs, practices, and
morals, offering an alternative ethos to that of the world. It is relatively easy to stand
against the legalization of abortion or euthanasia, and even to extol the virtues of the
necessary sacrifices of bringing an unwanted pregnancy to term or of living until
nature takes its course. But it is much more challenging, yet arguably closer to the
heart of Christ, for the Church to reach out in love to the unwed mother or the suffering patient and provide for their needs to help them cope with their situations, so in
desperation they do not resort to abortion or PAS. It is not the duty of the Church
simply to engage in ethical debate and to battle laws against PAS, but to reach out to
the suffering and needy, offering a cup of cold water and lending a sympathetic ear, to
help convey a sense of meaning and impart a will to persevere to those who feel most
like giving up. 13
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This paper was delivered at the Consultation on Theological Education and
Leadership Development in Post-Communist Europe, Oradea, Romania, 5 October
1994.

In the summer of 1994 staff of St. Petersburg Christian University, which in fact
is a seminary, sifted through literally tons of books donated from the West, ferreting out the occasional title relevant for a theological library. On the one hand, the
task required time consuming sorting through mountains of boxes for the relatively
rare gems in the rough. On the other hand, the shipping had been donated , several
thousand useful titles were being gleaned from the heap, and seminarians would
make use of a fair portion of the rest that the school would pass over. And so it is
with Western assistance to theological education in the East, writ large: a mixed
blessing. The question is: how help should and should not be given, and how help
should and should not be received.
In February 1993 Overseas Council for Theological Education and Missions,
Peter Deyneka Russian Ministries, and Wheaton College's Institute for East-West
Christian Studies hosted a meeting of evangelical theological educators in Moscow.
Insights drawn from that conference , plus seminary site visits and library research,
served as the basis for a survey of the current state of Protestant theological education in the former Soviet Union . Three findings of that investigation follow.
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1. Prior to glasnost formal Protestant theological education was practically
nonexistent. However, under Gorbachev an explosion of pent-up energy and
demand saw well over 40 residential programs established in three years ( 19901992) . These schools have emerged "in a manner unique in the history of
Reformation churches. Never before, and nowhere else, have Protestants launched
as many formal theological training programs as rapidly as they have in Soviet successor states."'
2. The new seminaries and training centers possess unusually dedicated staff
and extraordinarily eager students, but the vast majority of the schools lack sufficient texts, adequate libraries, qualified faculty, and permanent facilities.
3. At the present time programs, representing several thousand residential students and several thousand additional extension and correspondence students,
depend very heavily upon Western assistance. This third point serves as the focus
of the present study .

How Western help is managed-or mismanaged-will make a major difference in the
ability-or inability-of new schools to strengthen the Church in the East and to assist
the Church as it seeks to witness to an enormous number of nonbelievers in its midst.
"We do not want ready-made Western Christianity to be dumped on us," a Russian
theological educator reported in 1992. "We would love to have the tools, and then we
will work it out for ourselves." 2 While such sentiments abound among post-Soviet bloc
seminary administrators, paradoxically, Ralph Alexander of Biblical Education by
Extension rightly characterizes the present fixation of these same leaders on Western
accreditation as an "obsession." 3
What does this readily observable striving for Western credentials portend and how
might it foster rather than deter the manufacture of "ready-made Western Christianity"
east of the old Iron Curtain? Russian church historian Walter Sawatsky has predicted that,
particularly among evangelical Protestants, "the dominant literature in theology, and even
the dominant theories for theological education will likely be drawn from North
America," at the expense of training that is "contextually Slavic."4 While the new Russian
Protestant Euro-Asiatic Accreditation Association hosted a conference in October 1994on
the history of "The Protestant Movement in Russia" without Western participation, it
appears, at the same time, that this body is likely to adopt wholesale Western criteria for
the evaluation and credentialing of evangelical seminaries in the former Soviet Union.5
Western standards may be desirable in terms of required instructional facilities, faculty with earned doctorates, libraries of sufficient size and quality, and a broad curriculum.
But for the foreseeable future such criteria are prohibitively expensive, beyond the reach
of the vast majority of institutions in former Soviet bloc countries. Even worse, uncritical
acceptance of Western standards, what Regent College professor Paul Stevens calls "slav·
ish replication of Western curriculum and educational philosophy," would unquestion·
ably doom theological education in former East bloc countries to abject economic dependence upon the West , and with it, defacto foreign control. "
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Furthermore, to the extent that Western credentialing favors academic accomplishment over pastoral training and ministry, it may actually undermine, rather than facilitate, Christian leadership training after communism. How so? If Western accreditation
standards prevail, it quickly becomes apparent that at present the "right" credentials can
only be had in the West, hence the scramble for study abroad, Western degrees, and
what might be termed "bright flight."
Manfred Kohl's survey of theological educators in the East documented "overwhelming support for training in-country ." But the decline in Soviet-style central church
authority and the lure of the West already is spelling more and more post-Soviet seminarians opting for golden opportunities abroad. Borrowing from an American folk-song,
"Will they ever return" or will they "ride forever 'neath the streets of Boston"? Past performance suggests another brain drain could be in the making. Seventy-five percent of
Colombian theological students who have studied abroad never have gone home, the
same for 85 percent of seminarians from the Caribbean and 90 percent of seminarians
from India. 8 Is there any reason to believe it will be otherwise with former East bloc seminarians?
Wilson Chow, president of Hong Kong's China Graduate School of Theology, just
returned from the former Yugoslavia, already reports a "brain-drain of the theologically
trained because of internal ethnic conflicts, the unstable political situation, [and] the
attraction from seminaries in the West. "9 The present priority of North America 's
Association of Theological Schools upon globalization provides a perfect example of a
Western academic standard being unhealthy and counterproductive for theological education elsewhere .10 In the name of diversity and globalization too many Western seminaries currently are luring to their campuses rare, theologically trained seminary educators
from abroad, often draining the lifeblood of struggling institutions . How ironic that
Western seminaries could be so insensitive to the damage they may inflict upon schools
outside the North Atlantic community-all in the name of a better understanding of the
rest of the world!
Even if every theological student in the West did return home, unhealthy side effects
still might cause the church in the East to question the advisability of study abroad . As
Ralph Alexander points out, when seminarians study in another country, "training is
removed from the normal ministry context. "11 In addition, seminarians' introduction to
Western living standards and Western cultural values makes going home a difficult adjustment. The negative influences of narcissistic materialism and individualism are self evident. But even defensible Western mores, such as the high premium placed on efficiency,
productivity, and punctuality, pose problems for graduates attempting to re-enter societies
that frequently value the building of relationships more highly than the completion of
tasks by a set date. Also, modern higher criticism of the Scriptures, a staple of Western
theological education--even in evangelical institutions reacting to it-will not be a welcome import in the eyes of a great many church leaders east of the old Iron Curtain .12
The intense yearning of theological educators in the East for academic respectability
actually could undermine effective leadership development. As Yugoslav theologian Peter
Kuzmic argues, "We cannot uncritically copy Western models where truth is separated
from practice and where the world of academia is separated from the world of ecclesia.
7
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Instead of being accountable to the church, religious truth becomes a selfish, elitist, academic exercise." 13 In the same vein, theology professor Paul Stevens warns that "pride in
degrees and publishing records" can lead to "the loss of humility as a Christian goal." 14
Both a respect for learning and a fear of learning-lest it replace a fear of the Lordshould stand side by side to prevent the one from breeding unbridled pride or the other
from breeding mindless anti-intellectualism.
In the West programs exist which focus on the imparting of knowledge, or the formation of character, or practical and experiential preparation for ministry, or some combination of the three . Already in the East some of the same tendencies find expression. For
example, the Evangelical Baptist Theological Seminary in Odessa appears to have the
greatest emphasis upon academic scholarship of any Protestant institution in the former
Soviet Union, while Donetsk Bible College stresses missions, ministry skills, and "experience-based learning with existing new churches." 15 At a February 1992 meeting on leadership training in Vienna, Austria, Greg Reader oflnternational Teams stressed that "theological education should be accountable to the context it serves." 16 It would appear that
an effective application of this principle may be observed at Donetsk: students maintain
close, ongoing ties with local churches.
It can be argued that the lengthier and the more extensive theological education
becomes, the greater the danger that it will increase the distance between pulpit and pew.
Theological educators in the East should note that this "clergy-lay problem" requires
conscious, ongoing, creative attention, and that the West is hardly the place to look for
its solution. 17 (Ironically, the Kremlin's longstanding prohibition against Protestant theological education led to an ad hoc apprenticeship system of pastoral training, the unintended positive effect of which was to minimize the distance between clergy and laity.)
A final reason indiscriminate emulation of Western theological education would be
unwise is that the West itself is increasingly unsure of the validity of its own approach,
which one detractor has described as the "trained incapacity to deal with the real problems of actual living persons in their daily lives." Oddly enough, the world seems to
crave this "desert experience ...at the very moment when leaders in Western theological
education are having serious misgivings about their enterprise." 18
A seminary student studying in North America once asked, "How is it that the only
form of theological education that has been given to us in Africa comes from the part of
the world where the church is in decline?" An equally pointed rejoinder could have been,
"How is it that, knowing the church in the West is in decline, African denominations are
so hungry to get this sort of ministerial training that the West offers?" 19
From a distance few can detect the disarray to be found in many Western churches
and seminaries, especially through the rich camouflage of institutional endowments,
bricks and mortar, and the flood of Christian books , videos, conferences, and the like.
On the other hand, the global commitment and material prosperity of many Western
evangelical churches, missions, and seminaries has translated into an extraordinary, perhaps unprecedented outpouring of assistance for fledgling seminaries and Bible institutes
all across East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. In most institutions Western
assistance is welcome. The question is what kind of assistance is beneficial and who
should make that decision .
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If the case has been made that the Western connection to Christian leadership development in the East is a mixed blessing, what recommendations might contribute to more
enlightened Western assistance?
1. Theological educators in East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union should be
encouraged to develop culture-specific criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of leadership
training programs. They should be creative and judicious in adapting, rather than submitting to the wholesale adoption of, Western accrediting standards. They should weigh carefully the costs of accepting secular governments as the accrediting agents for theological
schools. And they should look worldwide for innovative approaches to the evaluation of
programs and graduates, such as those Jack Graves of Overseas Council for Theological
Education has identified in Brazil and Indonesia.
2. They should have close institutional, faculty, and student interaction with the local
church. 2° Churches do not exist in order to support seminaries. But seminaries should
exist in order to support churches.
3. They should stress the importance of theological training in-country, for all the previously discussed cultural, theological, and economic reasons. To that end seminaries in
former Soviet bloc states should:
a. encourage study abroad only for especially talented, mature, and dedicated pastors targeted for teaching positions;
b. shorten the length of Western instruction, utilize extension programs and competency tests and encourage completion of M.A. programs, rather than longer
M.Div. or doctoral programs;
c. encourage Western and indigenous churches, missions, and seminaries to work
together in a few in-country advanced degree programs;
d. encourage Western partners to invest more resources in Western faculty teaching in the East, especially those with relevant language skills, and less in video
talking heads and student scholarships for study in the West; 21
e. also, before opting for West European or North American theological education, students from East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union should
consider alternatives in non-Western nations that would entail much less culture shock and theological dissonance, at a fraction of the cost. For example,
the South Asia Institute of Advanced Christian Studies, Bangalore, India, would
welcome students from East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union in its
fully accredited programs for pastoral training or advanced degrees for future
theological educators .22
4. Regarding curricula, Western theological educators would do well to encourage the
introduction in former Soviet bloc evangelical institutions of:
a. courses on Eastern Orthodoxy and Catholicism which delineate common
ground and insurmountable differences; 23 and
b. courses on biblical principles of conflict management. Unseemly strife abounds
and demands serious attention within and between congregations, within and
between denominations, within and between Christian confessions, and between
Christians and persons of other faiths and no faith. Western Christian arbitration
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and conflict resolution services could be consulted for advice in developing
instruction in this vital area.H
5. Above all, Evangelical Christians, East and West, must foster and practice greater
cooperation, especially in so expensive and labor intensive an endeavor as theological
education. 25
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THE SOTERIOLOGICAL
ORIENTATION OF
JOHN WESLEY'S MINISTRY
TO THE POOR
KENNETH

J. COLLINS

The evidence pertaining to John Wesley 's ministry to the poor in eighteenthcentury Britain and Ireland is considerable. Indeed, reforming activities, of one
form or other, were a part of the life of Methodism during its early days at
Oxford, as well as the preoccupation of the seasoned Wesley .1 Field preaching in
the midst of coalminers , providing employment for the indigent, establishing
lending stocks for the poor, and creating charity schools for the ignorant were a
few of the many works of mercy undertaken by Wesley and the Methodists.
In the face of such evidence, the preliminary task of the historian must be to
develop an appropriate hermeneutical framework which is best able to make sense
not only of this rich diversity of activity, but which is also able to demonstrate the
overarching motivation and purpose behind it. In a real sense, to address the theme
of "Good News to the Poor " exclusively or almost exclusively along economic lines,
as is often done today, is to make a judgment about the nature of Wesley's ministry
to the poor which may belie not only its scope, but also its eighteenth-century context. 2 Two problems typically emerge from this approach : First, a predominantly
economic reading of the "good news" to the poor often leaves the larger soteriological and valuational context of Wesley's ministry underdeveloped . In this setting
such teleological questions as "Why did Wesley do what he did? " and "To what
end did he do it? " are shunted aside in favor of the descriptive question "What did
Wesley do?" Such an approach, then, often issues in a "flat" or "horizontal " reading
of Wesley's reforming activity since it brackets out, to a significant degree, the
depths of his specifically spiritual motivation .

Kenneth]. Collins is the Samuel]. and Norma C. Womack Professor of Philosophy and Religion at
the Methodist College in Fayetteville, N.C.

THE A SBURY TH EOLOG ICALjOURNAL

VOL

50 No. 1

SPRING

1995

76

Collins

Second, an overly economic reading, informed by contemporary political judgments, runs the risk of defining good and evil principally along economic or class
lines where the sins of the oppressor, but not those of the oppressed, are clearly recognized.3 Here the non-poor are not really a part of the environment where the
redemptive activity of God takes place, though their continued presence is undoubtedly required if only to give added value, by way of contrast, to the poor. Indeed, the
value-laden language of "preferential options" and the like, which have become a part
of the rhetoric of liberation theology today, reveal the proper inclusions as well as
exclusions-though
in a way perhaps foreign to Wesley's own ethic.
In light of these two considerations, this present work will demonstrate that the
soteriological orientation of Wesley's ministry to the poor is able to unite his multifarious reforms in terms of motivation, valuation, and purpose. To be sure, soteriology
as a hermeneutical framework will not only be able to embrace the themes of economic justice-as in other approaches-but
it will develop and evaluate such themes
as part of a larger, more inclusive, whole. 4 Here all people, poor and non-poor, will be
a part of the soteriological environment, though each group will undoubtedly play a
different role. More importantly, here the love and worship of God, hardly a concern
of modern economic theory, will be factored into the equation.
I. IMPEDIMENTSTO MINISTRY:RICHES, IDOLATRY,AND LOVE OF THE WORLD
One of the difficulties of a work like E.P. Thompson's The Making of the English
Working Class is its failure to realize sufficiently that not only were Wesley's economic categories, for the most part, medieval,5 but that they were also, more importantly,
soteriologically and ecclesiastically construed. For example, Wesley's definition of
riches as "anything more than will procure the conveniences of life," 6 as found in his
sermon, "The Wisdom of God's Counsels" or his claim of ten repeated in his sermons
that "one [who] has food and raiment sufficient for himself and his family, and something over, is rich," 7 are judgments hardly reflected in any reputable economic theory,
past or present. It is therefore all the more disturbing when contemporary Methodist
interpreters of Wesley's economics ignore the ecclesiastical context of this definition
and thereby render the transitions from church to state and from the eighteenth century to the twentieth that much easier, but also that much more dubious.
One of the clues, however, to Wesley's assessment of riches is found in his departure from the much-touted equation rich equals evil, an equation which has numerous
modern variations. For although the Methodist leader's criticism of the rich was extensive, it was by no means total. To be sure, the preceding equation is undermined and
its continuity broken in several places in Wesley's writings . For example, in his journal
of 17 November 1759, Wesley notes, "It is well a few of the rich and noble are called."
And he adds undoubtedly with hope and expectation, "Oh that God would increase
their number! "8 Second, in his piece, "The General Spread of the Gospel," produced in
1783, the Methodist evangelist exclaims: "Before the end even the rich shall enter into
the kingdom of God. "9 Moreover, just a few years before his death, Wesley opined that
"it is no more sinful to be rich than to be poor." But he immediately added, clarifying
his meaning: "But it is dangerous beyond expression." 10
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What the preceding material from Wesley's writings suggests, then, is that the rich
are neither evil by definition, nor do they constitute evil's irreducible core. In other
words, the dividing line between good and evil does not by necessity run along economic lines, although it often does. Interestingly, Wesley held both of these ideas
together, and in tension, and thereby preserved the basis for an even more radical
assessment of human evil, one which moved beneath the realm of economics in order
to probe the very depths of human desire and will, a substratum which, for Wesley at
least, lay behind sinful social structures.
In substantiation of the foregoing claim, it should be noted that Wesley underscored the danger of riches, interestingly enough, not only by an appeal to economic
considerations, but also by an appeal to the rhetoric of the heart. He did this in two
key ways: First, riches were deemed exceedingly dangerous in that they strike at the
very root of the personality and often displace the love of God with the love of the
world. Indeed, riches as a temptation to idolatry, as a detraction from the glory of
God, is a recurring theme in the sermon corpus.
Beyond this, Wesley stressed the danger of riches by means of a distinctive
"Platonic" vocabulary-a vocabulary which reveals some of the more important value
judgments made by this eighteenth-century leader. To illustrate, in this particular
idiom believers are cautioned against setting their affections on "transient
objects ...things that fly as a shadow, that pass away like as a dream." 11 Wesley elaborates in his sermon "Walking by Sight and Walking by Faith," produced in 1788:
I ask in the name of God by what standard do you judge of the value of things? By
the visible or the invisible world? Bring the matter to an issue in a single instance:
which do you judge best, that your son should be a pious cobbler or a profane lord. 12
In fact, the members of the Methodist societies were enjoined repeatedly to lay up
their treasures not on the earth but in heaven; to set their hearts not on penultimate
things, but on that which is ultimate. "He who is a child of God can truly say,"
Wesley exclaims: "All my riches are above! All my treasure is thy love." 13 The first
danger of riches, then, is that it strikes at the very heart of true religion: it magnifies
the visible and discounts the invisible; it displaces, in other words, the love of God,
and all holy affections, with the love of the world. 14
Second, the danger of riches consists in their being a great hindrance to the love of
neighbor. In other words, with the love of God despoiled, with the affections of the
heart now turned towards temporal things and self will, it is impossible to love the
neighbor as one ought. "A rich man may indeed love them that are of his own party,
or his own opinion," Wesley observes, "but he cannot have pure, disinterested goodwill to every child of man. This can only spring from the love of God, which his great
possessions expelled from his soul. " 15 Again, riches intensify self-absorption and
therefore beget and nourish "every temper that is contrary ... to the love of neighbor," 10
such tempers as contempt, resentment, revenge, anger, fretfulness, and peevishness. 11
In considering the case of Methodism in particular, as a reflection of the universal
Church, Wesley revealed the corrosive effect of riches in three movements. First, any
revival of religion, like the evangelical revival of the eighteenth century, "must neces-
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sarily produce both industry and frugality. " 18 That is, disciplined Christians will not
only work assiduously, taking care to use wisely their talents and graces, but they will
also cut off all needless expense. Second, these very characteristics, the fruit of vital
religion, "cannot but produce riches. " 19 Third, as riches increase, "so will pride, anger,
and love of the world in all its branches," the very things which will vitiate the love of
God and neighbor and thereby destroy vital religion. The movement has now come
full circle.
II. STEWARDSHIPAND THE PROMISEOF MINISTRY:
THE LOVE OF GOD AND NEIGHBOR
One solution to the problem of undermining vital Christianity through riches is to
maintain, as Theodore Jennings does, that the economic counsel of John Wesley as
expressed in his well-known sermon, "The Use of Money" is seriously flawed and,
therefore, must be rejected-at least in part.
To illustrate, Jennings, no doubt influenced by Marxist economic analysis , is
apparently unwilling to grant Wesley the first two movements of his economic triad:
namely, the advice to "gain all you can," and "save all you can. "20 Accordingly, for the
phrase "gain all you can" Jennings substitutes something like "gain all you need." In
other words, people should be allowed to earn no more than what they require for
their basic human needs, regardless of the amount or difficulty of the work done. But
observe that in his "Use of Money," Wesley does not restrict the gaining of money in
terms of human need; instead, he maintains that a person's needs determine how
much should be given to the poor. That is, to inhibit the gaining of money in a preemptive fashion may , in turn, restrict the amount of money available for ministry to
the poor. In fact, what constraints Wesley does, after all, place on the rightful earning
of money are in terms of such things as the health of laborers (they must neither hurt
their bodies nor minds), and the well being of their neighbors (they must not hurt
their neighbors in their bodies or their souls). Beyond this, Jennings is equally critical
of Wesley 's second counsel to "save all you can," since Wesley substantiates its value
not by a specific appeal to the needs of the poor, but by an appeal to avoiding the
"self-indulgence that leads to sin. "2 1
The problem with Jennings ' analysis, and others like it, is its failure to appreciate a
truth readily acknowledged by Wesley, namely, that vital religion necessarily produces
both industry (gain all you can) and thrift (save all you can), a point alluded to earlier. "For wherever true Christianity spreads," Wesley affirms, "it must cause diligence
and frugality .... "22 In a similar fashion, Wesley admonishes the Methodists in his "Use
of Money ": "No more sloth! Whatsoever your hand findeth to do, do it with your
might. " And again: "No more waste! Cut off every expense which fashion, caprice , or
flesh and blood demand ."23 Therefore, the prohibition or stifling of industry, the frustration or elimination of thrift by well-meaning social policy or by law may have , in
the end , some unintended but nonetheless serious ramifications.
Fortunately , the solution which Wesley himself offered to the continuing problem
of undermining Christianity through wealth was to add to the first two counsels a
third , namely , "Give all you can." H Although this normative statement, this guide to
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behavior, is well known in Methodist circles, what has not been fully appreciated is
the complex motivation which lay behind it. For example, in exhorting his own
Methodist societies, Wesley actually made three distinct kinds of appeal by means of
this prescription . First, and perhaps most important of all, he noted that believers
should give all they can because it is the Lord who is the Creator and rightful
Governor of the world. In other words, for Wesley, God is the true owner of all
things; believers, therefore, are merely stewards of this bounty .
Second, for Wesley, the love of God through the discipline of stewardship must
issue in the love of neighbor. Put another way, God has placed in the hands of those
who have the necessities of life and something left over-Wesley's definition of richthe wherewithal to minister to the poor. Therefore, the "rich" are to be the conduits,
the channels, of the blessings of the Most High. "Let thy plenty supply thy neighbours' wants," Wesley urges in his sermon "On Worldly Folly." 25 Therefore, to stifle
this gracious movement from God to humanity through needless self-indulgence is
nothing less than robbing the poor. "Everything about thee which cost more than
Christian duty required thee to lay out is the blood of the poor!" 26
Third, Wesley acknowledged one last motivating factor, and it consisted, interestingly enough, in improving the spiritual life of those who ministered to the needy .
Thus, in the larger economic and soteriological environment of ministry to the poor ,
there are three not two principal agents for Wesley: God and the poor, of course, but
also those who served the poor. Indeed, Wesley's economic ethic is remarkably distinctive in that it expresses pastoral concern for the latter as well .
III. JOHN WESLEY'S VARIEGATED MINISTRY TO THE POOR
Though seldom noticed , Wesley in his writings, especially in his sermon corpus ,
employs the term "the poor" in two key ways . First of all, commenting on Matthew
5:1-4, he specifically rejects a mere economic reading of the term "the poor " as
found in "Happy are the poor in spirit for theirs is the kingdom of heaven ." 27 Indeed,
by means of this judgment, Wesley sought to reaffirm, once again and in a critical
way, the radical nature of human evil which cannot be utterly identified with the
particular sin of greed or with the acquisition of wealth. In fact , in his sermon "Upon
Our Lord 's Sermon on the Mount, Discourse the First, " produced in 1748, the
Methodist leader not only denies that the love of money is the root of all evil , but he
also indicates something of the Lord 's design in offering the Sermon on th e Mount.
Wesley writes :
This sense [an economic reading] of the expression 'poor in spirit ' will by no
means suit our Lord 's pr esent design , which is to lay a general foundation
wh ereon the whole fabric of Christianity may be built ; a design which would be
in no wise answer ed by guarding against one particular vice ; so that even if this
wer e suppos ed to be one part of his meaning , it could not possibl y be the
whol e. 28
Th e poor in spirit, then, th e blessed of the Lord , are all tho se of what ever out ward
circumstanc es who "have that disposition of heart which is th e first step to all real
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substantial happiness ."29 Poverty of spirit, in other words, entails lowliness in heart,
and it begins "where a sense of guilt and of the wrath of God ends; and is a continual
sense of our total dependence on him for every good thought or word or work. "30 In
short, not outward circumstances but inward dispositions define this first definition
of the poor, and, more importantly , these same dispositions constitute the general
foundation of all true religion. But Wesley, quite obviously, also employed this term,
secondly, in a largely economic way. To illustrate, in his sermon, "Dives and
Lazarus," produced in 1788, Wesley exclaims:
Hear this, all ye that are poor in this world. Ye that many times have not food to
eat or raiment to put on; ye that have not a place where to lay your head, unless
it be a cold garret, or a foul and damp cellar! Ye are now reduced to "solicit the
cold hand of charity." Yet lift up your load; it shall not always be thus. 31
Ever energetic in ministry, Wesley sought out those who lacked the necessities of
life: he visited them in their homes and preached to them in the fields. As a result, he
knew by firsthand experience how "devilishly false is that common objection, 'They
are poor, only because they are idle."' 32 Furthermore, Wesley's lifelong association
with the destitute resulted in his love, respect, and appreciation for these children of
God. In 1757, for instance, in a letter to Dorothy Furly, he exclaimed: "In most religious people there is so strange a mixture that I have seldom much confidence in
them. I love the poor; in many of them I find pure, genuine grace, unmixed with
paint, folly, and affection." 33 And a few years later, in 1765, Wesley once again
demonstrated his affection for the impoverished and wrote in his journal: "I preached
at Bath, but I had only the poor to hear, there being service at the same time in Lady
H[untingdon]'s chapel. So I was just in my element." 34
A. The Temporal Needs of the Poor

So concerned was Wesley with the plight of the poor that he sought to improve
their temporal condition through numerous ministries. Thus, in November 1740, for
instance, Wesley undertook a humble experiment which involved about a dozen
unemployed people, drawn from the Methodist societies, in the carding and spinning
of cotton .35 The next year , in 1741, greatly offended by the poverty within the United
Society itself, Wesley developed a systematic program to feed the hungry, clothe the
naked, employ the poor, and visit the sick. 36 In fact, according to Ward and
Heitzenrater, for over forty years "all the class-money in London, amounting to several hundred pounds a year, was distributed to the poor by the stewards." 37 Moreover,
these attempts to ameliorate the temporal condition of the needy, some more successful than others, were augmented in 1746 by the opening of a free dispensary to provide medical services 38 and by the institution of a lending-stock to offer cash to the
impoverished. And though at its inception the stock did not amount to more than
fifty pounds, it eventually served more than two hundred and fifty people .39
In light of the preceding material, it should be evident by now that a significant
portion of Wesley's benevolent activity actually took place not indiscriminately but
within the context of the Methodist societies themselves. In other words, lending
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stocks, dispensaries, collections and the like most often serviced those poor who were
already participating in some way in the institutional life of Methodism. 40 More to the
point, Wesley's sermons demonstrate a hierarchical order in meeting the temporal
needs of the poor which clearly privileges those in the church over those beyond its
walls . Thus, in assessing the proper distribution of goods beyond the real needs of
one's family Wesley counsels: "If when this is done there be an overplus left, then 'do
good to them that are of the household of faith.' If there be an overplus still, 'as you
have opportunity, do good unto all men.' "41 Not surprisingly, then, there are relatively few instances in either Wesley's Journal or his letters which chronicle acts of charity which are not somehow purposely related to a larger ecclesiastical and soteriological context.
Furthermore, Wesley's ever-present soteriological orientation is revealed not only
in his concern over the temporal needs of the poor, but it is also demonstrated, once
again, in his emphasis on the spiritual state of those who minister and in his critical
assessment of their ministerial labors. To illustrate, in his homily, "Upon Our Lord's
Sermon on the Mount, Discourse the Thirteenth," Wesley maintains that though
believers may do good to their neighbors by dealing bread to the hungry and by covering the naked, they still may have "no part in the glory which shall be revealed. "42
And he displays the reasoning behind this judgment in the following excerpt from
this same sermon: "For how far short is all this of that righteousness and true holiness
which he has described therein! How widely distant from that inward kingdom of
heaven, which is now opened in the believing soul! "43
Viewed from yet another perspective, Wesley affirms that before the love of God
and neighbor is established in the heart through faith in Jesus Christ all works of
piety and mercy are not good, technically speaking. And though the Methodist leader
was obviously unwilling to call works of charity done apart from justifying faith good ,
strictly speaking, he was equally unwilling to call them "splendid sins" as some of his
Calvinist friends were willing to do. 44 And, in a real sense, his doctrine of prevenient
grace explains such reluctance . But perhaps the clearest expression of the indissoluble
relationship between works of mercy and holy tempers is found in Wesley's sermon
"On Charity" which was written in 1784 . In this piece, for example, Wesley states:
"That all those who are zealous of good works would put them in their proper place!
Would not imagine they can supply the want of holy tempers, but take care that they
may spring from them ."45
So then Wesley endeavored to root his ministry to the poor not only in terms of a
"horizontal axis," corresponding to the scope of the various temporal needs of the less
fortunate , but also in terms of a "vertical axis" which plumbed the depths of motivation and purpose and thereby recognized the value of holy affections for those who
ministered. Simply put, dispensing wealth improved the spiritual state of the giver as
well as the temporal condition of the receiver. Hoarding wealth , on the other hand,
spoiled the spiritual state of the rich and left the temporal needs of the poor neglected. In fact, in his Notes on the New Testament Wesley reveals a symbiotic relationship
between the indigent and those who minister to them which operates under the larger
providence of God. Commenting on the continuing existence of the poor in Matthew
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26:11 "Ye have the poor always with you," Wesley exclaims, though perhaps somewhat insensitively: "Such is the wise and gracious providence of God, that we may
have always opportunities of relieving their wants, and so laying up for ourselves treasures in heaven. "46
B. The Spiritual Needs of the Poor
Though the descendants of the social gospel movement as well as some of the
modern progenitors of liberation theology have, at times, looked askance at the language of "saving souls" as an instance of theological obscurantism, such language
reverberates in the writings of John Wesley. At an early Methodist conference, for
instance, Wesley asked those assembled to consider what is the office of a Christian
minister? To which he and others replied: "To watch over souls, as he that must give
an account. "47 And when he detailed the responsibilities of a "Helper" shortly thereafter Wesley exclaimed, revealing much of his mission and purpose: "You have nothing to do but to save souls. Therefore spend and be spent in this work. "48
To be sure, this particular emphasis of the redemption of souls, far from being an
unusual or occasional one, continued throughout Wesley's life. Thus, in 1763, as he
considered the purpose or end towards which the church should be directed, he
wrote the following in his sermon "The Reformation of Manners":

This is the original design of the church of Christ. It is a body of men compacted together in order, first, to save each his own soul, then to assist each other in
working out their salvation, and afterwards, as far as in them lies, to save all
men from present and future misery, to overturn the kingdom of Satan, and set
up the kingdom of Christ. 49
Moreover , when John wrote to his brother Charles in 1772, ostensibly to consider
an aspect of the doctrine of Christian perfection, he reminded him, among other
things, that his business as well as his own was "to save souls." 50
In view of this emphasis, part of the good news to the poor according to Wesley
consists not only in the transformation of the Christian community such that, with
the holy tempers of love in place, the body of Christ is now impelled to share sacrificially to meet the temporal needs of the poor, but it also consists in the glorious
proclamation to the poor of the redemption of the inward person, that all people of
whatever rank and station in life can be renewed in spirit, that the deepest recesses of
the heart can be made anew. Indeed, in his sermon, "Salvation by Faith," preached at
St. Mary's Oxford in 1738, Wesley points out that "whosoever believeth on him shall
be saved ,"51 and, more importantly for the task at hand, he affirms in this same sermon that the poor themselves have a "peculiar right to have [this] gospel preached to
them ."52
This right to the gospel by the poor, however, is also matched by a need for the
gospel in terms of both its temporal and spiritual aspects. In other words, just as
Wesley was reluctant to draw an exact equation between the economic condition of
the rich and their soteriological status , so too was he reluctant to draw a similar equation in terms of the poor. That is, though the poor are often characterized by the
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graces of humility and patience, Wesley was well aware of the sins often peculiar to
this estate . To illustrate, in an early manuscript sermon, Wesley asks the question , "O
faith working by love, whither art thou fled"? To which he curtly replies : "among the
wealthy? No. The 'deceitfulness of riches ' there 'chokes the word .. .' Among the poor?
No. 'The cares of the world ' are there, 'so that it bringeth forth no fruit to perfection .' " 53 And much later , in 1784, the seasoned Wesley continued this theme and
observed how "the poor were overwhelmed with worldly care , so that the seed they
had received became unfruitful. "54 Beyond this, in his sermon "Spiritual Idolatry ,"
Wesley affirms that idolatry in the form of "the desire of the flesh " plagues not only
the rich, but the poor as well . "In this also 'the toe of the peasant...treads upon the
heel of the courtier .' Thousands in low as well as in high life sacrifice to this idol. "55
This leveling of all men and women as sinners, poor and non-poor , this universal
flavor of sin, actually resulted in the enhanced status of the poor within the Methodist
societies where rank and privilege, so valued by the world, counted for nothing . In
fact, to know oneself as a sinner, to desire "to flee the wrath which is to come " was
the only requirement for membership in a Methodist society-a characteristic of
Methodist life, by the way, often resented by the rich .56
C. Wesley's Valuation of Different Kinds of Ministry

One way of understanding the relation between holiness of heart and life and the
works of mercy which flow from it, especially as such works relate to ministry to the
poor , is found, once again, in the work of Theodore Jennings. Thus , for example , this
contemporary scholar sets up a means/end relationship and maintains that the love of
God reigning in the heart is a suitable means to works of charity and apparently to
the-yet-higher end of reform of the political order. "Wesley emphasizes inward trans formation, " Jennings maintains , "because he is so earnestly interested in outward
behavior. "57 Elsewhere in his writings, Jennings specifically links holiness to political
goals, that is, to the elimination of private property and to the establishment of communism . "Wesley supposes that the Methodist movement will produce not only a
spread of the gospel throughout the earth," he writes, "but also , and therefore, bring
in the communist society ."58 And though these political goals themselves are ques tionable, especially in light of recent events in Eastern Europe, the valuational structure into which they are placed is even more dubious. Is the satisfaction of the temporal needs of the poor, though important , the very highest goal , the telos , at which
Wesley aimed? Was political transformation really the end, the major purpose of the
eighteenth-century revival? Or is this modern reading of Wesley , in its attempt to be
relevant , actually reductionistic in that it entails the substitution of the penultimate
for what is truly ultimate?
Yet another way of reading Wesley , of construing the relationship between the love
of God reigning in the heart and all manner of good works (individual , political , social)
is to contend that the one endlessly leads to the other in a cyclical fashion. In other
words, in this interpretation , the love of God and neighbor issues in works of mercy
which in turn enhance the love of God and neighbor .59 Here each element is a means to
the other and the question of valuation , of an ultimate telos , is thereb y avoided.
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Though this second reading of Wesley is much more plausible than the first, it too
must be judged as inadequate simply because it cannot incorporate the kinds of value
judgments which Wesley did, after all, make in this area . For example, in his sermon,
"On Visiting the Sick," produced in 1786, Wesley advises his visitors in the following
fashion:
But it may not be amiss usually to begin with inquiring into their outward condition. You may ask whether they have the necessaries of life. Whether they
have sufficient food and raiment. If the weather be cold, whether they have
fuel. 60
But after this, Wesley asserts, the visitor is to proceed to things of greater value.
"These little labours of love," he writes, "will pave your way to things of greater
importance. Having shown that you [have] a regard for their bodies, you may proceed
to inquire concerning their souls." 61 Furthermore, Wesley repeats this judgment, no
doubt for emphasis, but this time he clearly displays what is the telos of all ministry:
"While you are eyes to the blind and feet to the lame, a husband to the widow and a
father to the fatherless , see that you still keep a higher end in view, even the saving of
souls from death, and that you labour to make all you say and do subservient to that
great end."62
Though these value judgments have seldom surfaced in the secondary literature,
they are by no means idiosyncratic but represent Wesley's own thinking throughout
his career. For example, much earlier, in 1748, Wesley had written concerning those
engaged in ministry that "He doth good, to the uttermost of his power, even to the
bodies of men .... How much more does he rejoice if he can do any good to the soul of
any man!" 63 And two years later Wesley continued this theme in his sermon "Upon
Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, Discourse the Thirteenth" and wrote:
Over and above all this, are you zealous of good works? Do you, as you have
time, do good to all men? Do you feed the hungry and clothe the naked, and
visit the fatherless and widow in their affliction? Do you visit those that are
sick? Relieve them that are in prison? Is any a stranger and you take him in?
Friend , come up higher.... Does he enable you to bring sinners from darkness to
light, from the power of Satan unto God? 64
Two points are noteworthy in light of the preceding evidence : first, for Wesley at
least, a part of what it means to love your neighbor as yourself always involves the
exercise of both material gifts and spiritual talents; it entails the employment of all
those gifts and graces which will enhance the physical well being of the poor and their
spiritual character. Second, and perhaps more importantly, though the material needs
of the neighbor have chronological priority; they clearly do not have valuational priority in Wesley 's thought, 65 for their fulfillment prepares the way, to use Wesley's own
terminology , for things of greater importance.
But perhaps the most lucid expression of the goal of ministry as well as of its
accompan ying motivating factors in terms of the value and necessity of personal
inward transformation (spirituality) is found in the following selection from the ser-
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mon On Zeal, a sermon which epitomizes Wesley's thought in this area and which
provides insight into his ethical motivation and concern. Notice, for instance, what is
at the heart of this ethic and the consequences which flow from it . Wesley declares:
In a Christian believer love sits upon the throne, which is erected in the inmost
soul; namely , love of God and man, which fills the whole heart, and reigns without a rival. In a circle near the throne are all holy tempers: long-suffering , gentleness, meekness, goodness , fidelity, temperance-and
if any other is comprised
in "the mind which was in Christ Jesus ." In an exterior circle are all the works of
mercy, whether to the souls or bodies of men . By these we exercise all holy tempers; by these we continually improve them, so that all these are real means of
grace, although this is not commonly adverted to. Next to these are those that
are usually termed works of piety : reading and hearing the Word , public, family,
private prayer , receiving the Lord's Supper, fasting or abstinence . Lastly, that his
followers may the more effectually provoke one another to love, holy tempers ,
and good works, our blessed Lord has united them together in one-the church,
dispersed all over the earth; a little emblem of which, of the church universal,
we have in every particular Christian congregation. 66
In this sermon, then, it is as if Wesley has allowed us to peek into the throne room
of his entire theological and moral enterprise. 67 And on the throne sits not any politi cal ideology nor works of mercy, however noble or valuable they may be . No, love
itself sits on the throne, and next to it are all those holy tempers (holiness) described
earlier. And it is precisely only when these elements are in place , as both motivating
factors and as the highest goal of all ministry, that Wesley is then willing to consider
works of mercy , piety and the like . As noted earlier, "No outward works are acceptable to him [God] unless they spring from holy tempers,"68 he cautions . And again,
"That all those who are zealous of good works would put them in their proper place!
Would not imagine they can supply the want of holy tempers, but take care that they
may spring from them! "69 Therefore all those "dispositions of mind " like meekness,
gentleness and long-suffering, etc. , are not beside the point, a pious extravagance or
indulgence, but are "absolutely necessary ... for the enjoyment of present or future
holiness ."70 Indeed, they are nothing less than the lodestars of the moral life, the key
to Wesley's ethic.
CONCLUSION
It should be apparent by now that the soteriological orientation of John Wesley's
ministry to the poor is marked by three carefully drawn axes . First, Wesley's horizontal axis of ministry , directed towards the temporal needs of humanity , is more broadly
conceived than some and includes the principal agents of God , the poor , as well as
those who are engaged in service . Second , Wesley 's vertical axis of ministry is attentive not only to the proper spiritual motivation of those who minister to the poor ,
underscoring the crucial nature of right tempers , but it is also attentive to the spiritual
life of the poor themselves . Indeed , for Wesley , all people, poor and non-poor , young
and old, male and female , need to be ren ewed through faith in love . Third , th e
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Methodist leader's valuational axis, present in several of his later sermons, not only
assesses the worth of temporal and spiritual ministry, but it also places nothing other
than holy love at the center of things in terms of both motivation and purpose. Next
in importance, of course, are all those holy tempers of the human heart from which
flow works of mercy and works of piety. Indeed, for Wesley, only when this "inward"
work has begun is one ready for vigorous, redemptive service.
Viewed from another perspective, these three axes demonstrate the truly radical
nature of John Wesley's ministry to the poor in that he realized that the evils of economic injustice, though significant, were informed by more basic evils which had
their roots in the human heart. Accordingly, the greed of the rich, their taste for luxury and waste, could not be overcome simply by state fiat, nor by moralizing, but by a
transformation of the inward person as well .
Moreover, with respect to the poor themselves, Wesley was critical enough to realize that no group or class has a privileged soteriological status since all have fallen
short of the glory of God. Indeed, it was precisely on this basis of a universal need for
redemption, of a radical transformation of the human heart, that Wesley was able to
break out of the political strife and animosity so typical of his day to bring together
the poor and those who ministered to them in a larger, more inclusive circle of ministry, to foster mutual concern and affection among them as joint members of the
body of Christ, and ultimately to unite them in the broadest circle of love.
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1725 to 1741. Among the manuscript sermons are such important works as "The Image of
God ," and "The One Thing Needful. " See Outler 's introduction to his critical edition of
Wesley's sermons for more on this particular genre.
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there is sufficient evidence in Wesley's own writings to demonstrate that he upheld both religious and civil liberty . More to the point, in his "Thoughts upon Liberty" Wesley observes that
civil liberty entails "a liberty to enjoy our lives and fortunes in our own way; to use our property, whatever is legally our own, according to our own choice ." And in his "Observations on
Liberty" he adds : "Civil liberty is a liberty to dispose of our lives, persons, and fortunes, according to our own choice, and the laws of our country ." Cf.Jackson, Works, 11:41, 11:92.
59. Wesley maintained that works of piety as well as works of mercy are in some sense necessary to sanctification. In other words, if there be time and opportunity, these works are the normal means to an improvement of the rich grace of God. Wesley, however, did not contend that
doing good works necessarily results in an increase in holiness . The emphasis here, as elsewhere, is on the grace of God and works of mercy as a means of that grace. Cf. Outler, Sermons,
2:164. ("The Scripture Way of Salvation")
60. Ibid ., 3:390 . ("On Visiting the Sick")
61. Ibid ., p . 391. ("On Visiting the Sick") These hortatory comments found in the sermons
reveal that in his ministry to the poor Wesley was never simply preoccupied with their temporal needs, important though they were, but he also was ever concerned with the transcendent ,
with the issues of God and eternity, a trait which gave his economic ethic, at least at times, a
decidedly "other worldly" emphasis. "Every pound you put into the earthly bank is sunk, "
Wesley writes in his "The More Excellent Way," "it brings no interest above. But every pound
you give to the poor is put into the bank of heaven." Cf. Outler, Sermons, 3:276 .
62. Ibid ., 3:393 . ("On Visiting the Sick") Emphasis is mine.
63 . Ibid ., 1:519 . ("Upon Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, Discourse the Third ") With respect
to the roles of ministry, the task of visiting the sick (and the poor) demonstrates not separation as in some praxis models , not ministry which occurs in one direction only, from the poor
to those who minister to them, but it reveals , once again, a mutuality of need and of love in an
ever larger circle of ministry. Moreover , this mutuality of need and love is amply displayed in
Wesley 's sermon, "On Visiting the Sick," in which he counsels his readers to visit the afflicted
in person for two principal reasons : first, unlike a physician , the visitor can do great good to the
souls of men and women. Second , sending relief by another likewise does not improve one's
own graces ; there is no advance, in other words , in the love of God and neighbor. "You could
not gain that increase in lowliness , in patience , in tenderness of spirit , in sympathy with the
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afflict ed, " Wesley notes , "which you might have gained if you had assisted them in person. " Cf.
Outler , Sermons, 3:389 , 393.
64 . Ibid ., 1:695 . ( "Upon Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount , Discourse the Thirteenth ")
Emphasis is mine.
65 . Ibid . ("Upon Our Lord 's Sermon on the Mount, Discourse the Thirteenth ")
66 . Ibid. , 3:313-14. ("On Zeal")
67. Though there is no evidence that Wesley ever read St. Teresa of Avila's Interior Castle, the
central images which both spiritual leaders use to describe the Christian life are remarkably
similar. Both, for instance, employ paradigmatic metaphors which not only contain implicit
value judgments, but they also highlight the crucial nature of love . For example , Teresa 's seventh mansion and its "geographical " location in the center of the castle is analogous to Wesley's
placing of love on the throne from which all else in the Christian life flows . Compare Teresa of
Avila , Interior Castle, trans . E. Allison Peers (New York: Doubleday , 1989) , p. 206ff with
Outler , Sermons, 3:313-14 . ("On Zeal").
68 . Outler , Sermons, 3:320. ("On Zeal") Bracketed material is mine .
69. Ibid ., 3:305 . ("On Charity ")
70. Ibid., 4 :223. ("On Living Without God ") The danger of beginning not with love and hol y
tempers but with political and economic concerns is that "justice " so conceived will most likely
be unreformed , speckled with anger , class animosity, and perhaps even outright hatred of the
middle-class or the rich. In other words, its concern for the poor will be expressed in all those
unholy tempers against which Wesley inveighed . Once again , love and holiness are the proper
starting point. Only then will the poor be properly ministered to and receive the justice they
deserve .

BOOK REVIEWS
Pelikan, Jaroslav, Christianity and Classical Culture. The Metamorphosisof Natural
Theology in the Christian Encounterwith Hellenism (Gifford Lectures at Aberdeen ,
1992-1993) . New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1993. xvi, 368 pps .
ISBN 0-300-05554-4.
Based on the Gifford lectures given at the University of Aberdeen in 1992 and
1993, Pelikan's book is a significant contribution to understanding the fourth
Christian century and the influence of decisions made during that period upon subsequent generations of Christian theologians. The driving questions which gave
form to the lectures and the subsequent volume related to the interaction of
Christian ideas and Classical Greek culture; the case studies chosen for investigation were the four theologians known as "the Cappadocians" according to their
home province: Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, Macrina (siblings) and their
friend Gregory of Nazianzus. Cappadocia, comprising much of eastern Asia Minor ,
was largely a rural area with intermittent small towns and villages. The seats to
which Basil appointed his brother and friend were anything but prestigious in the
Byzantine imperial organization. Yet from that unlikely context , those four scholar/church persons/theologians came to dominate the mind of their century .
The method of the volume was not to deal with each author in sequence . Instead,
Pelikan systematically organized a presentation of the views of the individual theologians around the focal questions , but did not hesitate to allow the four friends to disagree with each other. The exposition was presented in the flowing lucid style one
has come to anticipate from Professor Pelikan. In nearly every instance, the quotations were artfully chosen from both the primary and secondary literature . Indeed, it
will be interesting to observe how many salient quotations from Cappadocians and
modern scholars will become standard features of later works!
Essential to reading the volume is an awareness of the structure (described by
Pelikan, pp . 38-39) . The first part of the volume examined the issues of theological language , the ways of knowing God, the unity and diversity of God, the universe as cosmos, space and time, the image of God , human divinization , the
nature of good and eschatology from the perspective of "natural theology as
apologetics ." In the second part of the tome, these same issues, with some variations on themes, are approached from the perspective of "natural theology as
presupposition. " It is therefore advisable to read the corresponding chapters of
the two sections in light of each other as well as within the sequence of the section in which they appear. No small task at that!
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The thesis of the volume was that "the natural theology of the Cappadocians, and of
the Greek Christian tradition as a total entity ...was the product of. ..encounters with
Hellenism (p. 21)." Pelikan argued that the central feature of the Cappadocian approach
was "the language of negation" or apophasis.This understood the mystery of God to be the
essential of God, and minimized the significance and accuracy of any positive affirmations
which might be made about the nature and purpose of the divine. The main goal for
humans, suggested the Cappadocians, was "Christian perfection, " a notion already seen in
the Qumran and biblical materials and especially with Alexandrian theology but with
roots in Plato and Aristotle. Christian perfection was more than a restoration of the image
of God according in creation. It sought also the achievement of the union of the human
will with the divine will. These two foci of theological reflection, about humans and God,
controlled the entire theological system of the Cappadocian writers .
Many of the particulars of Cappadocian theology will sound remarkably modem to most
readers. For example, it was insisted that the attribution of gender to God was a human
limitation and, as a matter of orthodoxy, God was beyond any ascription of gender. To
assert the characteristic of gender to God, even in the ascription of "Father," is to approach
the edge of heresy. With regard to abortion there was a difference of opinion: Basil considered abortion murder; Gregory of Nyssa understood a fetus as a potential human. With
regard to eschatology, Basil insisted that the last judgment included condemnation .
Gregory of Nyssa and Macrina argued for a universal restoration. Gregory of Nazianzus
affirmed an Origenist hope for universal salvation.
While one hesitates to criticize such a magisterial effort, and with which one finds such
resonance from one's own research, there are a number of concerns which do arise. The
first is with regard to the influence of Origen of Alexandria. This writer, as Pelikan rightly
suggested, was perhaps the major Christian theological influence on the development of
Cappadocian thought (29-30, et passim). Pelikan properly indicated certain areas of agreement and disagreement of the fourth century writers with their third century
Alexandrian/Caesarean predecessor. However, throughout Pelikan's analysis, the treatment
would have been enriched by reference to Origen's thought. As it is, a careful analysis of the
debt of the Cappadocians to Origen on the precise issues examined in the volume remains
a desideratum . Part of the problem, with regard to Origen and to other early Christian
materials is the unfortunately laconic footnote style, which takes up much space on the
page but allows minimal possibility of allusion to relevant illuminatory materials.
Other issues are actually more central to the analysis. The assumption of both the
Cambridge Platonists, on the one hand, and of Ritschl and von Harnack on the other, that
there was a clear divergence between "gospel" and "hellenism" in earliest Christianity was
perpetuated in the volume . Space does not allow a thorough critique of this thesis on the
basis of extant early Christian texts, but suffice it to say that it would probably be more
accurate to say that there was a divergence between popular hellenistic culture and the academic hellenistic culture encountered, understood and appropriated by Origen and the
Cappadocians. Such a distinction would require a more nuanced analysis, an analysis complicated by the fact that Ephrem of Syria, contemporary of the Cappadocians, was making
quite similar arguments about natural theology, the nature of God and the goal of
humankind , all without direct recourse to academic Greek philosophy .
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Secondly, the conflicts with the Arians and Manichaeans were minimally mentioned.
Here Pelikan, and many other scholars, have taken their lead from the Cappadocians in not
mentioning the names of certain opponents. The tradition of depriving one's enemies of
free publicity, however, does not mean that the writers were ignorant of the challenges at
hand . The Cappadocian's contemporary and intellectual fellow traveller, Ephrem, overtly
developed his arguments in direct opposition to both Arians and Manichaeans, a fact which
complicates Pelikan's picture of the Cappadocians. Thirdly, there is minimal discussion of
the developments of academic philosophy either at Alexandria or at Athens and other centers. Most of the major writers of the period , including Plotinus and Porphyry, who had
definitive influence on the philosophical possibilities appropriated by the Cappadocians,
were not mentioned. Finally, significant research of the last two decades missed Pelikan's
net. The traditional understanding of crucial elements of Cappadocian thought require
nuancing because of the work of, for example, Andre de Halleux who was not mentioned.
Despite these shortcomings, Pelikan's analysis of the fourth century Cappadocian theologians is a major contribution to the history of Christian theology. It is to be hoped
that this treatment of the theological background to the Nicene-Constantinopolitan
Creed of 381 CE. will add substance to the renewed interest in that landmark ecumenical creed, a document which institutionalized many of the theological conclusions of the
Cappadocian writers, a statement promulgated by a Council of Constantinople initially
convened under the presidency of none other than Gregory of Nazianzus .
DAVID BUNDY
Associate Professor of Church History
Christian Theological Seminary
Indianapolis, Indiana

McCoy, Charles S. and J. Wayne Baker, Fountainhead of Federalism:Heinrich Bullinger
and the Covenantal Tradition, with a Translation of Bullinger's Detestamentoseuf oedere
Dei unico et aeterno (1534). Westminster/John Knox Press: Louisville, Kentucky,
1991, 180 pp.
In recent years both theologians and political philosophers (particularly political
philosophers who are interested in influences on the American Founding Fathers) have
devoted attention to tracing the lines of influence of covenant thought in the realms of theology and governmental theory. For the first time to this reviewer's knowledge, these two
trajectories, have been brought together in a single work. McCoy and Baker, both theologians, have competently traced the development of covenantal thought from its roots in the
work of Heinrich Bullinger in the 16th century to its political adaptation in the thought of
the American framers of the United States Constitution. Such an ambitious undertaking is
accomplished in a book of only 98 pages, leaving the reader hungry for more but intrigued
sufficiently to pursue the issue for himself in greater detail. Nevertheless, the authors have
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not in any way sacrificed accuracy by limiting the text. It is now commonly accepted that
James Madison, the primary framer of the basic American legal document, the
Constitution, was heavily influenced by men who were themselves influenced by "federal"
thought, men such as John Witherspoon, John Locke, and David Hume.
Long before Madison, the Puritans of England and New England lived and moved in a
covenantal world . McCoy and Baker take the reader on a fascinating journey back
beyond the Puritans to the covenantal thought of Cocceius, well-known to theologians,
and, in political philosophy, to Johannes Althusis, unknown to almost everyone . The
fountainhead of this rich federal tradition is traced ultimately to the Swiss Reformer
Bullinger. Covenant theology, as most theologians are aware, was a powerful organizing
influence in sixteenth and seventeenth century Reformed theology. But the connection
between this early covenant theology and later political thought has often been ignored
or lost. McCoy and Baker have begun to remedy this situation in their work.
The authors have also done the theological world a huge favor by providing a translation of Bullinger's major work on the covenant, De Testamento seu FoedereDei unico et
aetemo (On the One and Eternal Covenant of God), published in 1534. If one is interested
to know how covenant thought began in earnest, he must read this work preferably in
the Latin, but at the very least, in this convenient translation .
If there are any criticisms of the book, the primary one is that the authors do not devote
enough detail to the influences of federal thought on the American Founding Fathers. In
general, the entire work could profitably be expanded. But, despite these shortcomings, if
they can be so-called, this work is must reading . In addition, it contains a fairly comprehensive bibliography of covenant literature, primary and secondary. This reviewer would also
recommend Baker's earlier work on Bullinger's covenant thinking, Heinrich Bullingerand
the Covenant:The Other ReformedTradition. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1980.)
MARC CLAUSON
Lexington Christian Academy
Lexington, Kentucky

Richey, Russell E., Early American Methodism. Bloomington and Indianapolis : Indiana
University Press, 1991, xix, 137 pp . ISBN 0-253-35006-9 .

Early American Methodismis a collection of six insightful essays, half of which originally
appeared in different form in Methodist History. Russell E. Richey, research professor of
church history at Duke University Divinity School, is a honed essayist capable of distilling
vast amounts of secondary literature for the non-specialist, and , following the "principle of
fecudity," suggesting new lines of interpretation. Religious history typically appears in the
fuller dress of the narrative , yet the linkage of Methodism and the essay form seems highly
appropriate given John Wesley's fondness for the sermonic essay, his chief means of theologizing . Much of the evidence Richey musters--personal journals and meditations-would,
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in less deft hands, seem merely arbitrary and anecdotal. Considering his ability to find
much where little appears to the untrained eye, Richey seems possessed of the same "glass
to the heart" (p. 44) that animated Francis Asbury.
Richey understands his work to be "self-consciously a revisionist endeavor" (p. xi),
executed in the narrow confines of forty years, 1770-1810. It is a rare work of history that
is at once both avowedly revisionist and yet discerning of and sympathetic toward the religious sensibilities of the phenomena in question . Revisionist history is almost by definition reductionist history, dismissing religion as vestigial. The revisionism on display here
is enriching, not denuding, for it clarifies much of Methodism's original intent in America,
namely, "To reform the Continent, and to spread scriptural Holiness over these lands" (p.
36). Richey's clarity is not simply cleaning an old lens grown dusty with time, but a fresh
lens ground in part by contemporary concerns, that illumines the past and suggests how it
can in tum illumine the future. It is a subtle clarity, turning on evidence such as two
words highlighted here and a preposition substituted for a conjunction there. On such
subtleties hangs the "Methodist construction of reality" (p.79) that Richey builds . When
Bishop William McKendree changes Wesley's two-pronged dictum of reforming the continent and spreading scriptural holiness to reforming by spreading scriptural holiness (pp.
35, 61), Richey overturns the conventional interpretation that saw reform being collapsed
into evangelism. Reform, for Richey, cannot be a competitor to holiness. In the early
national period under review, Methodists "had a very powerful corporate purpose and did,
in fact, offer a model of a reformed continent" (p. 62).
In what was almost an aside in the journals of eighteenth-century Methodist preachers,
"We rode" (p. 8), Richey again finds very nearly an entire world, a world of community
that overturns a cherished idol of Methodist-and American-individualism: "the solitary,
cloaked horseman, braving storm and cold...to deliver the gospel" (p. 8). Most often those
paired riders were Southerners, as Richey shows in perhaps the most engaging essay, 'The
Southern Accent of American Methodism." In the South, early Methodism proposed "an
evangelical alternative to patriarchal Anglicanism" (p. 55), built the church biracially,
showed profound ambivalence toward slavery, and dramatized grace in public gatherings,
especially the quarterly conference and later the annual conference. Here Richey makes the
claim never before heard that "the South shaped American religion as a whole" (p. 50),
although Methodism has largely ignored its Southern roots. Overcoming the New England
bias for religious beginnings is not easy. The choir director in Thornton Wilder's Our Town
charged his New Hampshire Congregational choristers to stifle their loud singing. That
should be left to the Methodists.
Richey's early American Methodism is not bawdy or unseemly, but certainly fullthroated. "We need a rewritten version of Methodist history, seen from the bottom
up" (p. 53). Looking from the bottom-up vantage, three realities-community,
fraternity, and order-gave to Methodism "incredible power" (p. 13) when properly balanced. Community eventuated in feasts of love, fraternity happened especially among
the travelling preachers who rode in pairs, and order carried forth the scriptural episcopacy that Americans inherited from Wesley's Anglicanism. There is almost a triune
premise at work among community, fraternity, and order, for within the Trinity,
although of infinite and not measurable span, there is also "the ordering of the spiri-
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tual resources of each for the sake of the whole connection and ultimately the kingdom" (p. 13).
The final essay, 'The Four Languages of Early American Methodism," is not only a culmination but also a model for writing denominational history. Every denomination has its
own linguistic structure, its preferred "grammar of grace." Richey testifies to the efficacyof
the first Methodist language, the popular or evangelical, every time he cites a journal entry
from Francis Asbury,Jesse Lee, or others . The popular language connected Methodists with
revival-minded Presbyterians and Baptists. Revival, "predominantly a communal affair"(p.
3), sometimes erupted with no preacher present. John Wesley, however pleased he might
have been with the popular or evangelical language, spoke more directly and doctrinallyin
the second language Richey identifies, the Wesleyan. It was not only the language of the
warm heart, but also of the clear mind. The third language, the episcopal or Anglican,
might seem a simple reiteration of the Wesleyan, but Richey claims that these two languages, certainly capable of juxtaposition, were "not really conceptually unified" (p. 92).
These two languages might be spoken at the same annual conference, although at different
times for different reasons. The fourth language, the republican, was spoken most clearly
by James O'Kelly, who formed the Republican Methodist Church in 1792 when that year's
General Conference denied his motion to give preachers the right to contest the bishop's
appointment of them. Perhaps only the episodic Methodists could continue to speak four
languages without blending them into one, as did the Lutherans and Calvinists. But every
denomination will be found to speak many voices, not unlike the requirement to show the
church's four classic marks: unity, holiness, apostolicity, catholicity.
It is said that short stories are harder to write than novels, and historical essays presumably exact greater labor than narratives . Early American Methodism shows both the essay
form and its practitioner at their best. Only occasionally does Richey transgress John
Wesley's "a plain truth for plain people" criterion. Only occasionally is slender evidence
made to support more than it really can. If this revisionist history is written from the bottom up, it ends at a kind of summit, allowing one to see early Methodist standards like the
camp meeting and the quarterly conference in a truer, more bracing light.
RODERICK T. LEUPP
Visiting Professor of Theology
Asia-Pacific Nazarene Theological Seminary
Metro Manila, Philippines

Gill, Kenneth D., Toward a Contextualized Theologyfor the Third World (Studies in the
Intercultural Theology of Christianity , 90 pp .; Frankfurt am Main : Peter Lang, 1994).
xi, 311 pp . ISBN 3-631-47096-7.
This volume traces the historical and theological developments of one of the major
Pent ecos tal traditions in Mexico as it formulated an understanding and praxis of
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Christianity which was contextualized in a particular 'Third World" milieu. The book is
the final stage of a dissertation presented at the University of Birmingham, England, written
under the direction of Prof. Walter Hollenweger. Gill is presently Collection Development
Librarian at The Billy Graham Center Library, Wheaton College. Previously, he held positions at the Asbury Theological Seminary and University of Texas-El Paso Libraries.
The Pentecostal tradition studied here is known by various names: "Jesus Name,"
"Jesus Only," or "Oneness" Pentecostalism. The perspective arose in the early years of the
Pentecostal tradition when it was noticed at a camp-meeting at Arroyo Seco, California,
that the New Testament instructions to baptize, with the exception of Matthew 28:19, all
talked of baptism "in Jesus' name" rather than with the traditional trinitarian formula .
This liturgical observation led to a permanent division between "Trinitarian" Pentecostals
and "Oneness" Pentecostals, a difference of perspective which has become more pronounced through the conflict and intellectual posturing of both sides. The "Oneness" perspective has become primarily, with the exception of the United Pentecostal Church, a tradition of Hispanic and African-American churches in the United States, and an important
branch of Pentecostalism outside the U.S.A., especially in Mexico.
The first chapter (pp. 1-42) discusses the origins of "Jesus' Name Pentecostalism" tracing its development from the Arroyo Seco Camp-meeting through the formation of the
Assemblies of God (from its beginnings anti-Oneness) and the U.S.A. "Oneness" denominations, the Pentecostal Assemblies of the World and the United Pentecostal Church .
The second chapter (pp. 43-74) describes the development of the "Jesus' Name
Movement" in Mexico. During 1912, Romanita, a young Mexican woman, was converted
at a small house church in Los Angeles. In 1914, after the end of the Mexican civil war,
Romanita returned to Mexico, and with the assistance of her nephew, Miguel Garcia,
began Bible studies. One of the converts was a Methodist Holiness pastor Ruben Ortega,
who before he took over leadership of the new "Iglesia Apost6lica," was rebaptized in
"Jesus' Name" in southern Texas. From this modest beginning, the new movement
spread throughout Mexico and into the United States where a separate denomination was
organized in 1930. As with most of the Pentecostal and/or Holiness churches, these all
divided, generally over issues of leadership and organization, to form other related
groups.
The struggle for organization and theological unity within the framework of evolving
contextualization in Mexican culture is described in chapter three (pp. 75-116) . Never
dominated by foreign missionaries or mission organizations, the Iglesia Apost6lica was
able to decide which foreign elements would be a part of its liturgy, theology, and praxis.
Importantly, its clergy, theologians, and other leaders were never the paid staff of foreign
organizations. It was a church of the lower and lower middle classes with an indigenous
leadership, frequently of worker-pastors.
Although it is not thus presented by Gill, much of the rest of the story of the denomination is the history of a remarkable family, the Gaxiola family which is now entering its
third generation of leadership in the church . Maclovio Gaxiola Lopez established (1943)
the Liberia Latinoamericana as the publishing house of the Iglesia Apost6lica. He took
over publication of the periodical El Mensajero Apost6lica, which in 194 3 became El
Esegeta. Interested in education both of ministers and clergy, he organized the first Bible
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schools. In 1948, his son Manuel J. Gaxiola began to publish a Sunday School curriculum which evolved into Espositor Biblico Cristiano. In the midst of his pastoral, educational and publishing responsibilities, Maclovio Gaxiola published a systematic theology,
TeologiaMoral: Doctrinay DisciplinaCristiana (Mexico, D.F.: Libreria Apost6lica, 1962)
which for the first time offered a comprehensive systematic treatment of the Apostolic
theological perspective. This was followed by a history of the church: Historiade la Iglesia
Apost6licade la Fe en CristoJesus (Mexico, D.F.: Libreria Apost6lica, 1964).
The second section of the volume describes the process of theological development.
Beginning with a description of early Christian theology (perhaps the weakest part of the
volume), Gill narrates the development of "Oneness" theology in the U.S.A. before moving
to a perhaps too brief discussion of the Mexican context in chapter six (pp. 177-198). Here,
on the basis of materials published by the IglesiaApost6licaand interviews, Gill presents a
narrative of the development of the theological perspective of the tradition as it has wrestled with the harmonization of the liturgical, christological, and trinitarian doctrines. He
argues that the theologians of the IglesiaApost6licahave found ways to state these doctrines
which are within the framework established by the ante-Nicene church and that are not
incompatible with trends in contemporary theology. In this theological effort, Manuel
Gaxiola has been the major constructive theologian . As a theologian, ecumenist, and historian , he builds upon the base of his father's work and has published an impressive list of
scholarly books and articles, thirty of which are listed in Gill's bibliography. Most of the
anonymous official documents of the church also reflect significant, often determinative
input from Manuel Gaxiola and his father. Manuel Gaxiola, who also earned a doctorate at
the University of Birmingham under Hollenweger, is certainly one of the most prolific
Pentecostal historians and theologians.
The appendices to the book provide important organizational and credal documents, as well as information about two splinter denominations, the Iglesia Evangelica
Cristiana Espiritel and La Luz del Mundo. The classified bibliography will be an indispensable resource for scholarship on Mexican Pentecostalism and the index facilitates
access to the tome .
Gill's volume presents a carefully documented case study of theological development
within one "Third World" context which is both interesting and important . The Iglesia
Apost6lica has grown into one of the largest Mexican non-Catholic denominations. As
such , it is a model for other traditions seeking to shed the vestiges of European and
U.S.A. cultural structures in light of their own reading and living of the biblical narratives. The book will be an essential source for discussing the development of
Pentecostalism and the Holiness Movement outside the U.S.A.
DAVID BUNDY
Associate Professor of Church History
Christian Theological Seminary
Indianapolis , Indiana
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Poewe, Karla, ed., Charismatic Christianity as a Global Culture (Studies in Comparative
Religion; Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994). xiv, 300 pp.
This is a major effort to describe and analyze a reality apparent to observers of global Christianity; that is that the traditions first defined by the religious expressions of
the Mediterranean, Reformation, and North American mainline experience are being
circumvented or challenged by a new tradition, Pentecostalism. If David Barratt's statistics (Dictionary of Pentecostaland Charismatic Movements ( Grand Rapids: Zondervan,
1988) are anywhere close to accurate, even in a comparative sense, Pentecostalism and
the Charismatic groups have come to be the second largest Christian communion after
Roman Catholicism. The volume, edited by Karla Poewe, professor of anthropology at
the University of Calgary, is comprised of a collection of 11 essays by an international
team of 10 specialists in anthropology and religious studies.
The introduction by K. Poewe, exploring "the nature, globahty and history of
Charismatic Christianity," provides a phenomenological description of the data, asserts
its global expanse citing relevant sources, and attempts to provide a narrative of the
process of this expansion. This is probably the most problematic section of the book. To
take Chinese Christianity, for instance, directly from Jesuits and Pietists, to current
expressions of charismatic Christianity in China, without any attention to the American
and British mission efforts of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries and their
encounter with Pentecostalism, which has been documented by Daniel Bays, among
others, is not historically accurate. The influence of the independent, denominational or
para-church Holiness and Pentecostal missions never enters into the discussion.
It is not that this experience, which had established its own global dimension
before World War I, should be determinative for the interpretation of the whole, or
that the traditions, as they now stand, have not grown far beyond any American or
European beginnings. However, this lack of attention to the contribution of the
American experience of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as well as the complete lack of attention to European contributions, especially from England, Italy, and
Scandinavia, to the development of Pentecostalism and/or Charismatic religion seriously mars the book. It is highly improbable that early Pentecostal missionaries were
aware of M. Ricci, K.F. Gutzlaff, or even J. Gossner. It is certain that they knew
Phoebe Palmer, William Taylor, Sadar Sundu Singh, Charles Parham, William
Seymour, Oral Roberts, Jimmy Swaggert, William Branham, and Gordon Lindsay, as
well as T.B. Barratt, W.F.P. Burton, Lewi Pethrus, and Reinhard Bonnke. More appropriate is the emphasis on the "faith mission" tradition of Muller and James Hudson
Taylor who did become "icons" for the traditions.
This reviewer would want to argue with Poewe that Pietism had an important
influence on the development of Pentecostalism, but that it was filtered through the
American and European Holiness and Pentecostal experience. After it was exported,
the nexus of ideas and methods which are part of these spiritual traditions, achieved a
life of their own. The American and European Holiness and Pentecostal experience
liberated, for better or worse, the ideas of personal piety accompanied by an empirically verifiable response to the perception of the presence of God in the believer 's life
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and the accompanying need for "social holiness" from the necessity of direct connection to established ecclesiastical traditions. Thus for example, in Latin America and
Africa, the "Charismatic religion " did not originate with the results of German
Lutheran mission, but developed quite apart from these churches with primary impetus from other traditions. In Poewe's defense, however, it must be said that scholars of
Pentecostalism in its global forms have often forgotten the complex European heritage which lies behind their own ideas . Poewe's formulation may help us to work
toward a more adequate understanding of the tradition.
The first section of the volume deals with methods and models. Andre Droogers,
University of Amsterdam, explores from a sociological perspective, "why and in what
sense religious experiences are or are not normal (p . 3)." Irving Hexham and K.
Poewe present an enlightening study analyzing how the Pentecostal and Charismatic
churches in South Africa were treated by both the media and by the extreme right and
left position in the apartheid struggle.
The second section contains articles on Latin America (David Martin), a groundbreaking study of Korean Pentecostal Missions to Japan (Mark A. Mullins, Meiji
Gakuin University, Tokyo) which suggests many new avenues of research, and a
review of the discussions about the relationship between Pentecostalism and
Fundamentalism by Russell Spittler.
The third section explores the process by which "orality" was turned into "literary
narrative ." Charles Nienkirchen contributes an important essay in which are
described the "conflicting visions of the past" in the "prophetic use of history in the
early American Pentecostal-Charismatic movements (p. 119)." The essay by Nancy
Schwartz is a pioneering analysis of the Legio Maria, a large independent "charismatic" Catholic church in western Kenya and Tanzania where she has done research
since 1982 and related to her still unpublished Princeton Ph .D. dissertation. Stanley
Johannesen, University of Waterloo, presented case studies on the development of
"third generation Pentecostal Language (pp . 175-199)," which attempts to suggest
alternatives to the influential analysis of Jean-Daniel Pluss based on Riccour and literary theory.
Walter Hollenweger, professor emeritus, University of Birmingham, contributed an
important article directed more toward Pentecostals in the so-called "first world" than
to anthropologists and sociologists. He deplores the tendency to "ruthlessly" transform oral narratives to written forms which become exclusionary rather than inclusionary. He insists that "privileged Pentecostals and scholars must learn to speak in,
and listen to stories (p. 200)."
The final essays in the section entitled "Charismatic Christian Thought," were con·
tributed by G. Roelofs , graduate student at the University of Amsterdam, who exam·
ines the use of orality and language in Flemish (Belgian) charismatic groups, and by
Karla Poewe who, in an extremely important methodological and programmatic article, urges a "rethinki ng [of] the relationship of anthropology to science and religion:
This chapter alone is worth the price of the volume.
This volume is indeed a tour def orce. Each essay is a significant contribution to
understanding religious life in the contemporary world . It models a multi-disciplinar y
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approach to the study of Pentecostalism and Charismatic Christianity and removes it
from the exclusive province of historians and theologians . Quite appropriately, histo rians and theologians will need to be aware of the theories and analytical results of
sociological and anthropological study . These can probably be brought to new levels
of sophistication by an awareness of the diachronic narrative of the tradition being
studied . As Poewe suggests, those inside and outside the traditions can make complementary contributions to the study of this very interesting, complicated, and multilayered expression of religious beliefs .

DAVID BUNDY

Associate Professor of Church History
Christian Theological Seminary
Indianapolis, Indiana

